Skip to main content

A.C. Graham on Rationalism, Irrationalism, and Anti-Rationalism (“Aware Spontaneity”)

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Critics of Enlightenment Rationalism Revisited

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism ((PASTCL))

  • 270 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter examines the views of the twentieth-century sinologist/philosopher A.C. Graham on the differences between anti-rationalism and irrationalism, and obviously, rationalism as well. Although Graham draws upon the insights of the classic Doaist work Zhuangzi as inspiration, he does not make very much of this comparison explicitly, not wanting (one assumes) to detract from his philosophical argument in Reason and Spontaneity (1985), his major philosophic work. Although this work draws comparisons and contrasts far and wide to make a case for what Graham calls “aware spontaneity” as the most appropriate human mixture of reason and unreflective impulse, this short chapter will focus on the differences between what Graham calls the “Reason as Guide” approach (e.g., Zhuangzi and Graham) and the “Reason as Master” approach (e.g., Kant, Descartes, Plato) to action, with both distinguished from the romantic irrationalist approach cultivating spontaneous impulse for its sheer intensity (e.g., de Sade, Nietzsche). This would seem a most fitting subject for this series of studies in Enlightenment criticism, and, in conclusion, will very briefly note similarities between Graham’s and Oakeshott’s critiques of rationalism (the latter of whose views I examined in the first volume of this edited work).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a lengthy, sympathetic yet critical review of Reason and Spontaneity, see Yukio Kachi, review of Reason and Spontaneity in Philosophy East and West (Vol. 40, No. 3, 1990, 389–398), whose main criticism is that Graham so weakens the concepts of end, choice, reason, and awareness that he cannot distinguish human (from non-human) ways of being aware. Kachi also cites sources which question some of Graham’s use of The Zhuangzi in expounding his idea of aware spontaneity.

  2. 2.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, vii.

  3. 3.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 7.

  4. 4.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, vii.

  5. 5.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, vii.

  6. 6.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 159.

  7. 7.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 171, 165.

  8. 8.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 164.

  9. 9.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 164.

  10. 10.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 165.

  11. 11.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 169.

  12. 12.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 187.

  13. 13.

    Quoted in Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 187.

  14. 14.

    Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 188.

  15. 15.

    Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen and Co., 1962), 61–62.

  16. 16.

    For an instance of this view, see R. Ames, ed., Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 220, 226.

  17. 17.

    For more on this see A. Botwinik, Michael Oakeshott’s Skepticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 140: “The optimal self for Oakeshott is one characterized by a reduced self-consciousness that allows for the play of different impulses and an ongoing process of self-discovery.” See also, for parallels between Oakeshott and Zhuangzi (and Confucius), the essays by Cheung in W. J. Coats and Chor-yung Cheung, The Poetic Character of Human Activity (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).

  18. 18.

    A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1929).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to W. J. Coats .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Coats, W.J. (2022). A.C. Graham on Rationalism, Irrationalism, and Anti-Rationalism (“Aware Spontaneity”). In: Callahan, G., McIntyre, K.B. (eds) Critics of Enlightenment Rationalism Revisited. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05226-2_16

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics