Experiences, Objectivity, and Collective Action in Feminism: A Pragmatist Analysis

Abstract

Pragmatism, as a method to clarify our ideas, can provide useful tools to feminist theories. Among these, standpoint theories claim that knowledge productions are socially situated, and that starting from the standpoint of women provides access to aspects of reality that cannot be captured by dominant groups. In doing so, they assume a relatively homogeneous experience and perspective of the subject “women”. Conversely, post-modern critiques have highlighted the singularity and importance of individual experiences. The point of this chapter is to maintain both the possibility of a common representation of experience and the differences among women, in other words to combine the objectivity of representation with an epistemic pluralism. First, I come back to standpoint theories and their definition of objectivity, to explain why this concept cannot simply be dismissed as a criterion for knowledge. Then I study how Dewey’s immediate empiricism makes it possible to attribute an epistemic value to particular “subjective” experience. Finally, I propose a comparison between Dewey’s idea of the “public” and Iris Marion Young’s concept of the “series” in an attempt to understand how a political and epistemic group can be built upon a truly shared experience, which does not assume a homogeneity of identities or experiences.