Abstract
This introduction gives a brief orientation in current literature on Wittgenstein and ethics, and situates the present volume in the rich tradition of writing about ethics in the wake of Wittgenstein from the 1960s onwards, engaging the pioneering work of Stanley Cavell, Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, D. Z. Phillips, R. F. Holland, Raimond Gaita, and Cora Diamond, among others. It reviews a range of themes and features that are recurrent in the essays of the collection as well as in the tradition. These include a prominent and distinctive role for examples; the use of a “philosophical we”; an emphasis on philosophical investigations as “grammatical” rather than empirical or historical; a distinctive attempt to situate discourse beyond the dualism of relativism and objectivism/universalism; an emphasis on the personal in ethics; and a concern for moral “seriousness”. We indicate how contributions in the book embody these emphases, but also where they offer further developments and re-interpretations, especially on issues regarding conceptual and moral change.
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Notes
- 1.
Nussbaum (2001) groups Cora Diamond with other late-twentieth-century “anti-Kantian” thinkers, who, in her view, are involved in an attack on rational (universalist) exploration in ethics.
- 2.
For critical responses to O’Neill, see Diamond (1991, 26–29 and 291–308).
- 3.
Both Cook’s criticism of relativism and his characterisation of moral life have much in common with Michele Moody-Adams’s account (Moody-Adams 1997), with the distinction that the latter finds her main points of sympathetic reference in the pragmatist tradition. For a characterisation and critique of some implications of this context-sensitive universalism in the Wittgensteinian tradition, see Hämäläinen 2020.
- 4.
Cf. an analogous case made by Burley (2020) in favour of a “radically pluralist” (Wittgensteinian) philosophy of religion that does not downplay the differences between religious standpoints but instead “dramatises” them as fully and faithfully as possible.
- 5.
The troublemaking nature of the demand of “seriousness” is exemplified in Rhees’ writings on euthanasia, abortion etc. (Rhees 1999a, essays 11–14). He fully recognises the weight of considerations (such as the “sanctity of life”) motivating the conservative standpoint towards these issues, yet is very clearly, even abrasively unwilling to embrace this standpoint - which has an almost paralysing effect on him.
- 6.
The example of murder has a particular importance for Wittgensteinian ethicists, due to its special character - committing a single murder makes one a murderer (as observed by Winch (1972c, 147)) in a way incomparable to how telling a single lie would make one a liar (it doesn’t really). Taking one’s actions and character traits and their impact seriously, however, doesn’t concern only extreme cases such as murder.
- 7.
Cf. Gaita’s (2006b) discussion of torture; his position in this case shows clearly that Wittgensteinian criticisms of “fearless thinking” reach deeper than, and are not exhausted by, aspects and topics about which there would be an easy agreement with religious conservatives.
- 8.
Ondřej Beran and Nora Hämäläinen’s work on this text was supported by the project “Centre for Ethics as Study in Human Value” (project No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/15_003/0000425, Operational Programme Research, Development and Education, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund and the state budget of the Czech Republic).
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Salskov, S.A., Beran, O., Hämäläinen, N. (2022). Ethical Inquiries After Wittgenstein: Introduction. In: Aldrin Salskov, S., Beran, O., Hämäläinen, N. (eds) Ethical Inquiries after Wittgenstein. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98084-9_1
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