Abstract
International environmental law is rightly perceived as one of the most challenging fields for the secondary rules governing State responsibility. In particular, the conditions for establishing how the critical obligation of States to prevent environmental harm has been breached remain rather obscure. The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the UN ILC in 2001, do not help to clarify the issue of whether preventive commitments of States in the field of environmental protection can be classified as obligations of conduct, of result, or otherwise. Considering the poor conceptualization of the matter in the ILC Articles, very little can be expected from the test of judicial application to which the same Articles are currently submitted. Nonetheless, recent international case law in environmental matters reveals that international judges are inclined to rest on the qualification of the States’ obligations to prevent environmental harm as one of conduct or of due diligence and to elaborate about the conditions governing the breach of such obligation. The present contribution aims at revisiting the issue of the breach of the obligation to prevent environmental damage in light of recent international case law and to assess its relevance for the process of the codification of State responsibility.
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Notes
- 1.
See Scovazzi (2001), p. 43 (“[i]nternational responsibility for environmental harm is commonly considered to be a complex issue for its substantive, procedural, and even terminological intricacies”).
- 2.
See recently Koskenniemi (2020), p. xi (holding, with reference to special regimes of international environmental law, that “State responsibility is a blunt tool. It has been impossible to apply it in a globally uniform way”). See also Nègre (2010), p. 804 (“International responsibility is thus not well-adapted to the environmental field”).
- 3.
See Trial Smelter Case (United States of America v. Canada), Award of 16 April 1938, 11 March 1941, reprinted in 1950. Reports of International Arbitral Awards 3:1911, at p. 1965; Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, Principle 21, reprinted in 1972. International Legal Materials 11:1416, p. 1420. See also the International Court of Justice relevant case law, referred to infra, note 59.
- 4.
Scovazzi (2001), p. 46.
- 5.
Ago (1991), pp. 498:
Il faut surtout –je sais que je me repète– faire entrer avec une nouvelle fermeté les atteintes portées à la preservation de l’environnement non plus dans le domaine des agissements tolérés comme licites, mais dans celui des faits ouvertements définis comme internationalement illicites.
- 6.
Ibidem, pp. 495–496: “Ce qu’on lui reproche [=à l’Etat] … c’est d’avoir négligé, par défaut de vigilance, de prévenir le dit fait. Cela crée à sa charge une source autonome de responsabilité internationale”.
- 7.
Ibidem, p. 496: “[o]n revient ainsi à l’hypothèse de base de la responsabilité pour fait internationalement illicite, avec toutes les consequences de droit qui en découlent”.
- 8.
See the text of the ARSIWA, with relevant commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) [hereinafter ILC Report 2001], in YILC, 2001, vol. II, pt. 2, p. 26 ff. See also General Assembly Res. A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001, where the GA
takes note of the articles on responsibility of States for international wrongful acts presented by the International Law Commission, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution, and commends them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action (para 3).
- 9.
See, for Draft Articles 20 and 21, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its twenty-ninth session”, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission [hereinafter YILC], 1977, vol. II, pt. two, pp. 9–11; for Draft Article 23 “Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its thirtieth session”, YILC, 1978, vol. II, pt. two [hereinafter “ILC Report 1978”] pp. 78–70.
- 10.
See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-eighth session, in YILC, 1996, vol. II, pt. two, pp. 60–61.
- 11.
See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-eighth session, in YILC, 1999, vol. II, pt. two, [hereinafter “ILC Report 1999”], pp. 50–63.
- 12.
The text of the Draft Articles on Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, adopted by the ILC in 2001, is annexed to GA Res. A/RES/62/68 of 6 December 2007, whereby the General Assembly “commended the articles … to the attention of Governments, without prejudice to any future action, as recommended by the Commission regarding the articles” (para 3).
- 13.
See the text in ILC Report 2001, p. 59.
- 14.
See recently GA Res. A/RES/74/180 of 18 December 2019, in which the General Assembly decided to postpone to its seventy-seventh session of 2022 “the question of a convention on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts or other appropriate action on the basis of the articles” (para 9).
- 15.
Ibidem, paras 4 and 5.
- 16.
For a recent stocktaking on the matter see Paddeu (2018), p. 83 ff.
- 17.
See the reports by the Secretary-General, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Compilation of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies, UN Doc. A/62/62 (1 February 2007) plus A/62/62/Add. 1 (17 April 2007); UN Doc. A/65/76 (30 April 2010); UN Doc. A/68/72 (30 April 2013); UN Doc. A/71/80 (21 April 2016) plus A/71/80/Add. 1 (20 June 2017); UN Doc. A/74/83 (23 April 2019).
- 18.
See UN Doc. A/62/62/Add.1, supra note 17, pp. 5–6 (referring to ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), judgment 26 February 2007, in ICJ Reports, 2007, p. 43 [hereinafter Genocide case]); UN Doc. A/68/72, supra note 17, p. 22 (referring to Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Castillo Gonzáles et al. v. Venezuela, judgment 27 November 2012 and to European Court of Human Rights, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. no. 39630/09, judgment 13 December 2012). Among these decisions, one (the Genocide case) is particularly pertinent for framing the issue of the breach of obligations of prevention and, while not concerning environmental matters, will be considered infra, under Sect. 3.
- 19.
See in particular: ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), judgment of 20 April 2010, in ICJ Reports, 2010, p. 14 [hereinafter Pulp Mills], para 187; International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chambers), Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, in ITLOS Reports, 2011, p. 10 [hereinafter Responsibilities of States in the Area], para 110; ICJ, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica), judgment of 16 December 2015, in ICJ Reports, 2015, p. 665 [hereinafter Certain Activities/Construction of a Road], para 104; Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of The Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), Award of 12 July 2016, reprinted in 2020. Reports of International Arbitral Awards 33:155 [hereinafter South China Sea], para 944; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Environment and Human Rights (States Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to the Personal Integrity: Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 of 15 November 2017. www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_23_ing.pdf. [hereinafter Environment and Human Rights], para 143.
- 20.
See ICJ, Pulp Mills and Certain Activities/Construction of a Road cases referred to in previous footnote.
- 21.
See Brunnée (2020), p. 155.
- 22.
- 23.
See text and related commentary in YILC, 1978, vol. II, pt. two, pp. 81–86.
- 24.
See R. Ago, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/302 and Add. 1–3, in YILC, 1977, vol. II, pt. one, p. 3 ff., respectively pp. 8 and 20 for the text of Draft Articles 20 (“Breach of an international obligation calling for the State to adopt a specific course of conduct”) and 21 (“Breach of an international obligation requiring the State to achieve a particular result”) submitted by the Special Rapporteur.
- 25.
Ibidem, p. 4, para 2. See also on this distinction Ago (1939), pp. 506–511.
- 26.
See Ago, Sixth Report, supra note 24, p. 4, para 4.
- 27.
Ibidem, pp. 4–5, para 4 and p. 8, paras 14–15.
- 28.
Ibidem, p. 4, para 3:
In the former case, the obligations are laid upon the State, requiring it to take or refraining from taking some specific action: for example, to adopt or to refrain from adopting a specific legislative, administrative or judicial act. In the latter case, international law, concerned with respect of the internal freedom of the State, merely requires the State to ensure a particular situation or result and leaves it free to do so by whatever means it chooses.
The approach above described is explicitly borrowed by Ago from Anzilotti (1906), p. 26, but it was shared among Italian scholars during the twentieth century: for an overview see Marchesi (2004), pp. 828–834.
- 29.
Ago, Sixth Report, supra note 24, p. 8, para 12:
It might, however, be wiser to speak more precisely, with regard to the first category, of ‘obligations of specific conduct’, for even in the case of ‘obligations of result’ it is still the ‘conduct’ of the State which is required in order to ensure the required result.
- 30.
Ibidem, especially footnote 27. On this aspect see further infra, note 46 and accompanying text.
- 31.
In particular Paul Reuter, while basically endorsing the distinction proposed by the Special Rapporteur, suggested that a third category of obligations “at a lower degree of precision” can also be identified: referring to obligations which required of the State neither specific acts nor definite results, but an attitude conducive to a result which was not mandatory, Reuter made as a relevant example the general obligation to be vigilant. See Summary records of the twenty-ninth session, 9 May-29 July 1977, 1455th Mtg., in YILC, 1977, vol. I., p. 219, paras 8–9.
- 32.
Ago, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/307 and Add. 1-2, in YILC, 1978, vol. II, pt. one, p. 31 ff, at 37 for the text of Draft Article 23 submitted by Ago.
- 33.
Ibidem, p. 32, paras 1 and 2.
- 34.
Ibidem, para 3.
- 35.
See Summary records of the thirtieth session, 8 May-28 July 1978, in YILC, 1978, vol. I, the statements by Reuter (1476th and 1478th Mtgs, respectively p. 7, paras 21–23 and 14, paras 6–7), Díaz González (1477th Mtg., p. 9, para 2), El-Erian (1478th Mtg., p. 15, para 9), Vallat (1478th Mtg., p. 9, para 14).
- 36.
Ibidem, 1478th Mtg., p. 18, para 36.
- 37.
In this respect, the Special Rapporteur unequivocally pointed out that “there were obligations of due diligence that were obligations of conduct, and which might therefore be said to have been breached by the mere fact that requisite due diligence had not been exercised” (ibidem).
- 38.
See ibidem, 1513th Mtg., pp. 206–208, in particular the report of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee on Draft Article 23 and the adoption of the text by the Commission.
- 39.
See ILC Report 1978, p. 81, para 1 and p. 85, para 15.
- 40.
Ibidem, p. 82, para 4.
- 41.
Ibidem, pp. 82–83, para 6.
- 42.
Ibidem, p. 82, para 4, fn 397.
- 43.
See respectively the comment on Draft Article 23 made by Austria and Mali, Observations and comments of Governments on chapters I, II and III of part I of the Draft Articles on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, UN Doc. A/CN.4/328 and Add. 1-4, in YILC, 1980, vol. II, pt. one, respectively pp. 92–93 and p. 101.
- 44.
See supra note 10.
- 45.
See State responsibility. Comments and observations received from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, in YILC, 1998, vol. I, pt. one, pp. 123–124, in particular the criticisms expressed by Denmark, on behalf of Nordic Countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark), Germany and France.
- 46.
See Crawford, Second report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/498 and Add. 1-4, in YILC, 1999, vol. II, pt. one, 21–22, paras 57–58. This point is built on the famous argument developed by Combacau (1981), pp. 194–199. See also Dupuy (1999), pp. 374–378; Economides (2010), pp. 375–376. Compare the position of Ago referred to supra note 30 and accompanying text.
- 47.
Ibidem, pp. 22–24, paras 60–68.
- 48.
Ibidem, pp. 26–27, paras 26–27, paras 77–79.
- 49.
Ibidem, pp. 27–28, paras 81–87.
- 50.
Ibidem, p. 29, paras 90–91, for the Crawford conclusion that “the case for deletion is a formidable one”. Alternatively, the Special Rapporteur suggested dealing with the issue at stake in a single, consolidated, provision (see ibidem, p. 44 for his proposal of a new Draft Article 20 dealing with “obligations of conduct and obligations of result”).
- 51.
See ILC Report 1999, pp. 59–61, especially paras 147–150 and 163.
- 52.
See Summary records of the meetings of the fifty-first session 3 May-23 July 1999, in YILC, 1999, vol. I, 2571st Mtg., pp. 29–35, 2573rd Mtg., pp. 41–44, and 2574th Mtg., pp. 48–49, especially the statements of Rao (p. 33, para 43) and Yamada (p. 41, para 6).
- 53.
See the text in ILC Report 2001, p. 54 (emphasis added).
- 54.
Ibidem, pp. 56–57, para 11 of the commentary to Article 12.
- 55.
See supra text accompanying note 13.
- 56.
ILC Report 2001, p. 62, para 14 of the commentary to Article 14 (emphasis added).
- 57.
Ibidem (emphasis added).
- 58.
See references supra notes 47 and 54. See further ILC Report 1999, p. 59, paras 148–149 and p. 63, para 186.
- 59.
See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, at pp. 241–242 para 29 (considering that
[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment);
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 78, para 140 (holding that
in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage).
- 60.
See Genocide, supra note 18.
- 61.
Ibidem, p. 220, para 429.
- 62.
Ibidem, p. 220, para 430 (emphasis added).
- 63.
- 64.
Genocide pp. 221–222, para 431.
- 65.
Milanović (2007), p. 687. See Gattini (2014), pp. 36–37 and 45–46, holding that “the partial contradiction in which the ICJ entangles itself in the Genocide case of 2007… was due to the Court explicit qualification of the obligation at stake as an obligation of means”. Also Crawford (2013), pp. 231–232, appears to note the apparent contradiction of the ICJ reasoning in the Genocide case.
- 66.
For a detailed account of the factual and legal background of the case see Pulp Mills case, pp. 31–40, paras 25–46.
- 67.
Ibidem, pp. 47–48, paras 67–74.
- 68.
Ibidem, p. 49, para 78.
- 69.
Ibidem, para 79.
- 70.
Ibidem, p. 58, para 111 (concerning the breach of the obligation to inform the joint commission before the issuing under domestic law of initial environmental authorizations for the two mills), p. 60, para 122 (concerning the breach of the obligation to notify Argentina through the joint commission about the planned measures), p. 68, para 149 (concerning the obligation to negotiate) and p. 70, para 158 (concerning the overall breach of procedural obligations by Uruguay).
- 71.
See in particular p. 86, para 214, and p. 101, para 265 (for the finding that there is no conclusive evidence that Uruguay has not acted with the requisite degree of due diligence or that the discharges from the mills had deleterious effects or caused damage).
- 72.
See Kerbrat (2018a), p. 11 (“La distinction… s’avère fragile”).
- 73.
See Besson (2020), p. 326 (“cette distinction est largement intenable en soi”).
- 74.
See the elaborate treatment of this point by Brunnée (2020), pp. 142–147.
- 75.
Pulp Mills, pp. 55–56, para 101. This statement is included in the “procedural” part of the analysis made by the Court, concerning Uruguay’s obligation to inform the joint commission. Similar expressions are found in the “substantive” part of the judgment, where it is stated that
[a]n obligation to adopt regulatory or administrative measures either individually or jointly and to enforce them is an obligation of conduct. Both Parties are therefore called upon (…) to exercise due diligence in acting through the Commission for the necessary measures to preserve the ecological balance of the river (ibidem, p. 77, para 187);
and that
the obligation to ‘preserve the aquatic environment, and in particular to prevent pollution by prescribing appropriate rules and measures’ is an obligation to act with due diligence in respect to all activities which take place under the jurisdiction and control of each party (ibidem, p. 79, para 197).
- 76.
Plakokefalos (2012), pp. 23–24.
- 77.
Ibidem, pp. 59–60, para 119.
- 78.
Ibidem, p. 60, paras 121–122.
- 79.
Ibidem, p. 83, para 204.
- 80.
Ibidem, para 205.
- 81.
Ibidem, pp. 84–86 paras 207–214.
- 82.
See the joint dissenting opinion of judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma appended to the judgment in Pulp Mills, questioning that “the conclusion whereby non-compliance with pertinent procedural obligations has eventually no effect on compliance with the substantive obligations is a proposition that cannot easily be accepted” (ICJ Reports, 2010, p. 120, para 26).
- 83.
See reference supra note 79 and accompanying text.
- 84.
Pulp Mills, p. 49, para 77.
- 85.
See Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, respectively p. 705, para 100 (introducing the section devoted to Nicaragua violations arising from dredging activities) and p. 718, para 145 (introducing the section on the alleged breaches by Costa Rica in connection with the construction of a road).
- 86.
See ibidem, respectively p. 710, para 112, and pp. 725–726, para 173.
- 87.
See ibidem, respectively p. 712, para 120, and p. 737, para 217.
- 88.
See ibidem, respectively p. 706, para 104 (concerning “certain activities”), and p. 720, para 153 (concerning “construction of a road”).
- 89.
Ibidem.
- 90.
Ibidem, p. 707, para 105.
- 91.
Ibidem, p. 708, para 108.
- 92.
Ibidem, p. 720, para 154.
- 93.
Ibidem, pp. 720–721, para 155–156.
- 94.
Ibidem, pp. 722–723, para 161.
- 95.
See the separate opinion of Judge Donoghue appended to the judgement (ibidem, p. 786, para 15). See also Bendel and Harrison (2017), p. 14.
- 96.
It can be contested whether this purpose can be served by a reminder in the sense that “[d]etermination of the content of the environmental impact assessment should be made in light of the specific circumstances of each case”: noteworthily, this reminder is followed by the full quotation of the paragraph of Pulp Mills underscoring that it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation the specific content of EIA (see Certain Activities/Construction of a Road p. 707, para 105 and supra note 80 and accompanying text).
- 97.
Certain Activities/Construction of a Road p. 720, para 154.
- 98.
See on this point the separate opinion of Judge Donoghue (ibidem, p. 787–788, paras 16–24).
- 99.
On this account, Judge Donoghue in her separate opinion criticised the utility of the distinction between procedural and substantive obligations made by the Court (ibidem p. 765, para 9).
- 100.
See supra note 87.
- 101.
Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, p. 712, para 119. In the same vein, the Court excluded the violation of substantive obligations by Costa Rica on the account that “Nicaragua has not established that the fact that sediment concentrations in the river increased as the result of the construction of a road in and of itself caused significant transboundary harm” (ibidem, p. 731, para 196).
- 102.
Ibidem, p. 743, para 207.
- 103.
Ibidem, p. 736, para 213.
- 104.
See Maljean-Dubois (2018), pp. 155–156 (“la Cour recherche si le Costa Rica a causé un dommage, et non s’il a mis en œuvre toutes les mesures pour éviter un dommage… le raisonnement de la Cour laisse à penser qu’un dommage est requis pour constater la violations des secondes [obligations substantielles]”).
- 105.
See supra notes 39–41.
- 106.
See Article 139, para 1, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 107.
See Responsibilities of States in the Area, p. 41, para 110 (emphasis added). This analysis of the scope and meaning of obligations of conduct and due diligence obligations was to be reasserted some years later by the ITLOS in the case Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (SFRC) (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted to the Tribunal), Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015, in ITLOS Reports, 2015, p. 4, at 40, para 39.
- 108.
See supra text accompanying note 46.
- 109.
See Responsibilities of States in the Area, p. 41, para 111 and p. 42, para 115, quoting respectively paras 187 and 197 of Pulp Mills.
- 110.
Responsibilities of States in the Area, p. 43, para 117.
- 111.
Ibidem, pp. 43–44, paras 118–120. The Chamber refers to the obligation of the sponsoring State to adopt “laws and regulations… and administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction”, provided for by Article 153, para 4 and Annex III, Article 4, para 4, UNCLOS. The content of the measures required for sponsoring States is further explored in the appropriate part of the advisory opinion (ibidem, pp. 68–69, paras 218–221 and pp. 70–73, paras 227–241). Interestingly, although the Chamber repeatedly underscores that “the scope and the extent of the laws and regulations and administrative measures required depend upon the legal system of the sponsoring State”, it also points out “the existence of such laws, regulations and administrative measures… is a necessary requirement for compliance with the obligation of due diligence of the sponsoring State” (ibidem, p. 68, paras 218–219).
- 112.
Ibidem, p. 44, paras 121–122.
- 113.
Ibidem, p. 44, para 123 (emphasis added).
- 114.
Ibidem, pp. 50–51, paras 145–148.
- 115.
Ibidem, p. 51, para 149.
- 116.
See Plakokefalos (2012), p. 34 (who speaks in this respect of “the first clear statement by an international tribunal on the content of a due diligence obligation to ensure that no environmental harm will occur from a certain type of activity”).
- 117.
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text, for Ago’s suggestion that due diligence obligations cannot be considered as obligations to prevent a given event, insofar as they impose on States, the adoption of a particular form of conduct.
- 118.
See Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Final Award of 2 July 2003, reprinted in (2004) Reports of International Arbitral Awards 23:159, paras 132–137.
- 119.
See Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway (The Kingdom of Belgium v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands), Award of 24 May 2005, reprinted in (2007) Reports of International Arbitral Awards 35:27, paras 59 and 222.
- 120.
Indus Water Kishenganga Arbitration (The Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. The Republic of India), Partial Award of 18 February 2013, reprinted in (2018) Reports of International Arbitral Awards 31:55, paras 447–452.
- 121.
See for the factual background of this part of the dispute South China Sea, paras 815–890.
- 122.
Ibidem, para 941.
- 123.
Ibidem:
Thus States have a positive ‘duty to prevent, or at least mitigate significant harm to the environment when pursuing large-scale construction activities’. The Tribunal considers this duty informs the scope of the general obligation in Article 192 [UNCLOS].
The Tribunal cited in this respect an excerpt from the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (see supra note 120).
- 124.
Ibidem, para 944.
- 125.
Ibidem, para 956.
- 126.
Ibidem, para 959. The Tribunal referred here to the specific wording of Article 194, para 5, UNCLOS.
- 127.
Ibidem, paras 964–966.
- 128.
Ibidem, para 983.
- 129.
- 130.
On opinion OC-23/17 see the contribution by Elena Carpanelli in this book.
- 131.
Environment and human rights, paras 123–241.
- 132.
Ibidem, paras 123–124.
- 133.
In particular, the Inter-American has considered the following general environmental obligations: the obligation of prevention (which encompasses a specific duty to require and approve environmental impact assessments); the precautionary principle; the obligation of cooperation (which encompasses both the duty to notify and the duty to consult and negotiate); and procedural obligations (which include subjects such as access to information, public participation and access to justice in environmental matters). It is interesting to compare this approach with the categorization of substantive and procedural obligations adopted by the ICJ in Pulp Mills.
- 134.
Environment and human rights, paras 142–143.
- 135.
Ibidem, paras 144–145.
- 136.
Ibidem, para 147.
- 137.
Ibidem, para 149 (“this Court considers that States, taking into account the existing level of risk, must regulate activities that could cause significant environmental damage in a way that reduce any threat to the rights to life and to personal integrity”).
- 138.
Ibidem, para 150.
- 139.
Ibidem, paras 156–169.
- 140.
Ibidem, para 170.
- 141.
See supra text accompanying notes 47 and 51.
- 142.
This of course raises the problem of the significance that an inquiry limited to a particular field of international relations may have from the point of view of the general secondary rules on State responsibility. With all due caution, we can simply note that—as suggested for example by the advisory opinion OC-23/17 of the Inter-American Court of Human in respect to due diligence obligations (see Environment and Human Rights, paras 123–124)—some of the general findings formulated by judges concerning the nature and the character of the obligation of States to prevent transboundary harm may be also transferred to other fields of international law where preventive obligations are at work.
- 143.
See especially the ITLOS advisory opinion Responsibilities of States in the Area, supra note 107 and accompanying text.
- 144.
See Genocide, supra notes 62–63; Pulp Mills, supra note 75; Certain Activities/Construction of a Road, supra note 88; Responsibilities of States in the Area, supra notes 109–110; South China Sea, supra note 124; Environment and Human Rights, supra note 134.
- 145.
Ago, Seventh Report, supra note 32, p. 34, para 11.
- 146.
See for example supra text accompanying notes 95, 116–117.
- 147.
See especially Besson (2020), pp. 256–257, 263–264 and 325–326.
- 148.
As already pointed out, these methodological questions mainly consist of splitting the unitary principle of prevention into a bundle of separate and unconnected procedural and substantive obligations: see references supra notes 72–74.
- 149.
See again in this respect the outcomes of the Pulps Mills and Certain activities/Construction of a road cases and compare the different assessment of obligations of procedure and substance respectively made by the ICJ and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.2.3.
- 150.
Gautier (2012), p. 862. There could be some irony in finding that the logic behind this quotation is not so far from the perspective adopted by Roberto Ago when, in outlining the distinction between obligations of conduct and of result, he suggested using the “determinacy” of the primary obligation at stake as a guiding factor for classification (supra notes 29–37).
- 151.
Gaja (2014), p. 990.
- 152.
Brunnée (2020), p. 155. See also supra text accompanying notes 55–57.
- 153.
See supra section 3.1.1.
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Acknowledgment
The author wishes to thank Dr. Alice Ollino for her invaluable comments on an earlier version of the text. All errors remain the author’s sole responsibility.
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Arcari, M. (2022). The Breach of the Obligation to Prevent Environmental Harm and the Law of State Responsibility. In: Arcari, M., Papanicolopulu, I., Pineschi, L. (eds) Trends and Challenges in International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94387-5_7
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