Abstract
Extended Mind is usually understood to be a claim about cognitive extension, that is, it is usually understood to be the claim that the boundaries of the mind can occasionally extend to include objects in the environment. This chapter will argue that understanding Extended Mind in this way helps zero in on how this claim should be defended. For example, Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) Parity Principle (PP) states that if bodily external objects play roles functionally equivalent to processes inside the head, and those in-the-head processes are regarded as cognitive, then those bodily external objects should be regarded as playing cognitive roles as well. If Clark and Chalmers are correct, then PP can be used to defend Extended Mind. As this chapter will show, the pivotal role PP plays becomes apparent when we consider what happens when PP is either minimized, as is the case with second wave Extended Mind, or removed altogether, as is the case with third wave Extended Mind, since it can be doubted that either of these two readings are in fact readings of Extended Mind. Third wave, in particular, may need to be understood in entirely different terms. This suggests that if Extended Mind is understood to be a claim about cognitive extension, then PP should be regarded as key to defending that claim.
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Notes
- 1.
Section “Second Wave Extended Mind” of this chapter only focuses on Sutton’s version of second wave. Another version of second wave not considered here is Menary’s Cognitive Integration view (see Menary 2010a, b). This is the view that “internal and external vehicles are integrated into a whole” (Menary 2006, p. 329) and “it is bodily manipulation of the external vehicles themselves… where the cognitive work gets done” (Menary 2010b, p. 240). For Menary, cognitive processes are thus hybrid processes that constitutively involve the bodily manipulation of external vehicles. Cognition then is an ability (or abilities) of an agent to manipulate their immediate environment. In light of the discussion in this chapter (see section “Third Wave Extended Mind”), Menary’s Cognitive Integration view would seem to be a Third Wave reading and so arguably incurs the problem facing other Third Wave readings, namely that it is not clear that it actually is a reading of EM.
- 2.
Note that this criticism of third wave does not consider many of the details of Kirchhoff and Kiversteins’ defense of Third Wave Extended Mind. For example, they appeal to predictive processing models of the mind and the role such modeling can play when considering whether or not the boundaries of the mind extend. However, determining whether or not these details can in fact resolve the criticism raised here is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
- 3.
Someone who pursues this line is Gallagher (2017). Indeed, Gallagher proposes to bring EM and enactivist views into alignment via a third wave reading of EM. Gallagher also shows the interesting overlap between EM and the work of various American Pragmatists. However, following the discussion in this chapter (see section “Third Wave Extended Mind”), it could be argued that there are problems both with linking third wave with EM and with linking it to enactivist proposals.
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Loughlin, V. (2022). Extended Mind. In: Glăveanu, V.P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_6
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