Abstract
Intentionality has been understood as the ability to think and behave in accordance with goals previously elaborated by the individual, or the teleological property of mind. In this sense, intentional mental states are typically characterized by displaying contents secondary to the achievement of cognitive and/or behavioral goals underlying the constitution of beliefs, judgments, desires, and expectations directed toward the external world or the subject itself. If, on the one hand, the philosophical interest in the theme goes back to the scholastics, in the scientific sphere, the first empirical research programs on the characteristics and functional role of intentionality for psychological functioning only started in the first decades of the last century. In this entry, the relationship between intentionality and the possible will be analyzed from the role played by intentionality in the formulation, execution, and evaluation of possible action plans. To this end, the rich intersection established between intentionality, free will, and context in determining action directions will be used as a background for the discussion of how the dimension of the possible is established in intentional action through the interaction between intentional autonomy, free choice, and socio-contextual events. Prior to this discussion, we will present a summary of the state of the art in philosophical and scientific studies about intentionality, aiming to provide introductory information about its ontological, neurocognitive, and conceptual characterization.
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Magalhães, J.H.G., de Araujo, J.P.M. (2022). Intentionality. In: Glăveanu, V.P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_210
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_210
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