Abstract
I investigate Du Châtelet’s contribution to the concept of time and position the relevance and content of that contribution between Leibniz and Kant. I argue that Du Châtelet advances Leibniz’s concept of time by explaining how we form the idea of time in our mind and how time as an ideal being relates to succession in real beings. I show that Du Châtelet, differently to Kant, recognizes the dependency of time in its constitution on succession in “real things” and that her concept of time is in this respect superior to Kant’s. With a detailed investigation into Du Châtelet’s notion of time in its own right and without prematurely “fitting” it into a defined debate between her contemporaries, I am aiming to reveal her original contribution to an understanding of time. I locate her concept of time in a context that is explicitly philosophical in terms of an investigation into how the idea of time is formed and constituted rather than a physical debate on the nature of time as a phenomenon relating to the movement of bodies.
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Notes
- 1.
This is Du Châtelet’s terminology.
- 2.
With a view to scholarship which positions Du Châtelet in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence within the context of the debate between Newton/Newtonianism and Leibniz/Leibnizianism and with regard to her relationship to Clarke from a historical point of view, see Hutton (2011). Hutton points to the fact that Du Châtelet placed much less emphasis on her theological argument on space and time in her 1742 edition of the Institutions de Physique than in her earlier edition of 1740, cp. Hutton (2011, 92).
- 3.
A very clear explanation of Leibniz’s defense against the Newtonian position on absolute space and time, of his theological argument as well as his argument based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason is to be found in Jeffrey McDonough (2014). McDonough’s elucidation also includes Leibniz’s defense based on the Principle of Indiscernibles, which I have left out here, since it pertains more to space than to time.
- 4.
Du Châtelet adopts the Principle of Sufficient Reason as well as the argument that time cannot share a quality with God. Thus, it is not surprising that she too argues that time is not a real being by repeating Leibniz’s two justifications for this assumption at the beginning of her chapter on time. Yet, following this brief introduction, which reads like a summary of Leibniz’s argument, she states that we can also conclude that time is not a real being by an analysis of our idea of time. This is an entirely new method for showing what time is and why time is not a real being. But I will come back to this in the second section.
- 5.
On the relationship of space and time to Leibniz’s monads in his mature metaphysics see Jeffrey McDonough (2014). He writes: “[…] space and time as “beings of reason” are in a sense at least two steps removed from the monads of his [Leibniz’s] mature metaphysics. (i) Although bodies may be held to stand in spatial and temporal relations to one another, Leibniz claims, space and time themselves must be considered abstractions or idealizations with respect to those relations. For while relations between bodies and events are necessarily variable and changing, the relations constituting space and time must be viewed as determinate, fixed, and ideal. (ii) As we have briefly noted, however, according to Leibniz's most mature metaphysics, physical bodies and events are themselves to be understood as merely well-founded phenomena. Relations of relative distance and duration holding between bodies must therefore themselves be a step removed from monadic reality, and thus space and time must be, as it were, a second step removed from the most basic non-relational entities of Leibniz’s most mature metaphysics”. McDonough (2014, Sect. 5.2).
- 6.
The argument is based on Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which is one of Leibniz’s most fundamental ontological principles and is also known as the “Leibniz law”. In short, it states that there cannot be two separate things which have all their properties in common.
- 7.
In the chapter on space, which simultaneously serves as an introduction to space and time, Du Châtelet clearly positions herself on Leibniz’s side having summarized the historical dispute on space and time and their ideality/reality (Inst1740eZ 5.74). The line of argumentation departs from Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason but then moves on to an ‘analysis of our ideas’. The clear accord with Leibniz should not be misread as a mere repetition of Leibniz’s works. Du Châtelet’s elucidation of time, in fact, continues on a very different path to that of Leibniz himself, while the emphasis on this being her own position remains subtle. Hecht (2019, 11) also emphasizes that Du Châtelet’s critique of Leibniz (or in this case the separation in the line of argumentation) remains subtle. Reichenberger (2011, 162f.) and Suisky (2011, 124–126) contend similarly that Du Châtelet comments on Leibniz’s statements in a way that changes their original meaning, while it is clear that the cause is not a misunderstanding, but a subtle distinction in her own standpoint.
- 8.
Reichenberger (2016) discusses Du Châtelet’s concepts of time and space in the context of the law of inertia. She draws attention to the fact that a detailed investigation of the relationship of Du Châtelet’s concepts of space and time to the Living forces debate is yet to be undertaken and is an important desideratum in scholarship on Du Châtelet. Nevertheless, it will become clear in the following article that Du Châtelet’s concept of time is not merely of interest in view of her concept of force and within her theory of mechanics, but rather is of philosophical interest in its own right, independent of physical debates relating to it.
- 9.
Du Châtelet does not reflect on the method she uses to determine time independently of her investigation of time. Yet her method is clearly indicated by her statement “[…] we are going to see, by the analysis of our ideas, that time is only an abstract being […]” Inst1740eZ 6.96 as well as “when we pay attention to the links between our ideas, we grasp that in the abstract notion of time the mind only considers beings in general […]” Inst1740eZ, 6.98, emphasis added.
- 10.
Du Châtelet adheres to the distinction made between contingent and necessary truths by Leibniz. Yet she determines that contingency is given “when a thing can exist in various ways”, as opposed to necessary truths, which can only be determined in a single way. See Inst1740eZ 1.7.
- 11.
The passage in the original French 1740 is: “Dans la durée [on confidère simplement] l’ordre des choses successives, entant qu’elles se succedent, en faisant abstraction de toute autre qualité interne que la simple succession” (Inst1740). Du Châtelet uses the word “choses” in this context. It is translated as “beings” by Bour and Zinsser, since it is used equivalently with “etres” by Du Châtelet. Yet, the translation does not reflect the ambiguity in Du Châtelet’s choice of terms. The simultaneous use of “choses” and “etres” might point to the fact that Du Châtelet is thinking in both cases of something unspecific—something only determined by virtue of its successive character. This is also in line with the fact that “choses” or “etres” seem to encompass the succession of material bodies as well as of ideas (cp. Inst1740eZ 6.108). The terminology is relevant since it leaves a certain ambiguity in Du Châtelet’s concept of time as to what extent ‘etres’ are material or sensual.
- 12.
Leibniz also uses the term succession in the context of time (e.g. in Leibniz 1998, 42) but the concept of succession is not the subject of further investigation, as is the case for Du Châtelet.
- 13.
Du Châtelet explains in this context that there is no exact or universal measurement of time apart from the instant (Inst1740eZ 6.114). Hecht (2019, 22) interestingly points out the value of Du Châtelet’s discovery of this universal measurement of “an instant” for the concept of force.
- 14.
What can be derived from this is that time, as a conceptual notion, comes about through our mind, which is a separate power to that which is represented in our mind and when both these elements are taken together this constitutes a consciousness of something in time.
- 15.
As can be seen from the above quote, Du Châtelet is in no doubt about the fact that successive existence of beings is necessary for our notion of time, i.e. that there has to be a successive content. Yet it is not clear whether that succession in our ideas is, for this content, at bottom dependent on external bodies.
- 16.
Through the power of imagination in the first instance, which she indicates, as we will see in the next paragraph, but does not explicitly expound.
- 17.
For the statement on geometry, metaphysics and the theological argument see Inst1740eZ 6.101.
- 18.
Du Châtelet does however explain that we abstract from “particulars” and thereby create the idea of time as an abstraction, Inst1740eZ 6.100.
- 19.
- 20.
A lot of work is still to be done with regard to Kant’s reception of Du Châtelet. First advancements on the relationship between Du Châtelet and Kant from this historical point of view are to be found in Reichenberger (2019), Ursula Winter (2011) and Winter (2006). Reichenberger (2019) establishes that Kant knew Du Châtelet’s works, including her Foundations of Physics, and shows how the intellectual circle surrounding the Gottscheds’ contributed to his knowledge of Du Châtelet. She argues that Kant’s direct reception of Du Châtelet was limited to his debut work Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (cp. Reichenberger 2019). Winter (2019) adds passages from Kant’s opus postumum, specifically the volumes XXI and XXII of the Akademie-Ausgabe, to Kant’s ruminations on Du Châtelet. In light of this discovery Winter puts into question whether further theories and aspects of Kant’s pre-critical period were not in fact in line with Du Châtelet’s philosophy. Furthermore, she points out with reference to Mittelstrass (2011) that important works of Leibniz’s were not published and accessible to Kant and that Kant thus knew Leibniz through other work. With regard to Kant’s early writings, Winter names Wolff, Bilfinger and Du Châtelet as possible reference points for Leibniz’s works.
- 21.
A textual comparison of Du Châtelet’s notion of space and time with Kant’s is to be found in Winter (2019). I do not want to delve into similarities and differences in their notions of time in this context. Rather, my aim is to highlight an important aspect in Du Châtelet’s notion of time, which is lost to post-Kantian philosophy.
- 22.
One-after-anotherness is the term I use here to depict the connection between alteration and succession and serves to clarify further why Du Châtelet’s depiction of time is accurate. On this theme see Carus (2021).
Abbreviations
(Inst1740) Du Châtelet, É. 1740. Institutions de Physique. Paris: Prault fils.
(Inst1740eZ) Du Châtelet, É. 2009. Selected Philosophical and Scientific Writings, translated by I. Bour and J. Zinsser, edited by J. Zinsser, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 115–200.
(Inst1742) Du Châtelet, É. 1742. Institutions physiques de madame la marquise Du Chastellet adressés à M. son fils: Nouvelle édition, corrigée et augmentée considérablement par l'auteur. Amsterdam: Aux dépens de la Compagnie.
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Carus, C. (2022). Du Châtelet’s Contribution to the Concept of Time. History of Philosophy Between Leibniz and Kant. In: Hagengruber, R.E. (eds) Époque Émilienne. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89921-9_5
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