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The United States Hegemony and Reshaping the Norms of State Immunity for International Crimes

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Abstract

Since 1996, the United States (US) has made several changes to its laws on State immunity. Prima facie, this indicates that the US is trying to reshape the international norms of State immunity, especially in the case of international crimes. However, this chapter argues that the US is not exerting any hegemonic effort to change the norms of State immunity for international crimes but is rather using its hegemony to preserve a privileged position, giving itself the right to dismiss the immunity of States and their officials in case of international crimes while denying other States the right to take a similar path.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99.

  2. 2.

    ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, paras. 81–91. This is the latest decision in which the ICJ discussed State immunities knowing that it refused to tackle the status of State immunity under customary international law in the Iranian assets case. See Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment ICJ Reports 2019, p. 7. This part of the judgment is criticized. See Hosseinnejad (2019).

  3. 3.

    See more on this coalition at www.c-catcanada.org. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  4. 4.

    Article 6.1, State Immunity Act. This article States that ‘A foreign State that is set out on the list referred to in subsection (2) is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court in proceedings against it for its support of terrorism on or after Jan 1, 1985’.

  5. 5.

    See, at the national level, Kim (2004), pp. 513ff.

  6. 6.

    Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1998) United States District Court, District of Columbia, March 1998, 1999 F.Supp.1.

  7. 7.

    United Nations (2008) Letter dated 24 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nationals addressed to the Secretary General, A/C.6/63/2.

  8. 8.

    Bank Markazi Aka Central Bank of Iran v. Peterson (2016), Supreme Court of the United States No. 14-770.

  9. 9.

    Daugirdas (2016), p. 561; Grandaubert (2016).

  10. 10.

    28 U.S.C. §1605B.

  11. 11.

    See Obama B (2016) Veto message from the President. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040. Accessed 15 April 2021. Cf. Pass JASTA (2016) Response to the message of the President accompanying his veto of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (2016). http://passjasta.org/2016/09/response-message-president-accompanying-veto-justice-sponsors-terrorism-act/. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  12. 12.

    Mazzetti (2016) Saudi Arabia warns of economic fallout if Congress passes 9/11 bill. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html?_r=0. Accessed 15 April 2021. See also Gordon J and Gillman O (2016) Saudi Arabia threatens to pull $750 billion in US assets if Congress passes bill makings its government liable for 9/11-related lawsuits. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3543702/Saudi-Arabia-threatens-pull-750-billion-U-S-assets-Congress-passes-bill-making-government-liable-9-11-related-lawsuits.html.

  13. 13.

    The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), p. 171. https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  14. 14.

    Saudi Press Agency (2016) GCC expresses concern over a US Congress bill contradicting the principles of equality and sovereign immunity of countries of the world. www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1537574. Accessed 15 April 2021. Saudi Press Agency (2016a) Official at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: JASTA great concern to community of nations objecting to erosion of principle of sovereign immunity. www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1543953. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  15. 15.

    Cîrlig and Pawlak (2016) Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: The JASTA and its implications. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593499/EPRS_BRI(2016)593499_EN.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  16. 16.

    Russian Foreign Ministry (2016) Comment by the information and press department on the US passing the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act with extraterritorial jurisdiction. http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2479122. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  17. 17.

    Chinese Foreign Ministry (2016) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Remarks on JASTA. http://sa.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t1404794.htm. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Helfer and Wuerth (2016), pp. 584–590. See also Corten (2009), pp. 171–175. See, on the role of power in international law, Byers (1999). See also Schachter (1999), pp. 200–205; Vagts (2001), pp. 873–888; Koskenniemi (2004), pp. 197–218; Alvarez JE (2003), pp.873-888.

  20. 20.

    See, on this topic, Marcelo and Kohen (2003), pp. 197–231, Roth (2003), pp. 232–63. See also Byers (2003), pp. 171–190. See, more generally, on the prohibition of the use of force, Corten (2012).

  21. 21.

    See Salmon (2014), p. 314, ‘Son changement ne pouvait s’effectuer que par la conjonction d’une nouvelle opinio juris accompagnée d’une pratique concordante de tous s’agissant de la coutume générale. C’était là, on le mesure, des conditions extrêmement lourdes’.

  22. 22.

    International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Report 1969, paras. 76–77.

  23. 23.

    Toope (2003), p. 289.

  24. 24.

    Salmon (2014), p. 9. See also Chaumont (1975), pp. 32–37.

  25. 25.

    Institute of International Law (2009) Resolution on the immunity from jurisdiction of the State and of persons who act on behalf of the State in case of international crimes. Third Commission, Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international-Session de Naples 73:228.

  26. 26.

    See for example, le Tribunal d’arrondissement de et à Luxembourg, première chambre (2019). Jugement civil 2019TALCH01/00116. See also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 51st session, A/54/10 (1999), Appendix, p. 172, para. 8.

  27. 27.

    A list of the international instruments adopted in the fight against terrorism is available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Int_Instruments_Prevention_and_Suppression_Int_Terrorism/Publication_-_English_-_08-25503_text.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  28. 28.

    S/RES/1373 (2001).

  29. 29.

    See, for example, S/RES/2178 (2014).

  30. 30.

    It is interesting to note that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined in the Flatow case that ‘Terrorism has achieved the status of almost universal condemnation, as have slavery, genocide, and piracy and the terrorist is the modern era’s hosti humani generis—an enemy to all mankind’, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 23.

  31. 31.

    Toope (2003), p. 292 quoting Keohane (1984).

  32. 32.

    This definition is built on the definition of the term role model in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Role-model is defined as ‘A significant other, upon which an individual patterns his or her behavior in a particular social role, including adopting appropriate similar attitudes’. See Scott and Marshall (2009), p. 99.

  33. 33.

    See Morgenroth (2015), p. 84. He indicates that ‘Role aspirant motivation is central to the main outcomes of role modelling - goal adoption, goal reinforcement, and achievement’.

  34. 34.

    Nolte (2003), p. 493, citing Triepel (1938). See also Clark (2011), pp. 18–23.

  35. 35.

    See Klein (2003), pp. 363–391.

  36. 36.

    Helfer and Wuerth (2016), pp. 575–580.

  37. 37.

    Danilenko (1993), p. 75.

  38. 38.

    Byers (1999), p. 6.

  39. 39.

    Hall (2010), p. 191.

  40. 40.

    Nye (2004), pp. 1–33.

  41. 41.

    Seiichi (2008), pp. 189–211; Patalakh (2016), pp. 85–112. See also Schachter (1999), p. 202. He states that ‘its (the power) utility depends on context and the specific factors that affect the power relationship’.

  42. 42.

    For example, see what Helfer and Wuerth (2016) called ‘custom’s overlapping domain’, pp. 594–596.

  43. 43.

    This is one of the three dimensions of public diplomacy as put forward by Joseph S. Nye. See Nye (2008), pp. 94–109.

  44. 44.

    Skordas (2003), p. 339, Verdier and Voeten (2015); Donner (2001), p. 28.

  45. 45.

    Yang (2012), pp. 23–25.

  46. 46.

    Yang (2012), pp. 25–26.

  47. 47.

    See Verdier and Voeten (2015), pp. 4, 15, Annex 1. See also Bankas (1999), p. 132. Further, there are a number of inter-governmental initiatives to restrict State immunity in specific areas. For an account of these initiatives, see Hafner (2013), pp. 1–4.

  48. 48.

    Tate (1952), pp. 984–985.

  49. 49.

    Verdier and Voeten (2015), p. 14. See also Byers (1999), pp. 113–114. He noticed that States belonging to the common-law family adhered to the restrictive immunity rule after the United States adopted the FSIA.

  50. 50.

    The FSIA is also claimed to be the first statute on State immunity. See Bankas (1999), p. 139; Donner (2001), p. 28.

  51. 51.

    See States’ answers to the questionnaire submitted by the International Law Commission on the subject of State immunity: A/CN.4/343 (1981), pp. 30–35.

  52. 52.

    The customary nature of the rule of restrictive immunity is also highlighted in the finding and declaration of the purpose section. See 28 U.S. Code § 1602.

  53. 53.

    Fensterwald (1959), p. 382.

  54. 54.

    Fensterwald (1959), p. 396.

  55. 55.

    Verdier and Voeten (2015), p. 23.

  56. 56.

    See International Law Commission Draft conclusions on the identification of customary international law with commentaries, A/73/10 (2018), pp. 140–141. See also ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99 p. 135, para. 77.

  57. 57.

    28 U.S.C. §1605.

  58. 58.

    Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina (1992), 965 F.2d 699, 9th Cir.

  59. 59.

    Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany (1994), 26 F.3d 1166, DC Cir.

  60. 60.

    Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1995), 886 F. Supp. 306, EDNY.

  61. 61.

    Cabiri v. Government of the Republic of Ghana (1999), 165 F.3d 193, 202, 2nd Cir.

  62. 62.

    Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (2001), 250 F.3d 1145, 7th Cir.

  63. 63.

    Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan (2003), 332 F.3d 679, DC Cir.

  64. 64.

    Belhas v. Ya’alon (2008), 07-7009, DC Cir.

  65. 65.

    Letelier v. Republic of Chile (1980), 488 F. Supp. 665, DDC.

  66. 66.

    It is stipulated in § 1605(5) that the tort exception shall not be applicable to (a) any claim based on the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (b) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.

  67. 67.

    Letelier v. Republic of Chile (1989) This paragraph has been recited in Liu v. Republic of China (1989), 892 F.2d 1419, 9th Cir.

  68. 68.

    Pavoni (2011), p. 153. See also Schnably (2017), pp. 310–312.

  69. 69.

    A/C.6/59/SR.13 (2005), para. 63.

  70. 70.

    28 U.S.C. §1605A.

  71. 71.

    Le Tribunal d’arrondissement de et à Luxembourg, première chambre (2019).

  72. 72.

    Given that the purpose of (Sect. 4) is only to contextualize the US opinio juris, it is beyond the scope of this section to tackle the legality of denying State immunity as a countermeasure. On this topic, see Franchini (2019); Moser (2012), pp. 809–852. See also Fox and Webb (2013), p. 16.

  73. 73.

    §1605A (2)(a)(i)(I). See also Franchini (2017), p. 9.

  74. 74.

    Senator Arlen Specter Statement (1994), Hearing before the Subcommittee on Court and Administrative Practice of the Committee on the Judiciary for Consideration on S.835. Hrg 103-1077, quoted in Cooper-Hill (2006), pp. 130–131. He emphasized that the denial of State immunity is a response to an act of terrorism.

  75. 75.

    Daliberti et al. v. Republic of Iraq (2000) 97 F.Supp.2d 38. See also Flatow v. Iran (1999).

  76. 76.

    Republic of Iraq v. Beaty (2009), 556 U.S. 848.

  77. 77.

    Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), A/56/10, Article 52(3)(a).

  78. 78.

    Preliminary objections submitted by the United States of America (2017), pp. 31–32, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/164/164-20170501-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  79. 79.

    See also Grandaubert (2016).

  80. 80.

    Fed. Ins. Co. v. Qaida (2015) In: re Terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 134 F. Supp. 3d 774, SDNY, Fed. Ins. Co. v. Qaida (2008) In: re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83, 2d Cir.

  81. 81.

    The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), p. 171.

  82. 82.

    28 U.S.C. §1605B.

  83. 83.

    Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army (2018) In: Terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, 298 F. Supp. 3d 631, SDNY. A new case has been brought against Turkey for violence committed by the Turkish security officials during protests that took place on 16 May 2017 in front of the residence of the Turkish ambassador in Washington. However, no judicial decision has been adopted on the matter. See Usoyan et al. v. Turkey (2018), Docket No. 1_18-cv-01141, DDC, Court Docket. Although this case does not raise the question of whether State immunity is dismissed in case of international crimes, it will be interesting to view the court’s interpretation of the term ‘international terrorism’ and whether it follows a wide or strict interpretation.

  84. 84.

    See also Stewart (2019), n. 99. It is noteworthy that there are several other definitions for terrorism in the United States Code. On this subject, see Perry (2004), pp. 249–274.

  85. 85.

    18 U.S.C. § 2331—U.S. Code.

  86. 86.

    See Genocide: 18 U.S.C §1091; Torture: 18 U.S.C 2340A; War Crimes 18 U.S.C Chapter 118.

    However, the crime against humanity is not expressly codified in the United States criminal laws. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that this implies that crimes against humanity are excluded from the aforementioned definition of international terrorism, given that most of the forms of crimes against humanity are already crimes in the United States. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive convention on crimes against humanity that resolves the uncertainty surrounding the scope of these crimes. Bearing this in mind, it is difficult to generally state that crimes against humanity are not included in the definition of international terrorism. A bill was introduced at the Congress, yet not in force, on crimes against humanity. See https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/1346. Accessed 15 April 2021. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to tackle the necessity of a separate codification of crimes against humanity. On that topic, see Elise Keppler (2008) From Nuremberg to Darfur: Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity—Testimony of Elise Keppler, International Justice Program senior counsel, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/24/nuremberg-darfur-accountability-crimes-against-humanity. Accessed 15 April 2021. See also Van Schaack (2019); Aceves and Hoffman (2003), pp. 237–267. See also Murphy (2015) First report on crimes against humanity, A/CN.4/680. p. 29, para. 55.

  87. 87.

    28 U.S.C. §1605B Section 2(b).

  88. 88.

    (2016) H.R. 6223 (IH): Safeguarding America’s Armed Forces and Effectiveness Act. This bill was intended ‘to amend title 28, United States Code to provide that a national of the United States may only bring a claim against a foreign State for an injury which was caused by international terrorism and which occurred on 11 September 2001’.

  89. 89.

    See ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, para. 55, where the court explained that an opinio juris ‘is reflected in particular in the assertion by States claiming immunity that international law accords them a right to such immunity from the jurisdiction of other States; in the acknowledgment, by States granting immunity, that international law imposes upon them an obligation to do so; and, conversely, in the assertion by States in other cases of a right to exercise jurisdiction over foreign States’.

  90. 90.

    See the United States (2005) Statement, A/C.6/59/SR.13, para. 63.

  91. 91.

    Altmann v. Republic of Austria (2005), 541 US 677, where the United States Supreme court stated that ‘the principal purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has never been to permit foreign States and their instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit in United States courts. Rather, such immunity reflects current political realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign States and their instrumentalities some present ‘protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of comity’ (quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson (2003), 538 U.S. 468). See, on the nature of the rules of State immunity in general, Finke (2010), pp. 853–881. See also Fox (2006), pp. 403–406. See generally on the topic of comity in American law: Dodge (2015), pp. 2071–2141.

  92. 92.

    See United States Senate (2016) Justice against sponsors of terrorism act, Congressional Record vol. 162, no. 78.

  93. 93.

    This is unlike the finding and declaration of purpose section of the FSIA 1976, which revealed that the restrictive rule of immunity was codified to bring the United States practice to conformity with the rules of international law. See 28 U.S. Code § 1602.

  94. 94.

    See also Pavoni (2011), p. 146, where he states that the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities case ‘highlights the absence of opinio juris when States grant immunities more extensively than required by international law’. In Pavoni’s view, ‘this reasoning equally applies when States accord immunities less extensively than those imposed by international law, regardless of the latter’s requirements and only as a matter of domestic law and policy’.

  95. 95.

    See also House Judiciary Committee (2016) Written testimony of Jimmy Gurule, Hearing before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice Washington, D.C. https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Gurule-Testimony-07142016-1.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021. United States Senate (2016) Justice against sponsors of terrorism act, Congressional Record vol. 162, no. 78.

  96. 96.

    The territory of the United States has been narrowly interpreted by United States’ courts to only include ‘the continental United States and those islands that are part of the United States or its possessions’. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428; Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1995), 886 F. Supp. 306, EDNY.

  97. 97.

    The purpose and finding section of the JASTA states that ‘the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Halberstam v. Welch (1983), 705 F.2d 472, DC Cir, provides the proper legal framework for how such liability should function in the context of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code’. Halberstam identified the following elements for an aiding and abetting claim: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides the assistance; and (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.

  98. 98.

    Obama B (2016) Veto message from the President. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  99. 99.

    See United States Senate (2016a) Congressional Record vol. 162, no. 178 (2016). See in particular Graham and McCain (2016) Senators Graham and McCain discuss amendment to JASTA law. https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4633606/user-clip-jasta-amendment&fbclid=IwAR3_VuZefJAStxfpRtkUyTGfkIo90Edvq9Eo8AtTzWj7Q97KBfdMbpQakZg. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  100. 100.

    Giblin has stated that ‘a State will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an expected net gain)’. See Gilpin (1981), pp. 9–10.

  101. 101.

    Data collected by Verdier and Voeten (2015), p. 24, reveals that normative changes to the notion of sovereignty contribute to the change of the customary rules of State immunity.

  102. 102.

    The reason for focusing on this specific context and not the wider context of international terrorism lies in the fact that the JASTA is concerned with State immunity with respect only to terrorism within the United States.

  103. 103.

    ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, para. 57. The relationship between the principle of sovereign equality and territorial sovereignty was earlier laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon (1812), 11 U.S. 116, 136.

  104. 104.

    Deyermond (2016), pp. 967–984; Silaeva et al. (2016); Bershidsky (2015). See also Smith (2000).

  105. 105.

    (2016) The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the promotion of international law. For an analysis of this declaration, see Mälksoo (2016). See also (2000) The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  106. 106.

    Silaeva et al. (2016); Bershidsky (2015).

  107. 107.

    See, on the legality of Russia’s behavior towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Gray (2018), pp. 712–728.

  108. 108.

    See, on the legality of the Russian annexation of Crimea, O’Connel (2018), pp. 855–873. See also A/RES/68/262 (2014).

  109. 109.

    Deyermond (2016), p. 958.

  110. 110.

    Deyermond (2016), pp. 958–959.

  111. 111.

    Deyermond (2016), p. 958.

  112. 112.

    Deyermond (2016), p. 974.

  113. 113.

    Deyermond (2016), p. 975.

  114. 114.

    See, on the legality of the Unites States invasion of Afghanistan, Byers (2018), p. 625ff. Cf. Greenwood (2002), pp. 301–317. See, on the topic of self-defense, Corten (2012), pp. 401–494.

  115. 115.

    (2011) Task force on Russia and U.S national interests report, Russia and U.S national interests: Why should Americans care? p. 30. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/10/Russia_US_nationalinterests_report.pdf?_ga=2.982451.323003478.1579708961-888287984.1579708961. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  116. 116.

    See Deyermond (2016), p. 963.

  117. 117.

    Anti-ISIL Airstrikes Continue in Syria, Iraq, 14 August 2015, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=129469. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  118. 118.

    See United Nations (2015) Identical letters dated 17 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, S/2015/719.

  119. 119.

    (2017) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar, 6 May 2017. https://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/MinistryNews/Pages/ArticleID201765134958689.aspx. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  120. 120.

    (2017) UAE: Measures against Qatar came after long patience. https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/MediaHub/News/2017/9/12/12-09-2017-UAE-Qatar. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  121. 121.

    (2017) Cairo breaking off relations came as a result of Qatari rule insistence against Egypt http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/113332?lang=en-us. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  122. 122.

    (2017) Statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the severance of diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar, 5 June 2017, https://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7824&language=en-US&ItemId=7474. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  123. 123.

    See Hofer and Luca Ferro (2017).

  124. 124.

    Those strikes have been condemned by Iraq and Syria; see Letter dated 11 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2015/963 (2015). See also SC/13994 (2019).

  125. 125.

    See also Nagan and Hammer (2004), p. 170 in which the authors highlighted that ‘States targeted by terrorists acts are reluctant to accept that their responses to such attacks are constrained by principles of sovereignty in international law’. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that States do not justify their responses by the same legal arguments presented by the United States.

  126. 126.

    Gupta (2004), p. 558.

  127. 127.

    (2019) Iraq: Analysis-Energy Sector Highlights https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/IRQ. Accessed 15 April 2021. On the main purpose behind the Iraq invasion: Rogers (2003); Juhasz A (2013) Why the war in Iraq was fought for big oil. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html. Accessed 15 April 2021. See also Abizaid (2008).

  128. 128.

    Defense Intelligence Agency (2017) Russia military power: building a military to support great power aspirations, p. 15. https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021. See also Depetris (2018).

  129. 129.

    See, for example, (2019) India’s Statement, SC/13963; (2019) Cuba’s Statement, S/PV.8496, pp. 55–56, Ukraine’s Statement, pp. 67–68, (2019) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Statement, GA/L/3594 and (2017) Pakistan’s Statement, GA/11950.

  130. 130.

    See Stewart (2019), pp. 652–653.

  131. 131.

    See Virally (1967), pp. 48–51; Byers (1999), pp. 88–90; Simma (1984), pp. 400–404. See also Paulus (2011), pp. 113–137.

  132. 132.

    Byers (1999), p. 90.

  133. 133.

    Byers (1999), pp. 90–101. See also Verdier and Voeten (2014), pp. 389–434. The authors claim that powerful States comply with international law in order to avoid setting a precedent that undermines a norm whose continued existence they value.

  134. 134.

    Obama (2016) Veto message from the President. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  135. 135.

    Cîrlig and Pawlak (2016) Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: The JASTA and its implications. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593499/EPRS_BRI(2016)593499_EN.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  136. 136.

    Lauterpacht (1951), p. 228; Verdier and Voeten (2014), p. 398.

  137. 137.

    Simma (1984), p. 402.

  138. 138.

    Verdier and Voeten (2015), pp. 16–17. Cf. Guerra (2016) Cuba. In: Laws lifting sovereign immunity in selected countries. The Law Library of Congress, pp. 2–5. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sovereign-immunity/lifting-sovereign-immunity.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  139. 139.

    A/CN.4/343, pp. 48–52 (1981); A/CN.4/.343/ADD.3, p. 3 (1981).

  140. 140.

    De Visscher (1957), pp. 149–150.

  141. 141.

    Schachter (1999), p. 203.

  142. 142.

    See Toope (2003), pp. 310–311.

  143. 143.

    Toope (2003), pp. 312–313.

  144. 144.

    See Stewart (2019), pp. 665–666. Cf. Hancock (2018), p. 1310; Pass JASTA (2016a) JASTA poses no risk of suits against our military personnel. http://passjasta.org/2016/09/jasta-poses-no-risk-suits-military-personnel/. It is argued that the JASTA does not tackle the immunity of State officials, citing in this context the Samantar decision where the Supreme Court decided that the FSIA does not concern the immunity of State officials. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that the Samantar decision was adopted before the enactment of the JASTA, which implies that it did not address whether or not the JASTA provides for an exception to the immunity of State officials. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).

  145. 145.

    United Nations (1951) Treaty series vol. 78, p. 277.

  146. 146.

    Pfaff (2001), p. 50. For other reasons, see Korey (1997), pp. 271–290; LeBlanc (2012), pp. 73–186.

  147. 147.

    See Bolton (2018). See also Wind (2009), p. 82 and references included therein.

  148. 148.

    See Amnesty International (2003) International Criminal Court: The unlawful attempt of the security council to give US citizens permanent impunity against international justice. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/108000/ior400062003en.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  149. 149.

    See Bolton (2018).

  150. 150.

    See also Amnesty International (2019) Afghanistan: ICC refuses to authorize investigation, caving into USA Threats. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/afghanistan-icc-refuses-to-authorize-investigation-caving-into-usa-threats/. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  151. 151.

    Human Rights Watch (2020), US sanctions International Criminal Court prosecutor. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/02/us-sanctions-international-criminal-court-prosecutor. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  152. 152.

    Alvarez (1998), pp. 2101–2103. See also Murphy (1999), pp. 47–48.

  153. 153.

    A tribunal in Luxembourg has refused to enforce a judgment issued in the United States because the terrorism exception in the FSIA1605A was not part of customary international law. See le Tribunal d’arrondissement de et à Luxembourg. On the contrary, courts will be more willing to enforce foreign judgments if the international crime exception to State immunity was part of customary international law.

  154. 154.

    Arango and Schmidt (2011) Iraq denies legal immunity to US troops after 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/middleeast/iraqis-say-no-to-immunity-for-remaining-american-troops.html. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  155. 155.

    Jakes and Santana (2011) Iraq Prime Minister: immunity issue scuttled us troop deal. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/22/iraq-pm-immunity-issue-scuttled-us-troop-deal/. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  156. 156.

    Baker (2014) Diplomatic note promises immunity from Iraqi law for U.S. advisory troops. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/world/middleeast/us-advisory-troops-get-immunity-from-iraqi-law.html. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  157. 157.

    Samuel (2016) Families of victims killed during US-led invasion of Iraq demand compensation. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqis-demand-compensation-from-us-for-victims-of-invasion-a7343996.html. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  158. 158.

    BBC (2020) Trump threatens Iraq with sanctions if us troops are expelled https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51003159. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  159. 159.

    For the 2019 list of States affected by terrorism, see The Institute for Economics and Peace (2019) Global terrorism index 2019. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  160. 160.

    For the 2019 list of States receiving military aid from the United States, see http://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore. Accessed 15 April 2021.

  161. 161.

    Byers (1999), p. 90.

  162. 162.

    Krisch (2003), p. 154.

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Essawy, R.M. (2022). The United States Hegemony and Reshaping the Norms of State Immunity for International Crimes. In: Bismuth, R., Rusinova, V., Starzhenetskiy, V., Ulfstein, G. (eds) Sovereign Immunity Under Pressure. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87706-4_13

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