Abstract
This chapter considers how algorithms affect competition and what their implications are for competition policy. With the economy going digital, a huge number of great innovations have materialized. Consumers have greatly benefitted from these innovations. However, several antitrust issues have emerged. This chapter looks at both the consumer benefits as well as the antitrust issues. It examines contemporary reports to determine whether algorithmic innovations have produced competition law concerns such as tacit collusion or price personalization. Other more sophisticated issues include the increase in nudging strategies from digital platforms.
This chapter develops the arguments set out in an article ‘Algorithms & Competition Law’ published in Competition Policy International (2020). I am grateful to Enrique Bravo, who has provided great research assistance on this chapter.
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Notes
- 1.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016b, p. 16).
- 2.
O’Reilly (2010).
- 3.
Stucke and Grunes (2016, p. 1).
- 4.
De Filippi (2014).
- 5.
Hof (2014).
- 6.
De Filippi (2014).
- 7.
Monopolkommission (2015, p. 30).
- 8.
CMA (2015, p. 50).
- 9.
Blattberg and Deighton (1991, pp. 8–11).
- 10.
Monopolkommission (2015, p. 31).
- 11.
CMA (2015, p. 93).
- 12.
OECD (2017).
- 13.
Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017).
- 14.
Consumer Watchdog (2010).
- 15.
European Commission (2017).
- 16.
NTTDATA (2015).
- 17.
Palmer (2017).
- 18.
FTC (2013).
- 19.
CMA (2015, p. 75).
- 20.
Soper (2016).
- 21.
Reuters (2011).
- 22.
Id.
- 23.
Gormsen (2020).
- 24.
Thaler and Sunstein (2012).
- 25.
Id.
- 26.
Id.
- 27.
McKinley (2019).
- 28.
Thaler (2018).
- 29.
BIT Report (2019).
- 30.
Id, 13–14.
- 31.
Id 13.
- 32.
CMA (2019).
- 33.
BIT report (2019, p. 13).
- 34.
Id; Levin (2017).
- 35.
BIT report (2019, pp. 22–23).
- 36.
Case AT.40099, Google Android (Google Android).
- 37.
Koponen (2019).
- 38.
Ha (2019).
- 39.
Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation Report (2020, p. 26).
- 40.
Id. 14.
- 41.
Walker (2016).
- 42.
European Commission (2018).
- 43.
Dunn (2016).
- 44.
Bindi (2017).
- 45.
Khan (2016, p. 766).
- 46.
Id.
- 47.
Authors United (2015).
- 48.
United States v Topkins, CR 15-00201 WHO Plea Agreement 4 (ND Cal 2015).
- 49.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016a, pp. 118–119).
- 50.
CMA Report (2015, 3.48).
- 51.
Brooke Group, v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 227 (1993).
- 52.
OECD Report (2017).
- 53.
OECD Report (2017, p. 22).
- 54.
Id. 21.
- 55.
Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016, pp. 14–15).
- 56.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016a, p. 61).
- 57.
Id, (2016, p. 62).
- 58.
Newman (2014).
- 59.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016b).
- 60.
Furman Report (2019).
- 61.
Id, para.3.164.
- 62.
Id, paras.3.163, 3.166.
- 63.
Id, para.3.171.
- 64.
CMA (2018).
- 65.
Id. para5.2.
- 66.
Id.
- 67.
Id.
- 68.
Case 50223 (12 August 2016) Online sales of posters and frames. CMA.
- 69.
CMA, (2018, para.5.35).
- 70.
Id, para.5.37.
- 71.
Id.
- 72.
Id, pp. 4–5.
- 73.
Ipsos et al. (2018).
- 74.
Id, p. 190.
- 75.
Id.
- 76.
Id, p. 167.
- 77.
Id, p. 168.
- 78.
Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2019).
- 79.
Id, p. 77.
- 80.
Furman Report (2019, para.3.171).
- 81.
CMA (2018, para.5.37).
- 82.
Schrepel (2020).
- 83.
Case AT.39740—Google Shopping.
- 84.
Id.
- 85.
Id. para.352.
- 86.
Id. paras.597–599.
- 87.
Case 322/81 (1983) NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities. ECLI:EU:C: 1983:313. Para.57.
- 88.
Van den Bergh (2017, p. 109).
- 89.
Alhborn and Evans (2009).
- 90.
Google Android.
- 91.
Case AT.40411—Google Search (Ad Sense).
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Gormsen, L.L. (2022). Algorithmic Antitrust and Consumer Choice. In: Portuese, A. (eds) Algorithmic Antitrust. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85859-9_3
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