Abstract
The impact of algorithms in our daily lives is ubiquitous. And the impact of algorithms in the competitive environment within which firms operate and consumers shop is equally ubiquitous. Indeed, in the age of Big Data and technological disruptions, algorithms rank search results, help process information and steer prices. The application of antitrust policies to algorithm-driven companies has given rise to what can be referred as “algorithmic antitrust.” This chapter provides an overview of the key antitrust implications of algorithms with a predominantly European perspective. The approach aims avoiding both excessively negative portrayal of the effects of algorithms on competition—since many antitrust concerns rarely materialize—without overlooking the specific and convincing competition issues raised by enforcing antitrust laws to algorithm-driven companies. Algorithmic antitrust in general, and in Europe in particular, deserves particular scrutiny. Without resorting to slogans and catchy answers, this chapter maps out the field before other authors delve into specific topics in the subsequent chapters of this book.
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Notes
- 1.
Ray (2020).
- 2.
- 3.
Liptak (2020).
- 4.
Ib. 5.
- 5.
Cormen et al. (2009), p. 6.
- 6.
Pasquale (2015), p. 4.
- 7.
Pasquale (2015), p. 6.
- 8.
Ib.
- 9.
Ib, 16.
- 10.
Ib, 11.
- 11.
Brandeis (1934).
- 12.
Garcia (2016).
- 13.
Citron and Pasquale (2014).
- 14.
- 15.
Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2019).
- 16.
OECD (2017).
- 17.
OECD (2017), p. 14.
- 18.
Alexander (2020).
- 19.
Veinott (2005).
- 20.
OECD (2017), p. 15.
- 21.
Courtois and Timmermans (2018).
- 22.
OECD (2017), p. 16.
- 23.
OECD (2017), p. 16.
- 24.
Ib.
- 25.
Oxera (2018), p. 3.
- 26.
Ib.
- 27.
CMA (2021).
- 28.
Baker (2019), p. 101.
- 29.
Baker (2019), p. 103.
- 30.
Baker (2019), p. 103.
- 31.
Baker (2019), pp. 104–106.
- 32.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016).
- 33.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 35.
- 34.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), pp. 35–36.
- 35.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 36.
- 36.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 40.
- 37.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 44.
- 38.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 44.
- 39.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 51.
- 40.
European Commission (2013).
- 41.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 48.
- 42.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 51.
- 43.
C-74/14, Eturas e.a., ECLI:EU:C:2016:42.
- 44.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 36.
- 45.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 36.
- 46.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 56.
- 47.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 61.
- 48.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 63.
- 49.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 63.
- 50.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 65.
- 51.
Ezarchi and Stucke (2016), p. 68.
- 52.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 37.
- 53.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 71.
- 54.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 72.
- 55.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 72.
- 56.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 72.
- 57.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 71.
- 58.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 71.
- 59.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 73.
- 60.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 73.
- 61.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 76.
- 62.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 77.
- 63.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 77.
- 64.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 79.
- 65.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 79.
- 66.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 80.
- 67.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 83 et sub.
- 68.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 101.
- 69.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 218.
- 70.
Chivot and Castro (2019).
- 71.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 227.
- 72.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 229.
- 73.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 230.
- 74.
Ezrachi and Stucke (2016), p. 230.
- 75.
European Commission (2016).
- 76.
Joined cased C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, Ahlström Osakeyhti v Commission, March 31, 1993, §63.
- 77.
Mandrescu (2018).
- 78.
US District Court Northern District of California, USA v David Topkins, 6 April 2015.
- 79.
DOJ (2015).
- 80.
Vestager (2017).
- 81.
Décision n°2018-FO-01 du seven juin 2018 concernant une procédure au fond mettant en cause Webtaxi S.à.r.l.
- 82.
Honore and Fabre (2018).
- 83.
Portuese (2018).
- 84.
European Commission (2018).
- 85.
Case AT.40182 -Pioneer.
- 86.
Honore and Fabre (2018).
- 87.
Van Cleynenbreugel (2020).
- 88.
C-74/14, Eturas, EU:C:2016:42.
- 89.
A contrario, Akman (2019).
- 90.
C-2/01 P & C-3/01 P, Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV & Commission v. Bayer, EU:C:2004:2.
- 91.
Van Cleynenbreugel (2020), p. 437.
- 92.
Van Cleynenbreugel (2020), p. 436.
- 93.
C-413/14 P Intel Corp. v. European Commission, September 6, 2017.
- 94.
Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, October 6, 2015.
- 95.
Botta and Wiedemann (2019), p. 400.
- 96.
Graef (2018), p. 552.
- 97.
European Commission (2019).
- 98.
quoted in Fussel (2019).
- 99.
Vestager (2019).
- 100.
Portuese (2020).
- 101.
Chen et al. (2016), p. 1344.
- 102.
Chen et al. (2016), p. 1347.
- 103.
Espinoza (2021).
- 104.
European Commission (2017).
- 105.
European Commission (2017).
- 106.
Case COMP/AT.39740.
- 107.
Google Shopping decision, paras.345–348.
- 108.
Google Shopping decision, para.358.
- 109.
Google Shopping decision, paras.361–479.
- 110.
Google Shopping decision, paras.361–479.
- 111.
Portuese (2020).
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Portuese, A. (2022). Prologue: Algorithmic Antitrust—A Primer. In: Portuese, A. (eds) Algorithmic Antitrust. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85859-9_1
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