Abstract
Lawyers in a wider sense, such as judges, legislators, lawyers and legal scholars, look for certain reasons regarding Legal Reasoning, however, it is not at all clear, why certain reasons are included, such as an economic analysis of the law, but others are critically looked upon, such as philosophical Reasons.
Legal Reasoning is a method of argumentation and thought as utilized by legal scholars, lawyers and judges while applying legal rules to specific interactions among persons. Legal Reasoning follows a certain path: first, the issue, of what is debated, secondly the legal rule, which governs the issue, thirdly the facts, which are relevant for the rule, fourthly, an application of the rule to the facts and fifthly, the conclusion of the application of the rules to the facts, which is the outcome. That said, during the process of Legal Reasoning, different methods are applied, and different reasons are given.
To understand the different stages of Legal Reasoning, first Law’s subject matter will be looked upon and three different matters identified with discourses while legislating, discourses at court and the scholarly discourses on texts, oral words and non-verbal resources. The thus concretized subject matters will secondly be set in context with the requirement of jurisprudence as such to be—and/or attempt to be—a science. Thirdly the narrative of law, its history and development over time, will be looked upon. In the final and fourth step the purposes of law, identified in peace under law and justice in the form of an equal application of the law, will be determined.
Throughout these four steps it will be assessed, which reasons are generally given to create and identify the subject matter, the requirement of jurisprudence to be a science, law’s history as well as its purposes, and which reasons could and should be given in each of these four steps. Within different subject matters, such as in legal or scientific discourses, different reasons are commonly included or excluded than in discourses at court or during discourses while legislating. However, it is not at all broadly reflected or theoretically/scientifically asked, why different reasons are considered to be sufficient or insufficient.
This paper stands with the Caveat—that it will not develop a safe new method of reasons to be recognized as such, but will advocate the necessity of an interdisciplinary discourse as well as an examination from the point of theory of science. Thus subjectivity prevails. As lawyers, judges, legal scholars and theoretical scientists are human beings, they are bound as hermeneutical subjects and can not entirely free themselves of their own preferences, prejudices and preconceptions. However, they can reflect on them and be thus self aware to critically assess these.
This article is based on the findings of the interdisciplinary research group “Generative Hermeneutik” and its legal section, in which Prof. Dr. Sebastian Martens (University of Passau), Prof. Dr. Olaf Muthorst (Free University of Berlin), Dr. Thomas Heiß (University of Passau) and Dr. Verena Klappstein, M.A., LL.M. participate. Theological participants are: Prof. Dr. Bernd Harbeck-Pingel and Dr. Britta Müller-Schauenburg, philosophical participants are: Prof. Dr. Mathias Gutmann and Dr. Benjamin Rathgeber. This article is the extended version of a speech “Why do lawyers, legal scholars, judges and legislators need reasons for Legal Reasoning and how can those Reasons be recognized?” given at the XXIXth World Congress of IVR—Dignity, Democracy, Diversity, in Lucerne, 7th–13th July 2019 during the Special Workshop “Theory of Legal Evidence, Evidence and Recognition in Law and Legal Theory”.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Regarding the contested construct of a legal syllogism: Alexy (2003), pp. 433 et seq.; Engisch (1963), pp. 8 et seq.; Riehm (2006), pp. 4 et seq.; Rödig (1973), pp. 163 et seq.; von Schlieffen (2011a), pp. 111 et seq. See as well below regarding the ἐνθύμημα (Greek: enthymeme, enthumēma) at Sect. 2.1.2.4, p. 49 and in fn. 56.
- 3.
See Sect. 2.1, pp. 40 et seq.
- 4.
See Sect. 2.1.1, pp. 41 et seq.
- 5.
See Sect. 2.1.2, pp. 44 et seq.
- 6.
See Sect. 2.1.3, pp. 50 et seq.
- 7.
See Sect. 2.2, pp. 54 et seq.
- 8.
See Sect. 2.3, pp. 57 et seq.
- 9.
See Sect. 2.3.1, pp. 57 et seq.
- 10.
See Sect. 2.3.2, pp. 58.
- 11.
See Sect. 2.4, pp. 61 et seq.
- 12.
See Sect. 2.1, pp. 40 et seq.
- 13.
See Sect. 2.2, pp. 54 et seq.
- 14.
See Sect. 2.3, pp. 57 et seq.
- 15.
See Sect. 2.4, pp. 61 et seq.
- 16.
See below: Sect. 2.4, pp. 61 et seq.
- 17.
See above in fn. 46.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
See, for example, the relevant questions as asked by Baldwin et al. (2012), p. 27: “Is the action or regime supported by legislative authority? Is there an appropriate scheme of accountability? Are procedures fair, accessible, and open? Is the regulator acting with sufficient expertise? Is the action or regime efficient?”.
- 22.
Baldwin et al. (2012), pp. 29 et seq.
- 23.
Baldwin et al. (2012), p. 30.
- 24.
Carrier (2017), pp. 161 et seq.
- 25.
Kelsen (1960), pp. 73 et seq.
- 26.
See below: Sect. 2.1.3, pp. 50 et seq.
- 27.
See above: Sect. 2.1.2, pp. 44 et seq.
- 28.
Neupert (2011), pp. 14 et seq.
- 29.
- 30.
See above: Sect. 2.1.1, pp. 41 et seq.
- 31.
See those mentioned in fn. 29.
- 32.
See those mentioned in fn. 19 and 85.
- 33.
This minimization from the point of view of theory of cognition starts with cognizing subject, who must decide in the present on a past object of cognition. From a logic point of view, if the object of cognition is material and still exists more or less unchanged due to the course of time, it can be looked at by the judge herself, e.g. appearance and documents. If the object of cognition is non-material and/or not re-producible, witnesses and party attendances may be asked. If the cognizing subject cannot decide, what exactly it cognizes with his own expertise it may call on expert witnesses.
- 34.
See: Regarding the question, how many aspects the matter of dispute has: Becker-Eberhard, in: Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO (2016), § 253 ZPO, paras 32 et seq.: The matter of dispute consists of the complaint (action for performance, affirmative action for a right or action requesting a change of a legal right or status) as can be found in the demand of relief (Klageantrag) and the submitted circumstantial facts to it, forming the bipartite concept of the matter of dispute (zweigliedriger Streitgegenstandsbegriff), whereas according to the onepartite concept of the matter of dispute (eingliederiger Streitgegenstandsbegriff) only the demand of relief determines the concept. According to another conception, which is a mixture of the former two in a relative way (Jauernig and Hess 2011, § 37 paras 39 et seq.; Stein et al. 2016, before § 253 paras 46 et seq.), one can apply, in line with the norm, either the onepartite concept, e.g. in the case of the pendency of the proceedings (Rechtshängigkeit), joinder of actions (Klagehäufung) or limitation of actions (Verjährung), however, the twopartite concept for the material legal force (materielle Rechtskraft)—so the latter—or must decide on the legal target of protection—so the former.
About the procedure before the constitutional court the twopartite concept of subject matter, consisting of the designation of the sovereign act that is contested and the claim to be violated by it in at least one basic right, prevails: Decision of the constitutional court, 15.06.1988, 1 BvR 1301/86, BVerfGE 78, 320 (328); Bethge, in: Maunz et al. (2019), § 90 BVerfGG, para 175g.
About criminal a major difference occurs: As the criminal procedure is not, like the civil procedure, based on the principle of party disposition (Dispositionsmaxime), but on the principle of ex officio disposition (Offizialmaxime, see section 155 para 2 German StPO), it merely depends on the circumstantial facts.
- 35.
- 36.
See below: Sect. 2.3, pp. 57 et seq.
- 37.
See below: Sect. 2.2, pp. 54 et seq.
- 38.
Kriele (1981), pp. 409 et seq.
- 39.
See as well: Nierhauve (2016), pp. 123 et seq.
- 40.
Kriele (1981), pp. 410 et seq.
- 41.
Kriele (1981), p. 410.
- 42.
- 43.
See below: Sect. 2.4.2, pp. 62 et seq.
- 44.
See above in fn. 34.
- 45.
With regard to this, see below: Sect. 2.2.3, pp. 56 et seq.
- 46.
This meta rule consists of the following criteria: 0. an existing gap, 1st the possibility to express the envisaged custom as an abstract rule, 2nd a longa consuetudo, 3rd opinio iuris sive necessitatis, which is a certain legal practice as it is observed and as the relevant actors consider it to be law, and 4th the congruence with higher ranking law. See instead of all for the German context: Krebs and Becker (2014), p. 97; Larenz (1991), p. 433; Säcker (1971), p. 148; regarding the comparability of the different methods to form and interpret different legal sources in the light of Aristotle’s Theory of Four Causes: Klappstein (2017), pp. 111 et seq.; Klappstein (2016), pp. 405 et seq.
- 47.
Instead of all: Kriele (1981), p. 409.
- 48.
“The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice”.
- 49.
- 50.
For Germany regarding the category of case law: Klappstein (2009), pp. 266 et seq. with further references.
- 51.
See below: Sect. 2.2, pp. 54 et seq.
- 52.
Langenbucher (1996), pp. 63 et seq.
- 53.
“Evaluation of evidence at the court’s discretion and conviction
(1) The court is to decide, at its discretion and conviction, and taking account of the entire content of the hearings and the results obtained by evidence being taken, if any, whether an allegation as to fact is to be deemed true or untrue. The judgment is to set out the reasons informing the conviction of the judges.
(2) The court shall be bound to statutory rules of evidence only in the cases designated in the present Code.”—citations omitted.
- 54.
“The court shall decide on the result of the evidence taken according to its free conviction gained from the hearing as a whole.”—citations omitted.
- 55.
“(1) The court shall rule in accordance with its conviction gained from the overall outcome of the proceedings. The judgment shall state the grounds which were decisive for the judicial conviction.
(2) The judgment may only be based on facts and results of evidence on which those concerned have been able to make a statement.”—citations omitted.
- 56.
Aristotle, translated by Rapp (2002), I 1355a, 1356b, 1357a and 1403a; Dörpinghaus (2002), pp. 59 et seq. and 67 et seq. Rapp (2002a, b), p. 360; on the enthymeme in jurisprudence see the different articles in von Schlieffen (2011b); see as well: Schnapp (2016), pp. 127 et seq.; Simon (2011), pp. 700 et seq.; von Schlieffen (2011a), pp. 112 et seq.
- 57.
See above: Sect. 2.1.2.1, pp. 45 et seq.; Dannecker (1993), pp. 377 et seq.; Gast (2015), pp. 25 et seq.; Gabriel (2019), pp. 116 et seq.; Gröschner (2013), pp. 269 et seq. and 361; Jandach (1993), pp. 103 et seq.; Möller (1997), pp. 94 et seq.; Neupert (2011), pp. 70 et seq.; Schnapp (2016), pp. 140 et seq.
- 58.
See above: Sect. 2.1.2, pp. 44 et seq.
- 59.
See below: Sect. 2.4, pp. 61 et seq.
- 60.
- 61.
“Eine jede Lehre, wenn sie ein System, d.i. ein nach Prinzipien geordnetes Ganze der Erkenntnis sein soll, heißt Wissenschaft […] Eigentliche Wissenschaft kann nur diejenige genannt werden, deren Gewißheit apodiktisch ist; Erkenntnis, die bloß empirische Gewißheit enthalten kann, ist ein nur uneigentlich so genanntes Wissen. Dasjenige Ganze der Erkenntnis, was systematisch ist, kann schon darum Wissenschaft heißen, und, wenn die Verknüpfung der Erkenntnis in diesem System ein Zusammenhang von Gründen und Folgen ist, so gar rationale Wissenschaft. Wenn aber diese Gründe oder Prinzipien in ihr, wie z.B. in der Chemie, doch zuletzt bloß empirisch sind, und die Gesetze, aus denen die gegebene Facta durch die Vernunft erklärt werden, bloß Erfahrungsgesetze sind, so führen sie kein Bewußtsein ihrer Notwendigkeit bei sich (sind nicht apodiktisch-gewiß) und alsdenn verdient das Ganze in strengem Sinne nicht den Namen einer Wissenschaft, und Chymie sollte daher eher systematische Kunst, als Wissenschaft heißen.”—Kant (1786), Vorrede—citations omitted.
- 62.
See: Okasha (2016), p. 2.
- 63.
See above references mentioned in fn. 42 and 56.
- 64.
Rüthers et al. (2019), 10th edition 2015, p. 417, para 704; that can be different, e.g. in Austria the rather vague sections 6 et seq. Austrian ABGB or in Switzerland Art. 1 ZGB.
- 65.
Decision of the BVerfG of 23.10.1985, 1 BvR 1053/82, BVerfGE 71, 108, 115; decision of the BVerfG of 20.10.1992, 1 BvR 698/89, BVerfGE 87, 209, 224.
- 66.
Beaucamp and Treder (2019), 3rd edition 2015, pp. 33 et seq., paras 138 et seq.; Bydlinski (1991), p. 437; Gast (2015), pp. 257 et seq.; Koch and Rüßmann (1982), pp. 166 et seq.; Kramer (2019), 4th edition 2013, p. 56; Larenz and Canaris (1995), pp. 141 et seq.; Müller and Christensen (2013), pp. 328 et seq.; Muthorst (2019), pp. 104 et seq.; Rüthers et al. (2019), 10th edition 2015, pp. 416 et seq.; Zippelius (2012), pp. 35 et seq.; see as well further references at: Klappstein (2016), pp. 423 et seq. in fn. 150.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
- 72.
See above: Sect. 2.1.1.2, pp. 41 et seq.
- 73.
Carrier (2017), pp. 180 et seq.
- 74.
See below: Sect. 2.2, pp. 54 et seq.
- 75.
Carrier (2017), pp. 161 et seq.
- 76.
For the relevance before the court already Aristotle in the Rhetoric, cited at Gröschner (2013), p. 275 in fn. 31.
- 77.
Carrier (2017), pp. 175 et seq.
- 78.
- 79.
See below: Sect. 2.2, pp. 54 et seq.
- 80.
- 81.
Okasha (2016), p. 2.
- 82.
Okasha (2016), pp. 36 et seq.
- 83.
- 84.
See: European Commission (2017).
- 85.
European Commission (2017), p. 17.
- 86.
Carrier (2017), pp. 161 et seq.
- 87.
See below Sect. 2.4, pp. 61 et seq.
- 88.
Carrier (2017), p. 181.
- 89.
Kriele (1981), pp. 409 et seq.
- 90.
Carrier (2017), p. 184.
- 91.
Carrier (2017), p. 44.
- 92.
Kriele (1981), pp. 410 et seq.
- 93.
Kriele (1981), pp. 410 et seq.
- 94.
- 95.
See, e.g., the forthcoming proceedings, edited by Klappstein and Heiß of the conference in May 2019: “Fragen & Antworten – Verstehen & Erklären in den Wissenschaften”.
- 96.
- 97.
See below: Sect. 2.4.2, p. 62.
- 98.
Carrier (2017), pp. 161 et seq.
- 99.
- 100.
This notion can, of course, be contested from the point of view of natural law.
- 101.
Citing a quote of Winston Spencer Churchill: Wrigley (2002), p. XXIV.
- 102.
Klappstein (2018), pp. 79 et seq. with further references.
- 103.
See Sect. 2.3.3, pp. 59 et seq.
- 104.
- 105.
See Sect. 2.1.2.3, p. 48.
- 106.
See the Sect. 2.1.1.2, “The Standards of Administrative Legislation”, pp. 42 et seq.
- 107.
See Sect. 2.2.2, pp. 55 et seq.
- 108.
See Sect. 2.2.3, p. 56.
- 109.
See Sect. 2.2.3, p. 56.
- 110.
See Sect. 2.3, pp. 57 et seq.
- 111.
See Sect. 2.3.1.2, p. 58.
- 112.
See the Sect. 2.1.1.2 “The Legislative Procedure”, pp. 41 et seq.
- 113.
See Sect. 2.4.2, p. 62.
- 114.
See Sect. 2.4.2, p. 62.
- 115.
See Sect. 2.4.2, p. 62.
- 116.
See Sect. 2.3.3, pp. 59 et seq.
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Klappstein, V. (2021). Why Does Legal Reasoning Necessitate an Interdisciplinary Discourse and an Examination from the Point of Theory of Science?. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_3
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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