Abstract
The right to dignity plays an important role in constitutional law, and a more important one in criminal law. The chapter proposes taking substantive criminal law beyond the conventional dogmatic discourse, thus discussing the nature of substantive criminal law in light of universal fundamental constitutional principles and the need to investigate the nexus between constitutional law and substantive criminal law. It suggests that constitutionalizing substantive criminal law is necessary and inevitable, as it brings constitutional models of balance between confronted rights and interests, and provides the justification for attributing the stigma of guilt to certain acts. Attributing such a stigma needs to be highly supervised and justified, and that can be best done through constitutional scrutiny.
Research Fellow, the International Center for Health, Law and Ethics, Haifa University (Israel). I would like to dedicate this article to my mentor Prof. Mordechai Kremnitzer, a man of dignity and values, to whom I owe a lot.
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Notes
- 1.
Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law, GG). Art. 1(2). Translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html.
- 2.
Council of Europe (1988) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) as amended by Protocol No. 11. In Council of Europe Treaty Series 155. Articles 3 and 4.
- 3.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) s 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982. Article 15.
- 4.
Civil Appeal (The Supreme Court of Israel) 6821/93 Bank Hamezrahee Ha-Meuohad v. Megdal Kfar Shetufey (1993) 49(4) P.D. 221.
- 5.
Article 4 of the Basic Law.
- 6.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) Act 108 of 1996. Article 10.
- 7.
Defoe (1994).
- 8.
Kafka (1956).
- 9.
Stuntz (1997), p. 6.
- 10.
E.g., U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.
- 11.
Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514; Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660; Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225.
- 12.
- 13.
Fletcher Fletcher (1998a), p. 12.
- 14.
Hart (1958), p. 431.
- 15.
e.g., U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.
- 16.
Achour v. France (2006) IV, Eur. Ct. H.R. 268; Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993) Eur. Ct. H.R. 20.
- 17.
Fletcher (1996), pp. 11–42.
- 18.
E.K. v. Turkey (2002) Eur. Ct. H.R. 21.
- 19.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) Part I, § 11 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, c. 11.
- 20.
Stuart (1995), pp. 249–250.
- 21.
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985) 1 S.C.R. 295, 244 ¶ 117 (Dickson J).
- 22.
Curr v. R. (1972) S.C.R. 889, 899.
- 23.
Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law, GG). art. 1.
- 24.
Ibid, art. 2.
- 25.
BVerfGE 95, 96–103, 2 BvR 1851/94 (hereinafter “East German Border Guard Case”). https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/1996/10/rs19961024_2bvr185194.html; Poetter S (2009) The Main Leading Cases of Federal Constitutional Court – East German Border Guard (BVerfGE 95, 96). http://www.juraexamen.info/die-wichtigsten-leitentscheidungen-des-bverfg-ddr-mauerschutzen-bverfge-95-96/.
- 26.
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1999) 1 S.C.R. 497, 507 (Can.); Barak (2006), p. 88.
- 27.
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 484.
- 28.
Barak (2006), p. 86.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
Ibid, p 59.
- 32.
Ashworth (1995), p. 3, 83.
- 33.
Hart (1968), p. 157.
- 34.
Dostoevsky (1993).
- 35.
Ashworth (1995), p. 22.
- 36.
Blackstone (1769), pp. 4–5.
- 37.
Kant (1965), p. 140.
- 38.
Bishop (1892), p. 16.
- 39.
Ashworth (1995), p. 40.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
Mill (1859), p. 9.
- 43.
- 44.
Green (1997), p. 1570.
- 45.
Murphy (1988), p. 25.
- 46.
Barak (2006), p. 9.
- 47.
Ibid, p. 4; cf. Holmes (1881), p. 1.
- 48.
Colautti v. Franklin (1979) 439 U.S. 379.
- 49.
Shoham (1970), p. 47.
- 50.
Greenawalt (1995), p. 710.
- 51.
Bishop (1892), p. 19.
- 52.
Fletcher (2000), pp. 569–573.
- 53.
Fletcher (1998b), p. 12.
- 54.
Fitzgerald (1966), pp. 123–124.
- 55.
Eser (1966).
- 56.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
- 57.
Feinberg (1988b), pp. 1–3.
- 58.
Ibid, p. xiii.
- 59.
Ibid, p. 2.
- 60.
Ibid, p. 3.
- 61.
Ibid, p. 25.
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
For a comprehensive study on the various approaches, see Bendor and Dancig-Rosenberg (2016), p. 325 (Isr.) (Hebrew).
- 64.
- 65.
Selgado (2002) IsrSC 56(5) 529, at 551–62 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.).
- 66.
See In re Davis, 557 U.S. 1, 2 (2009). See also Fletcher (2010), p. 330.
- 67.
- 68.
Langodny (2011), pp. 764–765.
- 69.
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558, 575.
- 70.
Barak (2006), p. 57.
- 71.
E.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 567.
- 72.
Dworkin (1990), p. 11.
- 73.
Barak (2006), p. 58.
- 74.
Summers (1982), p. 810.
- 75.
Barak (2006), pp. 55–56.
- 76.
E.g., East German Border Guard Case, BVerfGE 67 at 151, 173.
- 77.
Donald and Howard (2015), p. 18.
- 78.
R. v. Oakes (1986) S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
- 79.
Fletcher (2002), pp. 77–78.
- 80.
Fletcher (2000), p. 532.
- 81.
I mean only those who could fairly be blamed for wrongdoing.
- 82.
Davis v. United States (1895) 160 U.S. 469, 485–486; Fletcher (2000), p. 536.
- 83.
Crimes are public wrongs, for in addition to the particular victim the public as a whole is injured in its sense of security and well-being.
- 84.
Fletcher (1998b), p. 77.
- 85.
The wrongdoing is reflected by the harm caused by the criminal actor to the legal-social order, namely violating a particular protected interest. On the notion of harm as wrongdoing. See Feinberg (1984), pp. 105–125.
- 86.
Fletcher (1998b), p. 213.
- 87.
Or ‘imputation.’ See Robinson (1997), pp. 279–377.
- 88.
On ‘criminal responsibility,’ see Brandt (1960), pp. 106–115.
- 89.
Fletcher (1998b), pp. 81–82.
- 90.
- 91.
Kafka (1956), p. 209.
- 92.
On the meaning of moral guilt, see Fletcher (1998b), p. 99.
- 93.
Babcock Gove (1993).
- 94.
Wendell Holmes (1963), p. 3.
- 95.
E.g., Nozick (1981a), p. 363.
- 96.
Ashworth (1995), p. 86.
- 97.
Ibid, p. 1.
- 98.
Simester and Sullivan (2002), p. 3.
- 99.
Ibid, pp. 20–21.
- 100.
E.g., Rawls (1973), p. 83.
- 101.
Kant (1965), p. 100 (parenthesis added).
- 102.
Jareborg (1988), pp. 44–46, 76–78.
- 103.
Simester and Sullivan (2002), p. 4.
- 104.
Nozick (1981a), pp. 366, 370.
- 105.
Hart (1968), p. 160.
- 106.
Ripstein (1999), pp. 140–141.
- 107.
It is remarkable that the German term for guilt is schuld. The German word associated with schuld is verschulden, which means debt, indebted, under obligation, and be blamed. Alike, the German term for retribution is vergeltung, which means to pay back or to repay.
- 108.
Nozick (1981b), pp. 60–61.
- 109.
See generally Descartes (1641).
- 110.
As Abraham Lincoln said during a speech, he delivered to the U.S. Congress on December 1, 1862, “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.” Lincoln (1953), p. 537.
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Wattad, M.S. (2021). Crime, Guilt and Punishment: Dignifying Criminal Law. In: Ghanayim, K., Shany, Y. (eds) The Quest for Core Values in the Application of Legal Norms . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78953-4_4
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