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Scope and Limits of General and Descriptive Legal Theories

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Conceptual Jurisprudence

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Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on general and descriptive legal theories—as proposed by H.L.A. Hart. To achieve such a goal, we will highlight some of the hurdles that these theories face by: (i) trying to identify and explain the necessary features of a practice that is considered to be absolutely contingent; (ii) proposing a general theory that explains only our concept of law; (iii) developing a descriptive or non-evaluative theory that does not describe empirical facts but instead uses evaluative judgments; (iv) describing a normative practice; etc. Finally, this essay concentrates on the debate over the criteria that determine which theory or when a theory of law is better than another in order to determine if general and descriptive legal theories depend on a normative thesis to get started.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hart (2012), pp. v and chap. I. He also clarifies that this book may also be considered an essay on descriptive sociology, apart from its concern on analysis. See Hart (2012), pp v–vi. Green explained the scope of this claim. Green (2012), pp. xlv–xlviii.

  2. 2.

    Hart (1983), pp. 2–3.

  3. 3.

    Green (2004), p. 575.

  4. 4.

    Recently, Michael Guidice attempted to show that while analytical jurisprudence and conceptual analysis of law have often been identified as one and the same proyect, the identification is false. Guidice claimed that conceptual analysis is not the most important part of analytical jurisrpudence. Guidice (2015), p. 17.

  5. 5.

    Hart (2012), p. 239.

  6. 6.

    Hart (1987), p. 36.

  7. 7.

    Hart (2012), p. 240.

  8. 8.

    Hart (2012), p. 242.

  9. 9.

    Hart (2012), p. 243.

  10. 10.

    Hart (2012), p. 244.

  11. 11.

    Endicott (1998), pp. 283–300, Bix (1993), p. 9.

  12. 12.

    Hart (2012), pp. 244–248.

  13. 13.

    Hart (2012), pp. 248–250.

  14. 14.

    Hart (2012), p. 243. In fact, some authors propose to construe—or to mitigate—the characterization that Hart creates with his theory in light of the context of Hart’s debate with Dworkin, bearing in mind his intent to contrast his theory with that of Dworkin. See Dickson (2004), p. 120.

  15. 15.

    Most notably: Dworkin (1983), p. 255, MacCormick (1981), pp. 160 and Lyons (1993), pp. 96–101.

  16. 16.

    Waluchow revealed that in a private communication Hart admitted that “Positivism and the Seperation of Law and Morals” contained a causal-moral argument for positivism. Waluchow (1998), pp. 411, 66fn.

  17. 17.

    Raz (1996), pp. 1–7.

  18. 18.

    I appreciate the valuable comments offered by Professor Michael Moore on this subject. His opinion about this matter can be found in Moore (1998), pp. 302–303.

  19. 19.

    Bix (1999b), p. 191 and Moore (1992), pp. 188–242.

  20. 20.

    On this matter we share the distinction made by Raz (1998), p. 273, n. 38 between general and essential aspects of law. For the Oxford professor, the general aspects of law are those that are shared by all legal systems, whereas the essential aspects are those attributes without which a social phenomenon could not be considered law. Based on this distinction it can be said that the issue of the essential properties of law is related to the issue of its general aspects because every essential property is also a general feature of law, however, not every general property is an essential property of law—this is the purpose of the distinction.

  21. 21.

    Dickson (2001), pp. 18–19.

  22. 22.

    Raz (2004), pp. 13, 19.

  23. 23.

    Langlinais and Leiter consider that Hart is a modest essencialist and summerized his method in the following way: “(1) a theory of law should be an account of the essential properties of modern legal systems in general; (2) a theoretical account of law’s essential properties can proceed without consideration of its value or reason-giving force; (3) legal systems are socially constructed, and a theory of law is therefore a theory of the social facts about beliefs, attitudes and actions that constitute a legal system; (4) this social construct is amenable to linguistic analysis, given that it is constituted by language; and (5) given that law is socially constructed, a general theory of law is just an attempt to elucidate the folk concept of law, that is, the concept manifest in the language we use to think and talk about it.” Langlinais and Leiter (2016), p. 679.

  24. 24.

    Raz (2004), pp. 4–7.

  25. 25.

    Raz (2004), p. 8.

  26. 26.

    Dworkin (2006), p. 229 and Bulygin (2007), pp. 99–110 support this option. With a similar approach, Moore argues the possibility that Hart may have believed that law has an essence that is related to the social world in a manner similar to the one in which natural phenomena are related to physics and natural sciences. In sum, it is said that instead of referring to “natural types” one could refer to “social types”. Moore (1998), pp. 312–313.

  27. 27.

    Bix (2003), pp. 555–556. See also Raz (1996), p. 7. In fact, Raz (2007), pp. 117–118 clarifies that his viewpoint does not adhere to the idea that law is a noun that is determined by the way in which reality is divided independently of the speakers and maintains that his position on how the concept of law changes is proof of this. Nevertheless, he maintains that in most cases things have their own nature independent of whether or not we have concepts that allow us to refer to them. In order to clarify this, he questions if the physical reality changes when we acquire the concept of a molecule. With this observation he suggests that things have a nature that differs from the concepts that are cultural products.

  28. 28.

    Raz (2007), pp. 117–118.

  29. 29.

    Bix (2006), p. 15.

  30. 30.

    For example, it should be stated that a society such as the Egyptians of the IV century B.C., did not have law because it did not share our concept of law. See Raz (2004), p. 19.

  31. 31.

    Bix (2009), Raz (1996), p. 7.

  32. 32.

    Jewish Theocratic societies are cited as examples of societies that did not have a concept of law but had legal institutions.

  33. 33.

    Raz (2004), pp. 23–27.

  34. 34.

    Raz (2004), p. 74.

  35. 35.

    This distinction proposed by Raz suggests that we must not identify the concept with the definitions of words. In fact, it is said that the meanings are somewhere between the words and the world. This distinction is exemplified by saying that the theories of law do not aim to explain the meaning (total or partial) of the word law, but the concept of law. It is considered that the context (linguistic and non-linguistic) is what establishes that the concepts do not need to be identified by the use of the specific words. However, the conditions that establish the identity of the particular concepts are idealizations built from our conceptual practices, that is to say, from the usage of those concepts in general. See Raz (2004), pp. 49–51, 55, 63.

  36. 36.

    Raz (2004), p. 68.

  37. 37.

    Hart (2012), p. 240.

  38. 38.

    Moore (1998), pp. 324–327.

  39. 39.

    Hart (2012), p. 241.

  40. 40.

    Dickson (2001), pp. 21–25 and Schauer (2005), p. 495, 10fn.

  41. 41.

    Hart (2012), p. 14.

  42. 42.

    Coleman and Leiter (1995), p. 207.

  43. 43.

    Hart (1987), p. 39.

  44. 44.

    Raz (1994), pp. 208–209.

  45. 45.

    Dickson (2001) passim. See also Hart’s distinction (1965), p. 1286 between purposive activity (as poisoning) and moral activity.

  46. 46.

    Coleman (2001), pp. 3, 175.

  47. 47.

    Dickson (2001) passim and Waluchow (1994), pp. 19–29.

  48. 48.

    Dickson (2001), p. 66.

  49. 49.

    Dickson (2001), p. 54.

  50. 50.

    Dickson (2001), pp. 58–60.

  51. 51.

    Waluchow (1994), pp. 19–29.

  52. 52.

    Dickson (2001), p. 181.

  53. 53.

    Bix (1993), pp. 194–197.

  54. 54.

    Finnis 2003, p. 116.

  55. 55.

    Hart 1987, p. 39, Raz (1994), pp. 208, Dickson (2001) passim and Waluchow (1994), pp. 19–29; etc.

  56. 56.

    Hart (2012), p. 89.

  57. 57.

    Hart (2012), pp. 89–91.

  58. 58.

    Hart (2012), pp. 202–203.

  59. 59.

    Hart (2012), p. 94.

  60. 60.

    MacCormick (1981, p. 29) and Bix (1999a). In fact, Hart (1983), p. 14 himself categorizes his theory this way.

  61. 61.

    Hart (2012), p. 243.

  62. 62.

    Hart (2012), p. 244.

  63. 63.

    Hart (1983), pp. 31–35.

  64. 64.

    Waluchow (1994), p. 30 and Marmor 2001, p. 154.

  65. 65.

    To see how confused the division that Hart makes between the internal and external points of view can be: Postema (1998), p. 226.

  66. 66.

    Hart (2012), p. 203.

  67. 67.

    Finnis (1980), pp. 9–19; Perry (1995), pp. 107–135.

  68. 68.

    Orrego (1997), p. 342.

  69. 69.

    Moore (1998), p. 326.

  70. 70.

    Himma (2002), p. 1224.

  71. 71.

    Some authors believe that these questions can find their origin in the question “what should I do?”. See Finnis (2003), pp. 107–108 and 115–116. A clear example of how an extensive debate between two viewpoints within the current analytical jurisprudence finishes without offering any kind of practical difference when trying to be applied can be seen in Etcheverry (2005).

  72. 72.

    Twining (2005), p. 577.

  73. 73.

    Dworkin (2002), pp. 1678–1679.

  74. 74.

    Posner (1996), p. vii.

  75. 75.

    Raz (1996), p. 7.

  76. 76.

    Authors like MacCormick, Waldron, Schauer and Campbell are part of this movement. See MacCormick (1985), pp. 1–41, Waldron (2001), pp. 411–433, Schauer (1998), 65–78 and Campbell (1996). See also Goldsworthy (1990), pp. 449–486 and Postema (1998), pp. 329–357. An interesting critical study of this version of legal positivism can be seen in Rivas (2007) passim.

  77. 77.

    Schauer (2005), pp. 495–501.

  78. 78.

    Hart discusses with Fuller about what kind of theory (defended by positivism or natural law) favors the civil disobedience to evil law. See Schauer (2005), pp. 493–495.

  79. 79.

    Dworkin (2004), pp. 9–12.

  80. 80.

    Marmor (2006), pp. 395–704.

  81. 81.

    Murphy (2001), pp. 371–409.

  82. 82.

    Perry (1995), pp. 197–135, Leiter (2001), pp. 355–370, Nino (1995), pp. 12–50 and Scarpelli (1955), p. 5.

  83. 83.

    Coleman (2001), p. 197.

  84. 84.

    Coleman (2002), p. 347.

  85. 85.

    Bix (2004), p. 18.

  86. 86.

    Dickson (2001), p. 144.

  87. 87.

    Coleman (2001), p. 3, Waluchow (1994), pp. 19–29 and Guidice (2015), pp. 88–89.

  88. 88.

    Lyons (1983), pp. 104–109.

  89. 89.

    Schauer (2005), pp. 65–78 and Schauer (1996), pp. 31–35.

  90. 90.

    Bix (2004), pp. 18–23, 28. Using a similar idea, Nino (1985), p. 191 attempts to solve the controversy between positivism and the natural law theory.

  91. 91.

    Raz (1996), pp. 4–7, (1998), pp. 280–281 and Dickson (2001), p. 93.

  92. 92.

    Bix (2003), p. 546.

  93. 93.

    Schauer (2005), pp. 493–501.

  94. 94.

    Orrego (1997), p. 129.

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    Juan B. Etcheverry

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  2. Hermann Kantorowicz-Institute of Fundamental Legal Research, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany

    Gonzalo Villa Rosas

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Etcheverry, J.B. (2021). Scope and Limits of General and Descriptive Legal Theories. In: Fabra-Zamora, J.L., Villa Rosas, G. (eds) Conceptual Jurisprudence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 137. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78803-2_3

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