Abstract
For years the European Union has been concerned about the quality of legislation and better regulation. This has been observed for a long time in various programmatic and working documents of the different EU institutions. It aims to fighting against the criticisms of over-legislation, excessive bureaucracy and obsolescence of European legislation, which undermine the credibility of the Union itself. On the other hand, this concern is also due to a sincere attempt to achieve better norms that harmonise or unify the Member States’ legislation. In recent times this interest has also focused on the criminal norms elaborated in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
In any case, despite the efforts made to date, the quality of EU legislation still can be improved. In this context, it would be desirable to provide legislative rationality—from the field of Legisprudence—for the elaboration of European criminal legislation. A good starting point for this would be the development of a model of supranational legislative rationality that establishes rationality criteria that can be used in European Criminal Law.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Becerra Muñoz (2013), pp. 287–288.
- 4.
Escobar Hernández (2006), pp. 181 et seq.
- 5.
See Díez Ripollés (2013), pp. 20 et seq.
- 6.
Cobb and Elder (1983), p. 12.
- 7.
It should be noted that a social issue is actually a construction or interpretation of reality and that, besides the construction of an issue, there may be various interests, which are not necessarily related to its resolution, such as partisan interests, personal political success, institutional interests, etc. See, Kingdon (2011), pp. 109–114; Cobb and Elder (1983), pp. 82–83; Edelman (1988), pp. 12–36; Díez Ripollés (2013), pp. 20–21.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Kingdon (2011), pp. 71–73. Although, as this author points out, it is not so important to know the origin of the idea as other factors that contribute to the good reception of this idea among the actors of the legislative process.
- 11.
Recently, remarkable efforts to study the European political agenda have been made. In this sense, the European Union Policy Agendas Project must be highlighted, which has developed a database and tried to analyse the European Council’s agenda, as well as the Comparative Agendas Project, focused on the comparative analysis of the political agendas of the different Member States. See, http://www.policyagendas.eu/ and http://www.policyagendas.eu/. Accessed 29 July 2019.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
Princen (2011), pp. 928 et seq.
- 17.
In criminal matters, it has been common to frame the issue as intimately linked to the common values of all Europeans and to turn it into a question of identity. However, not all issues are susceptible to this method.
- 18.
These can highly determine the content of the political agenda, more than what happens on a national level. Thus, pressures from one institution on another can make a certain issue access the agenda or be removed from it.
- 19.
In particular, the dramatic events which have acted as a focusing event have also played a great role in the EU in order to allow an issue enter the legislative agenda quickly or to increase its priority. Thus, the focus on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in the USA is paradigmatic. Terrorism was not an EU priority until that moment. The same phenomenon took place more recently due to the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks and the attack in Paris n November 2015, which triggered the process of Directive 2017/541.
- 20.
- 21.
Szapiro and Kaeding (2013), p. 171.
- 22.
- 23.
Hardacre and Akse (2015), p. 16.
- 24.
The initiatives can be consulted in: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful (Accessed 29 July 2019). In view of the limited success of this mechanism, as regulated by Regulation EU/211/2011, the EU has recently approved a new Regulation EU/2019/788 of April 17, 2019, on the European citizens’ initiative, replacing the previous one. This aims to make the European citizens’ initiative more accessible and user-friendly.
- 25.
The green papers consist of a document—published on the Directorate’s website—that contains a proposal from the Commission in relation to a given matter. Lobbyists or interested stakeholders generally have a deadline to respond and give their opinion on the matter. On the other hand, the white papers are similar to the last, but they contain more specific legislative proposals. See Hardacre and Akse (2015), pp. 29–30. Green papers have been common in criminal matters in recent decades. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the following: Green Paper on the protection of minors and human dignity in audio-visual and information services (COM/96/0483 final); Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor (COM/2001/0715 final); Green paper—Compensation to crime victims (COM/2001/0536 final); Green Paper from the Commission—Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union (COM/2003/0075 final); Green Paper on mutual recognition of non-custodial pre-trial supervision measures (COM/2004/0562 final); Green paper on the approximation, mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union (COM/2004/0334 final); Green Paper Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area—A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention (COM/2011/0327 final). White papers on this subject have been less common, although some examples can also be found, such as the White Paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such convictions in the European Union (COM/2005/0010 final).
- 26.
The most recent—open or closed—consultations can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/in-fo/consultations_es . Accessed 29 July 2019.
- 27.
Except in Directive 2017/1371/EU, on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, for which an external study was committed: “Study on the legal framework for the protection of EU financial interests by criminal law”, from February 2012 (Contract JUST/2011/EVAL/FW/1023/A4).
- 28.
- 29.
See particularly, Communication from the Commission on impact assessment (COM (2002) 276 final). Also consult other communications: European Governance: Better Law-making (COM(2002)275; Action Plan “Simplifying and Improving de Regulatory Environment” (COM(2002)278; Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue–General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission” (COM(2002)704); and The Collection and Use of Expertise by the Commission: Principles and Guidelines” (COM(2002)713).
- 30.
Muñoz de Morales Romero (2010a), pp. 494–495.
- 31.
See Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making (2003/C 321/01); Akse (2013), p. 31.
- 32.
See Impact assessment guidelines of 15th January 2009 (SEC (2009) 92), that replaces the former Commission Guidelines of 2005. More recently, the Better Regulation Guidelines (SWD(2015) 111 final).
- 33.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Better regulation for better results - an EU agenda” (COM(2015) 215 final).
- 34.
For supposed reasons of urgency, the Commission has dispensed the impact assessment with regards to Directive 2017/541/EU, on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decisions 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.
- 35.
There are guidelines on how to make the consultations, what to take into account, how to formulate the questions, etc. The same guidelines warn that not all stakeholders have the same strength and that the results of the consultation will not always be exactly representative of a state of opinion. See Impact assessment guidelines of 2009 (SEC (2009) 92), p. 20.
- 36.
See critically, Akse (2013), p. 50.
- 37.
See Impact assessment guidelines of 2009 (SEC (2009) 92), pp. 9–10.
- 38.
See Akse (2013), pp. 121, 125–126.
- 39.
For the same opinion, emphasising that this favours the principles of proportionality and ultima ratio, see Muñoz de Morales Romero (2010a), pp. 495–497.
- 40.
Íbid, p. 496.
- 41.
More information can be consulted in Corral Maraver (2020).
- 42.
See Rodríguez Torres (2016), pp. 3, 11–13.
- 43.
See Costa and Brack (2014), pp. 216–218, 226–227.
- 44.
See Rodríguez Torres (2016), pp. 4–10.
- 45.
Lelieveldt and Princen (2011), pp. 129–130. For these authors, 15,000 lobbyists would be closer to the reality.
- 46.
To try to alleviate this strength imbalance, the European Commission spent part of its budget to support some of the groups, especially NGOs and civil society associations, which usually have less resources to organise on a European level. In this way, the Commission allows other types of interests to be represented, although it seems that it tends to mainly fund groups that support its policies. In addition, this action does not completely eliminate the issues of the small interest groups when they move in a transnational scenario. See Mazey and Richardson (2006), pp. 286, 288–289; Lelieveldt and Princen (2011), pp. 137–138, 148.
- 47.
See This agreement shall replace the agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission of 23 June 2011, replaced by the Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation of 16 April 2014. Document available in: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014Q0919(01) (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 48.
- 49.
Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory Transparency Register (COM(2016) 627 final). Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0627 (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 50.
It is worth noting the Corporate Europe Observatory, which is a working group aimed at controlling the EU’s economic lobby, which it believes fosters social inequality and the degradation of the environment; it is also responsible for monitoring the phenomenon of revolving doors; and Integrity Watch created within the NGO Transparency International, to make the lobbying information in the EU institutions more accessible. More information available at: http://corporateeurope.org/ and http://www.integritywatch.eu/ (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 51.
It can be consulted at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 52.
Commission Decision of 21st February 2012 on setting up the expert group on EU criminal policy (2012/C 53/05) (register number: E02760).
- 53.
There are also other Commission’s expert groups that may eventually be consulted on criminal matters. For instance: Procedural criminal law (E00636), Commission stakeholder expert group on public procurement (E02807), EU High Level Group on combating racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance (E03425), Expert group on the rights of the child (E02884), Forum on organised crime prevention (E00622), Expert Group on Policy Needs for Data on Crime (Crime Statistics) (E02837), Expert Group Trafficking in Human Beings (E02722).
- 54.
This happened in the case of Directive 2017/1371/EU on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, for which the Commission requested the Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht of Freiburg drafted a report. See Wade, M. (2011), Evaluating the needs for and the needs of a European Criminal Justice System, Freiburg. Report available in: http://www.mpicc.de/shared/data/pdf/euroneeds_report_jan_2011.pdf (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 55.
The early warning mechanism is regulated by Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Articles 6 and 7), annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. This is an external control that seeks to monitor compliance of EU legislation with the principle of subsidiarity. This principle is important in the EU level because it determines its powers in the areas of shared competence, as is the case of Criminal Law and, thus, the Union should only legislate when regional or local authorities cannot do so with the same effectiveness. According to this, within a period of 8 weeks from the reception for the proposal, national parliaments may send a reasoned opinion to the presidents of the three institutions in which they assess the compliance of the legislative proposal with the principle of subsidiarity. Since the report is optional, it is common to issue it only when an infringement of that principle is detected. See, inter alia, Aranda Álvarez (2013), Camisón Yagüe (2012), Gattermann and Hefftler (2015), Peters (2009), Auel and Christiansen (2015).
- 56.
Through this mechanism, any Member State can consider that a certain draft directive in criminal matters affects its national fundamental rights. In that case, the Member State can request to stop the procedure and the submission of the proposal to the European Council. A period of 4 months is then opened for the European Council to reach an agreement on the proposal. This mechanism has both supporters and detractors, since on one hand it can be considered as a way of preserving constitutional legal traditions and, on the other hand, can be seen as an assignment to the Member States of a veto power and as a way to foster nationalism and intergovernmentality.
- 57.
See Mangas Martín and Liñán Nogueras (2010), p. 237.
- 58.
According to data from the legislature 2009–2014, 85% of the files are decided during the first reading and 8% in the so-called early second reading. Only 5% of them were concluded after a complete second reading and less than 2% reached conciliation and a third reading. There are no major differences depending on the area of activity. From the available data of the previous legislature (July 2014–April 2017) it appears that 75% of the files are adopted during the first reading, 23% during the early second reading and 2% in the second reading, without any file reaching the conciliation phase. In criminal matters, most of the directives up until now have also been approved during the first reading. Of the 50 files in which the European Parliament LIBE Committee—in charge of criminal matters legislation—was involved, 86% were adopted during the first reading and 14% during the early second reading, without any of them requiring the exhaustion of the second reading or reaching the conciliation phase. See Activity Report on the Ordinary Legislative Procedure available at http://www.europarl.euro-pa.eu/ordinary-legislative-procedure/en/ordinary-legislative-procedure.html (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 59.
See Rasmussen and Reh (2013).
- 60.
These documents are not usually available in the European Parliament Public Register. It is possible to request them on the basis of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30th May 2001 regarding public access to the European Parliament, Council and Commission’s documents, but there is a possibility that they will not be forwarded. See infra.
- 61.
See Hardacre and Akse (2015), p. 164.
- 62.
Íbid, pp. 160–162. See also, Joint declaration on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure (2007/C 145/02), recitals 7, 8 et 9.
- 63.
The judgement is based on a claim by Mr. Emilio De Capitani, who requested information on an ongoing legislative process from the European Parliament. Specifically, he requested the four-column document used in the trilogues. The Parliament only sent him partial information, refusing to transmit the information in the fourth column, which is the possible compromise text, because it considered it would undermine the legislative process. The Parliament’s decision was based on Article 4.3 of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, which allows denial of access to documents in the case they are for internal use or related to an institution that has not yet made a decision on a procedure, if its disclosure seriously impairs the decision-making process. This does not apply in the case that such disclosure has a higher public interest. The CJEU ruled in favour of Mr. De Capitani, pointing out that, given the usual use of trilogues in EU Law-making processes, it cannot be presumed, unless there are reasons that justify it, that providing these documents when required damages the legislative process.
- 64.
See more information at https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/69206 (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 65.
See Guía del Parlamento sobre el procedimiento legislativo ordinario, pp. 26–30. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/29856/qc0415816esn.pdf (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 66.
- 67.
Document available at http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/better_regulation/documents/c-om_2015_215_en.pdf (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 68.
Document available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:20-16:123:FULL&from=EN (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 69.
The infringement reports are available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/annual-reports/index_en.htm (Accessed 29 July 2019).
- 70.
See Protocol No. 36 on transitional provisions. See also Mitsilegas and Carrera (2014), pp. 22, 32.
- 71.
See Nieto Martín (2010), pp. 234–235.
- 72.
See Sánchez Lázaro (2016), pp. 247–254.
- 73.
Nilsson (2006), pp. 117–118.
- 74.
See, inter alia, Muñoz de Morales Romero (2010b), pp. 39–45.
- 75.
Corral Maraver (2020).
- 76.
Substantially following the model proposed by Díez Ripollés (2013), pp. 91–98, 109–162.
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Corral-Maraver, N. (2021). EU Law-Making Process in Criminal Matters After Lisbon. In Search of a Better EU Criminal Policy. In: Becerra, J. (eds) Criminal Law-Making. Legisprudence Library, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71348-5_4
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