Abstract
In this chapter we develop more extensively the logical framework introduced in Malerba et al. (Legal Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2016: The Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference, vol.294 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pp. 83–92, IOS Press, 2016) to model reasoning across legal systems. The logic extends the system presented in Rotolo et al. (Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL 2015, San Diego, CA, USA, June 8–12, 2015, pp. 99–108). In particular, we propose a logical system that encompasses the various interpretative interactions occurring between legal systems in the context of private international law. This is done by introducing meta-rules to reason with interpretive canons.
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Notes
- 1.
This does not cover cases where, e.g., a is semantically included in b, which was considered in Rotolo et al. (2015).
- 2.
A defeater is a rule which prevents opposite conclusions without allowing to positively deriving anything.
- 3.
An argument from substantive reasons states that, if there is some goal that can be considered to be fundamentally important to the legal system, and if the goal can be promoted by one rather than another interpretation of the statutory provision, then the provision should be interpreted in accord with the goal.
- 4.
Atomic rules do not substantially change, except for the notation for interpretations in Definition 6.
- 5.
“It is the duty and right of parents to support, raise and educate their children, even if born out of wedlock. […] The law ensures such legal and social protection measures as are compatible with the rights of the members of the legitimate family to any children born out of wedlock. […]”.
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Acknowledgements
This chapter is an extended version of Malerba et al. (2016). We would like to thank the anonymous referees of JURIX 2016 for their fruitful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.
The author was partially supported by the EU H2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 690974 for the project MIREL: MIning and REasoning with Legal texts.
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Malerba, A., Rotolo, A., Governatori, G. (2022). A Logic for the Interpretation of Private International Law. In: Rahman, S., Armgardt, M., Kvernenes, H.C.N. (eds) New Developments in Legal Reasoning and Logic. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70084-3_7
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