The Concept(s) of God

Abstract

“The Concept(s) of God” In this chapter, Lorkowski draws attention to just how difficult the concept of a deity would be. Though different conceptions entail different problems, the author’s primary focus is on difficulties inherent to the concept of virtually any creator deity. These include the absolute foreignness of the being that is posited, the dilemma created by positing an eternal person either temporally or atemporally, and the difficulties inherent to positing a god as a metaphysically necessary ultimate cause. Lastly, to both emphasize how problematic the concept is and as an introduction to the reader, Lorkowski includes an appendix of twenty worries regarding the impossibility of standard conceptions of a deity.

Appendix: A Plethora of Paradoxes (Just the Top Twenty)

• Atemporal existence is incompatible with human free will, as it entails that all times, including the future, are equally real to god.

• Atemporal causation is incoherent because cause must precede effect.

• Atemporal personhood is incoherent because intent is an inherently temporal notion.

• Temporal eternality is incompatible with perfect personhood, since the former entails infinite inaction while the latter requires moral action.

• Temporal eternality is incompatible with a perfect intellect, as the former makes creation at a specific time arbitrary while the latter entails a lack of arbitrariness.

• The combination of omnipotence and moral perfection is incompatible with suffering because omnipotence bestows the ability to prevent all suffering and moral perfection provides the motive and obligation to do so.

• Perfect justice is incompatible with people receiving different degrees of evidence regarding the existence of a deity.

• Perfect mercy is incompatible with perfect justice, since the former entails punishment less than what is just.

• Omniscience is incompatible with human free will, since the former entails that god knows our actions in advance while the latter entails that our decisions are not preordained.

• Omniscience is incompatible with god’s mode of being, as it excludes “what it’s like” knowledge, such as what it’s like to be limited, frustrated, blind, nauseous, etc.

• Omniscience is incompatible with moral perfection because god cannot know what it is like to desire to do wrong.

• Omniscience is incompatible with immutability, as the body of knowledge known by an omniscient being is constantly changing.

• Immutability is incompatible with god’s answering any prayer.

• Immutability is incompatible with a creation event.

• Immutability is incompatible with omnipresence because space (and therefore God’s presence) is continually expanding.

• Omnipotence is incompatible with incorporeality because god cannot do physical things like walk.

• Moral perfection is incompatible with god’s freedom, as the former requires god to do what is best in all situations.

• God’s omniscience is incompatible with moral perfection because the former entails that God knows secrets in which it would be improper to pry.

• God’s omnipotence and moral perfection are incompatible because a morally perfect being cannot do something wrong.

• God’s immateriality is incompatible with omniscience because God cannot have sensory knowledge.