Abstract
John Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is an enduringly important contribution to our understanding of rules, of language, and of rule-based or rule-bounded institutions. It is important to add to Searle’s account, however, by pointing out the regulative function of constitutive rules. Many human activities and goals can be pursued in multiple ways, but constituting the approved or official way of doing things, as is so common in law, has the effect of making alternatives less eligible, less available, or less permitted, all of which can be seen as the regulative overhang of constitutive rules.
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Schauer, F. (2021). On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. In: Di Lucia, P., Fittipaldi, E. (eds) Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is". Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_6
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