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Well-Being as Harmony

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Explorations in Ethics

Abstract

Hasko Von Kriegstein’s chapter aims to sketch a comprehensive theory of well-being based on a small set of principles of harmony. It is called harmonism. Here, Von Kriegstein develops a notion of harmony between mind and world that has three aspects. First, there is a correspondence between mind and world in the sense that events in the world match the content of our mental states. Second, there is a positive orientation toward the world, meaning that we have pro-attitudes toward the world we find ourselves in. Third, there is a fitting response to the world. Taken together these three aspects make up an ideal of being attuned to, or at home in, the world. Such harmony between mind and world constitutes well-being. These principles have the potential to provide a unified explanation of many items traditionally found on ‘objective lists’ of human values, such as achievement, knowledge, pleasure, self-respect, and virtue. The three principles can be understood as different aspects of a coherent ethical ideal of harmony.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Belshaw (2014, 580).

  2. 2.

    Cf. the Stoic contention that sometimes even a choice like ending one’s own life can be according to nature (Baltzly 2019, section 5).

  3. 3.

    Cf. Zimmerman (2001, chapter 3); for an opposing view, see Anderson (1993).

  4. 4.

    This notion is more or less equivalent to Zimmerman’s concrete states (Zimmerman 2001, 52–3).

  5. 5.

    See, for example, Crisp’s debunking arguments against accomplishment (Crisp 2006b, 637–42).

  6. 6.

    This assumes the object interpretation of desire-satisfactionism (Van Weelden 2019, 138).

  7. 7.

    Cf. Rice (2013, 200).

  8. 8.

    Sumner (1996, 70), Crisp (2006a, 102), Fletcher (2013, 219).

  9. 9.

    Hurka (1993), Dorsey (2010), Bradford (2015).

  10. 10.

    Cf. Lin (2017).

  11. 11.

    Cf. Lin (2017).

  12. 12.

    Relatedly, many have noted that some forms of hedonism are essentially one-item objective-list theories (e.g. Fletcher 2013, 206).

  13. 13.

    Cf. Hurka (2004, 252).

  14. 14.

    Cf. Chisholm (2013, 22), Fletcher (2013, 214).

  15. 15.

    Hurka (1993, chapters 8–9), Hurka (2011, chapters 4–5).

  16. 16.

    Cf. Searle (1983, 10–1).

  17. 17.

    Cf. Keller (2009, 668).

  18. 18.

    I would say, however, that the locution pre-established harmony is misleading insofar as it obscures the fact that the pre-establishment on God’s part is a necessary condition for there to be harmony at all rather than mere correspondence.

  19. 19.

    This is not to endorse a correspondence theory of truth. Rather, it is to endorse the truism that truth is objective, that is, that true beliefs ‘portray the world as it is’ (Lynch 2004, 12). Any theory of truth (and of knowledge) will have to capture that thought.

  20. 20.

    Keller (2004, 34), Hurka (2011, 97), Bradford (2015, 25), Navarro (2015, 3343), von Kriegstein (2019, 404).

  21. 21.

    Keller (2004, 33–4), Bradford (2015, 20), von Kriegstein (2019, 394).

  22. 22.

    Railton (1986, 9), Rosati (1996, 300).

  23. 23.

    Cf. Griffin (1986, 17).

  24. 24.

    Aristotle (1984, book X.3), Broad (1930, 234), Feldman (2004, 39).

  25. 25.

    Cf. Stalnaker (1984, 15).

  26. 26.

    I cannot discuss ill-being in this paper. I hope that the extrapolations I make when needed are uncontroversial. For more discussion of the negative analogue to well-being see Kagan (2015), Mathison (2018).

  27. 27.

    Feldman (2004, 64–5), Dorsey (2012, 415).

  28. 28.

    Overvold (1980, 117–8), Bykvist (2002, 480).

  29. 29.

    Adapting one’s pro-attitudes is not necessarily a prudent strategy. Insofar as it might undermine one’s motivation to improve one’s circumstances it might keep one from improving one’s well-being more substantially than adapting one’s pro-attitudes does.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Heathwood (2007).

  31. 31.

    Cf. Arneson (1999, 124), Keller (2009, 659).

  32. 32.

    Ewing (1939), Scanlon (1998).

  33. 33.

    Brentano (1889), Nozick (1981), Hurka (2001), Bradford (2015).

  34. 34.

    A fortiori, it is not a subjectivist theory in the sense that would require every valuable event to be the content of a pro-attitude (Van Weelden 2019, 147–9).

  35. 35.

    In cases of outrageous moral violations our indignation may, of course, quite rightfully overpower any such pity, however appropriate.

  36. 36.

    Cf. Maguire (2018, 793).

  37. 37.

    Cf. Sepielli (2009, 8).

  38. 38.

    See Nozick (1981, 427 for NACP; 432 for POP; 433 for FRP).

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Acknowledgement

In thinking about this project I have greatly profited from conversations with a large number of colleagues. I remember the following individuals making particularly helpful comments at various stages: Dani Attas, Gwen Bradford, Kenneth Boyd, David Enoch, Avigail Ferdman, Diana Heney, Thomas Hurka, David Kaspar, Ittay Nissan-Rozen, Devlin Russell, Sergio Tenenbaum, Andreas T. Schmidt, Wayne Sumner, Ulla Wessels.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Law & Business, Ted Rogers School of Management at Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada

    Hasko von Kriegstein

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  1. Philosophy, St. John’s University, Staten Island, NY, USA

    David Kaspar

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von Kriegstein, H. (2020). Well-Being as Harmony. In: Kaspar, D. (eds) Explorations in Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48051-6_6

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