Skip to main content

Consumers and Complaints: Marketing Evolution Leads to Legal Innovation from Contract Clauses to General Fairness

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Mapping Legal Innovation
  • 433 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter examines the ongoing legal innovation from law that heavily favors marketers to consumer complaint resolution that seeks to satisfy most consumers. The law started with the concept of “caveat emptor” declaring that consumers should not believe any “seller’s talk” and therefore could not complain about false statements. It then evolved to allow the enforcement of express warranties made by the marketer. Once explicit consumer contracts became the norm, government agencies and the courts restricted terms that unfairly favor marketers over consumers. However, U.S. law heavily favors the enforcement of contract-mandated arbitration but there is current controversy over whether such clauses also can prohibit class action arbitrations or lawsuits.

Meanwhile, after World War II, consumer product companies established complaint departments to resolve consumer complaints, when possible, at a minimal cost. As marketing changed to value long term consumer relationships over immediate concerns about profits and losses, company complaint handling departments evolved to seek to satisfy all consumers, where reasonably possible, regardless of consumer contract terms relevant to the complaints. Except for a few cases, this new approach largely replaces outside dispute resolution although dissatisfied consumers may still complain online or to outside agencies or even seek arbitration or litigation. This chapter predicts that this trend will continue and will lead to the adoption of consumer-friendly contract terms by major consumer product firms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    Marotta-Wurgler and Taylor (2013), p. 241.

  2. 2.

    See e.g., Ayres and Schwartz (2014), pp. 546–549.

  3. 3.

    Reis et al. (2003).

  4. 4.

    Preston (1996), pp. 27–42. Soon after this, the tort of deceit evolved to condemn intentional and knowingly false statements of fact made by the seller about the goods being offered for sale in situations where buyer reliance on such statements was reasonable. Proving intent of the speaker and the reasonableness of reliance on the statement made deceit difficult to prove. Id. at pp. 70–71.

  5. 5.

    Carnegie v. Household International Inc., 376 F. 3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).

  6. 6.

    Macaulay (1963), p. 55.

  7. 7.

    See e.g., Isaacs (1917).

  8. 8.

    Dimatteo (2010), p. 729.

  9. 9.

    Marotta-Wurgler and Taylor (2013), p. 257.

  10. 10.

    Id. pp. 245–246, 265.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Ayres and Schwartz (2014). Class action lawsuits address this failing by allowing attorneys to represent the entire class of consumers thereby challenging terms of the contract or advertising for the product.

  12. 12.

    See Sovern (2015) and Ayres and Schwartz (2014), pp. 579–585, (proposing that once marketers learn about consumer expectations of contract terms, marketers be required to warn consumers of contract terms that consumers don’t expect).

  13. 13.

    See Leff (1970) (proposing that contract terms be regulated just as the product itself is regulated).

  14. 14.

    White and Lesser Mansfield (2002), pp. 246–258.

  15. 15.

    Petty and Hamilton (2004), pp. 156–161.

  16. 16.

    16 C.F.R. § 444 (2001). See also White and Lesser Mansfield (2002), p. 233, pp. 258–259.

  17. 17.

    15 U.S.C.A. § 45b.

  18. 18.

    FTC Settlement Will Ban Fraudulent Marketers from Invention Promotion Business, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/05/ftc-settlement-will-ban-fraudulent-marketers-invention-promotion, (May 10, 2018).

  19. 19.

    Shariff et al. (2010), p. 214.

  20. 20.

    Schmitz (2012), pp. 95–100.

  21. 21.

    9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012). Frankel (2014), pp. 531, 532–541 . Arbitration clauses may not be enforced if they involve lack of consent or consideration, unconscionability or fraud. Schmitz (2012), p. 91.

  22. 22.

    Resnik (2015).

  23. 23.

    Davis (2013), pp. 95–96.

  24. 24.

    See e.g., Schmitz (2012), pp. 86–94; Horton and Cann Chandrasekher (2015), pp. 64–76. Most recently, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congressional intent was clear that arbitration clauses that prohibit class arbitrations should be enforceable despite an arguable conflict with labor laws that allow collective labor activity. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).

  25. 25.

    Horton and Cann Chandrasekher (2015), pp. 81–83.

  26. 26.

    Ferrera et al. (2014), p. 25.

  27. 27.

    Fitzpatrick (2010), pp. 818–820.

  28. 28.

    Bronstad (2019).

  29. 29.

    Bronstad (2017).

  30. 30.

    Epic systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).

  31. 31.

    Davis (2013), pp. 95–96.

  32. 32.

    Duffy (2007).

  33. 33.

    CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies From Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court, (July 10, 2017), available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court/.

  34. 34.

    Frankel (2014), p. 550.

  35. 35.

    Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff (2015), p. A1.

  36. 36.

    Horton and Cann Chandrasekher (2015), p. 91.

  37. 37.

    Id., at pp. 80–81.

  38. 38.

    Van Loo (2016), pp. 558–562. The CFPB obtained about $2.5 billion annually for consumers during the same period. Ibid.

  39. 39.

    Corkery and Silver-Greenberg (2020).

  40. 40.

    Sheth and Parvatiyar (1995), p. 407.

  41. 41.

    Macaulay (1963), pp. 55, 66 (“Holding a customer to the letter of a contract is bad for ‘customer relations.’ Suing a customer who is not bankrupt and might order again is poor strategy.”).

  42. 42.

    Reis et al. (2003), pp. 197–198.

  43. 43.

    Andreasen and Best (1977), p. 93.

  44. 44.

    Ahman and Buttle (2001), pp. 31–33.

  45. 45.

    Reis et al. (2003), p. 197.

  46. 46.

    Sheth and Parvatiyar (1995), p. 410.

  47. 47.

    Siedel and Haapio (2011), p. 104.

  48. 48.

    Technical Assistance Research Programs Institute (1979) Consumer Complaint Handling in America: Final Report, ES-4. However, a similar survey done in spring 1975 found that about 60% of complaining consumers said their complaint had been satisfactorily resolved. Andreasen and Best (1977), pp. 93, 98.

  49. 49.

    Tax et al. (1998), pp. 60, 72; Homburg and Fürst (2005), p. 95.

  50. 50.

    Technical Assistance Research Programs Institute (1986) Consumer Complaint Handling in America: an Update Study Part II, ES-2.

  51. 51.

    Siedel and Haapio (2011), p. 111.

  52. 52.

    Van Loo (2016), pp. 586–587.

  53. 53.

    Id., at p. 570 (2016).

  54. 54.

    15 U.S.C.A § 45b.

  55. 55.

    https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/council-113/media/complaint-stats/2016/usa_2016-sorted-by-complaints.pdf.

  56. 56.

    https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-releases-annual-summary-consumer-complaints.

  57. 57.

    Van Loo (2016), pp. 590–591.

  58. 58.

    The annual CFPB report is available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/2019-consumer-response-annual-report/.

  59. 59.

    Gundlach and Achrol (1993), p. 141.

  60. 60.

    Poppo and Zenger (2002).

  61. 61.

    Ahman and Buttle (2001), Sheth and Parvatiyar (1995), pp. 397–418.

  62. 62.

    Urban (2004), pp. 77, 82.

  63. 63.

    Van Loo (2016), p. 555.

  64. 64.

    Homburg and Fürst (2005), pp. 95, 108.

  65. 65.

    Kotler and Lane Keller (2009), pp. 128–129.

  66. 66.

    Urban (2004), pp. 77, 80.

  67. 67.

    Kotler and Lane Keller (2009), p. 129.

  68. 68.

    Knox and van Oest (2014), pp. 42, 51.

  69. 69.

    Id. at 42.

  70. 70.

    Van Loo (2016), p. 38.

  71. 71.

    Id, p. 549.

  72. 72.

    Van Loo (2016), p. 570.

  73. 73.

    Id., pp. 558–562.

  74. 74.

    Homburg and Fürst (2005), p. 95.

  75. 75.

    Knox and van Oest (2014), pp. 42, 50–51.

  76. 76.

    Van Loo (2016), pp. 564–566.

  77. 77.

    Id., at pp. 569–571.

  78. 78.

    Bouthinon-Dumas and Masson (2012), pp. 213, 232–233.

  79. 79.

    Id., p. 213.

  80. 80.

    See e.g., Dent (2009).

  81. 81.

    Powell (1993).

  82. 82.

    See e.g., Coyle and Green (2014), Choi et al. (2013) (discussing sovereign bonds).

  83. 83.

    Mooz and Evans (2015), p. 9.

  84. 84.

    Davis (2013), pp. 108–116.

  85. 85.

    Id, p. 96, citing David Horton (2010), pp. 654–655.

  86. 86.

    Resnik (2015).

  87. 87.

    Marotta-Wurgler and Taylor (2013).

  88. 88.

    Bagley (2008).

  89. 89.

    See Berger-Walliser et al. (2011), p. 66, Bouthinon-Dumas and Masson (2012), pp. 230–232.

  90. 90.

    Siedel and Haapio (2011), pp. 15–16.

  91. 91.

    See e.g., Coyle and Green (2014), pp. 133, 138–141; Choi et al. (2013), pp. 7–10.

References

  • Ahman R, Buttle F (2001) Customer retention: a potentially potent marketing management strategy. J Strat Mark 9:29

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreasen AR, Best A (1977) Consumers complain – Does Business respond? Harv Bus Rev 93

    Google Scholar 

  • Ayres I, Schwartz A (2014) The no-reading problem in consumer contract law. Stanford Law Rev 66:45

    Google Scholar 

  • Bagley CE (2008) Winning legally: the value of legal astuteness. Acad Manage Rev 33:378

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger-Walliser G, Bird RC, Haapio H (2011) Promoting business success through contract visualization. J Law Bus Ethics 17:55

    Google Scholar 

  • Bouthinon-Dumas H, Masson A (2012) The usefulness of legally useless clauses – proactive law and strategic perspective. In: Berger-Walliser G, Ostergaard K (eds) Proactive law in a business environment. Djof Furlag, Kobenhavn

    Google Scholar 

  • Bronstad A (2017) This factor is drawing increasing scrutiny in class action settlements. Natl Law J. March 15, available at http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202781386647/This-Factor-Is-Drawing-Increasing-Scrutiny-in-Class-Action-Settlements

  • Bronstad A (2019) Consumer class actions nearly tripled in the Past Decade, Report Says. Natl Law J. October 23, available at https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/10/23/consumer-class-actions-nearly-tripled-in-the-past-decade-report-says/

  • Choi SJ, Gulati M, Posner EA (2013) The dynamics of contract evolution. N Y Univ Law Rev 88(1):1–50

    Google Scholar 

  • Corkery M, Silver-Greenberg J (2020) ‘Scared to Death’ by Arbitration: Companies Drowning in their own System. New York Times, April 6, Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/business/arbitration-overload.html

  • Coyle JF, Green JM (2014) Contractual innovation in venture capital. Hast Law J 66:133

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis KE (2013) Contracts and technology. N Y Univ Law Rev 88:83

    Google Scholar 

  • Dent GW Jr (2009) Business lawyers as enterprise architects. Bus Lawyer 64:279

    Google Scholar 

  • Dimatteo LA (2010) Strategic contracting: contract law as a source of competitive advantage. Am Bus Law Rev 17:727

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duffy MC (2007) Comment: making waives; reining in class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion. Temp Law Rev 85:847

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferrera GR et al (2014) The legal and ethical environment of business: an integrated approach. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business

    Google Scholar 

  • Fitzpatrick BT (2010) An empirical study of class action settlements and their fee awards. J Empirical Legal Stud 7:811

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankel R (2014) The arbitration clause as super contract. Wash Univ Law Rev 91:531

    Google Scholar 

  • Gundlach GT, Achrol RS (1993) Governance in exchange: contract law and its alternatives. J Public Policy Mark Fall 12:141

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Homburg C, Fürst A (2005) How organizational complaint handling drives customer loyalty: an analysis of the mechanistic and the organic approach. J Mark 69(3):95. Available at https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.69.3.95.66367

  • Horton D (2010) The shadow terms: contract procedure and unilateral amendments. UCLA Law Rev 57:605

    Google Scholar 

  • Horton D, Cann Chandrasekher A (2015) After the revolution: am empirical study of consumer arbitration. Geo Law J 104:57

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaacs N (1917) The standardizing of contracts. Yale Law J 27:34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knox G, van Oest R (2014) Customer complaints and recovery effectiveness: a customer base approach. J Mark 78:42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kotler P, Lane Keller K (2009) Marketing management. Pearson

    Google Scholar 

  • Leff AA (1970) Contract as thing. Am Univ Law Rev 19:131

    Google Scholar 

  • Macaulay S (1963) Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study. Am Sociol Rev 28:55

    Google Scholar 

  • Marotta-Wurgler F, Taylor R (2013) Set in stone? Change and innovation in consumer standard-form contracts. N Y Univ Law Rev 88:240

    Google Scholar 

  • Mooz B, Evans A (2015) Silicon Flatirons Ctr, Ongoing Innovation in Legal Education. Silicon Flatirons Center

    Google Scholar 

  • Petty RD, Hamilton J (2004) Seeking a single policy for contractual unfairness to consumers. J Consum Aff 38:146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Poppo L, Zenger T (2002) Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strateg Manage J 23:707

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Powell MJ (1993) Professional innovation: corporate lawyers and private lawmaking. Law Soc Inquiry 18:423

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Preston IL (1996) The Great American blow-up: puffery in advertising and selling, rev edn. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison

    Google Scholar 

  • Reis D, Pena L, Lopez Paulo A (2003) Customer satisfaction: the historical perspective. Manage Decis 41:195

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Resnik J (2015) Diffusing disputes: the public in the private of arbitration, the private in courts, and the erasure of rights. Yale Law J 124:2680

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitz AJ (2012) American exceptionalism in consumer arbitration. Loyola Univ Chicago Int Rev 101(81):91

    Google Scholar 

  • Shariff MJ, Pomrenke M, Hilder V (2010) Perspectives on legal strategy through alternative dispute resolution. In: Masson A, Shariff MJ (eds) Legal strategies: how corporations use law to improve performance. Springer, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheth JN, Parvatiyar A (1995) The evolution of relationship marketing. Int Bus Rev 4:397

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siedel G, Haapio H (2011) Proactive law for managers: a hidden source of competitive advantage. Gower Publishing Ltd., Surrey

    Google Scholar 

  • Silver-Greenberg J, Gebeloff R (2015) Arbitration everywhere, stacking the deck of justice. New York Times, Nov. 1, at A1

    Google Scholar 

  • Sovern J (2015) Forum: consumers often sign contracts they don’t read or understand. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (March 3), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/2015/03/03/Forum-Consumers-often-sign-contracts-they-don-t-read-or-understand/stories/201502240007?pgpageversion=pgevoke

  • Tax SS, Brown SW, Chandrashekaran M (1998) Customer evaluations of service complaint experiences: implications for relationship marketing. J Mark 62:60–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Technical Assistance Research Programs Institute (1986) Consumer Complaint Handling in America: an Update Study Part II, ES-2

    Google Scholar 

  • Technical Assistance Research Programs Institute, Consumer Complaint Handling in America: Final Report, ES-4(1979)

    Google Scholar 

  • Urban GL (2004) The emerging era of customer advocacy. MIT Sloan Manage Rev 35:77–82

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Loo R (2016) The corporation as courthouse. Yale J Reg 33:547

    Google Scholar 

  • White AM, Lesser Mansfield C (2002) Literacy and contract. Stanford Law Policy Rev 13:233

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ross D. Petty .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Petty, R.D. (2021). Consumers and Complaints: Marketing Evolution Leads to Legal Innovation from Contract Clauses to General Fairness. In: Masson, A., Robinson, G. (eds) Mapping Legal Innovation . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47447-8_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47447-8_13

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-47446-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-47447-8

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics