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Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood

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Abstract

In the wake of the 2010/11 Arab uprisings, Qatar is seen to have taken significant foreign policy risks in supporting Islamists, including the moderate Islamist Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). This chapter will show that Qatar’s support for the SMB was not precarious, but pragmatic, based on Qatar’s constructed identity and a specific political environment between 2011 and August 2013. Regional dynamics in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, at the time, predisposed the Qatari government to view the Syrian uprising as an opportunity to enhance Qatar’s influence in the region. The chapter will also demonstrate that Qatar’s support for the SMB against the one-party Ba’th regime initially resonated with many actors in the region and internationally.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lina Khatib, “Qatar and the Recalibration of Power in the Gulf” (Carnegie Middle East Center, September 2014), 4–7, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_recalibration.pdf; Lina Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (March 1, 2013): 417–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12025; David B. Roberts, “Qatar and the UAE: Exploring Divergent Responses to the Arab Spring,” The Middle East Journal 71, no. 4 (Autumn 2017): 558, https://doi.org/10.3751/71.4.12.

  2. 2.

    For the purposes of this chapter, ‘moderate Islamist’ denotes an ideological commitment by Islamists to non-violent political change and parliamentary democracy.

  3. 3.

    See Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013), 74.

  4. 4.

    Brad Lendon, “Qatar Hosts Largest US Military Base in Mideast,” CNN, June 6, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html.

  5. 5.

    Qatar hosted an Israeli trade office from 1996 to 2009, and Hamas relocated from Damascus to Doha in response to the Syrian conflict in 2011/12. For more on Qatar and Israel, see Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” The Middle East Journal 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 443–59.

  6. 6.

    See Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 108–9.

  7. 7.

    Allen James Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (Washington, DC: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 58.

  8. 8.

    Cihat Battaloğlu, Political Reforms in Qatar: From Authoritarianism Top Political Grey Zone (Berlin, Germany: Gerlach Press, 2018), 18.

  9. 9.

    Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 55.

  10. 10.

    Fromherz, 58–59.

  11. 11.

    Qatari tribes shifted from the Maliki to the Hanbali school of law under the influence of Wahahbism during the rule of Sheikh Jasim. See Andrew Hammond, “Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father, Like Son,” Policy Brief (European Council on foreign relations (ecfr.eu), February 11, 2014), 4, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf.

  12. 12.

    Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 59.

  13. 13.

    The formation of the Saudi state was based on an alliance in 1744 between the fighting power of Muhammad bin Saud and the religious call of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab. See Stephane Lacroix and George Holoch, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 8.

  14. 14.

    J.E. Peterson, “Britain and Formation of Gulf States: The Case of Qatar and Shaykh Jassim Bin Muhammad,” in Jassim Bin Mohammed Bin Thani—The Day of Solidarity, Loyalty and Honor, ed. Jamal Mahmud Hajar et al. (Qatar: GEM Advertising & Publications, 2008), 67.

  15. 15.

    Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, “Seeds of Change: Comparing State–Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 107.

  16. 16.

    David B. Roberts, “Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy Objectives,” Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 2 (2012): 234–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.695123.

  17. 17.

    Mark Lynch, “How Trump’s Alignment with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Is Inflaming the Middle East” (Project on Middle East Political Science, October 2017), 33, https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf.

  18. 18.

    Robert Mogielnicki, “The New Economics of Qatar–Turkey Relations,” Middle East Institute, August 30, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/new-economics-qatar-turkey-relations.

  19. 19.

    Mohammed Sergie, “Embattled Qatar Is Rich Enough to Get by for Another 100 Years,” Bloomberg Businessweek, June 6, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-06/a-year-later-iran-is-the-big-winner-of-the-qatar-embargo.

  20. 20.

    “A Renewed Sense of Nationalism Takes Root in Qatar Reflections,” Stratfor Worldview, December 29, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/renewed-sense-nationalism-takes-root-qatar.

  21. 21.

    See Linda Berger, “The Gulf Cooperation Council between Unity and Discord towards the Arab Uprisings,” Sicherheit Und Frieden (S + F)/Security and Peace 32, no. 4 (2014): 260.

  22. 22.

    Jocelyne Cesari, “Disciplining Religion: The Role of the State and Its Consequences on Democracy,” Journal of Religious and Political Practice 2, no. 2 (2016): 139–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2016.1181365.

  23. 23.

    Courtney Freer, “Rentier Islamism in the Absence of Elections: The Political Role of Muslim Brotherhood Affiliates in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 49, no. 3 (August 2017): 483, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743817000344.

  24. 24.

    Lacroix and Holoch, Awakening Islam, 10.

  25. 25.

    Ahmed Abdelkareem Saif, “Deconstructing before Building: Perspectives on Democracy in Qatar,” in Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2012), 18.

  26. 26.

    David B. Roberts, “Qatar and the Brotherhood,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, no. 4 (2014): 25, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.941557.

  27. 27.

    Roberts, 26.

  28. 28.

    Roberts, 25; Baskan and Wright, “Seeds of Change,” 97–100.

  29. 29.

    Matthew Hedges and Giorgio Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood: What Does the Future Hold?” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 131.

  30. 30.

    Stéphane Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” POMEPS Briefings (Project on Middle East Political Science, October 2017), https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf.

  31. 31.

    Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 132–33.

  32. 32.

    Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” 51.

  33. 33.

    Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 133.

  34. 34.

    Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” 52.

  35. 35.

    Bernard Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 19, 2013), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130219_Haykel_SaudiQatar_GulfAnalysis.pdf.

  36. 36.

    Qaradawi accepted Qatari citizenship in 1969.

  37. 37.

    David H. Warren, “Qatari Support for the Muslim Brotherhood Is More Than Just Realpolitik, It Has a Long, Personal History,” MAYDAN: Politics & Society, July 12, 2017, https://www.themaydan.com/2017/07/qatari-support-muslim-brotherhood-just-realpolitik-long-personal-history/.

  38. 38.

    David B. Roberts, “Qatar, the Ikhwan, and Transnational Relations in the Gulf,” POMEPS Briefings (Project on Middle East Political Science, October 2017), https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf.

  39. 39.

    David H. Warren, “The ‘Ulamā’ and the Arab Uprisings 2011–13: Considering Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the ‘Global Mufti,’ between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Legal Tradition, and Qatari Foreign Policy,” New Middle Eastern Studies 4 (2014): 7.

  40. 40.

    Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 149.

  41. 41.

    Hamid bin Jaber al-Thani was Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister at the start of the Arab uprisings. He vacated the two ministerial positions when the former Emir abdicated in June 2013.

  42. 42.

    “UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)” (United Nations, March 17, 2011), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/Libya%20S%20RES%201973.pdf.

  43. 43.

    Shahram Akbarzadeh and Arif Saba, “UN Paralysis over Syria: The Responsibility to Protect or Regime Change?” International Politics 56, no. 4 (August 2019): 536–50, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0149-x.

  44. 44.

    “Security Council Veto List (in Reverse Chronological Order),” United Nations, accessed September 3, 2019, http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick.

  45. 45.

    The draft resolution was sponsored by France, Britain, Germany, Portugal, and Northern Ireland.

  46. 46.

    “UN Security Council 6627th Meeting” (United Nations, October 4, 2011), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627.

  47. 47.

    Christopher Phillips, “Eyes Bigger Than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 38–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12250.

  48. 48.

    Ralf Trapp, “Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 19, no. 1 (April 2014): 9, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kru002.

  49. 49.

    See “UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013)” (United Nations, September 2013), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013).

  50. 50.

    Alex De Waal, “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011,” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (March 2013): 369, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12022.

  51. 51.

    Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, “Libya’s Pathway to Peace,” New York Times, April 14, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html.

  52. 52.

    Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2014), 3, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_arab_spring.pdf.

  53. 53.

    Daniel F. Wajner and Arie M. Kacowicz, “The Quest for Regional Legitimation: Analyzing the Arab League’s Legitimizing Role in the Arab Spring,” Regional & Federal Studies 28, no. 4 (2018): 16, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1451846.

  54. 54.

    Waal, “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011,” 376.

  55. 55.

    Wajner and Kacowicz, “The Quest for Regional Legitimation,” 16.

  56. 56.

    Phillips, “Eyes Bigger Than Stomachs,” 38.

  57. 57.

    “Security Council Debates Situation in Syria,” UN News, January 31, 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/01/401882-security-council-debates-situation-syria.

  58. 58.

    “Arabs Agree New Syria Plan, Urge U.N. Support,” Reuters, January 22, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-initiative/arabs-agree-new-syria-plan-urge-u-n-support-idUSTRE80L0WL20120122.

  59. 59.

    India and South Africa are members of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) grouping, and both shared in the Russian interpretation that UNSC 1973 was misused in aid of regime change in Libya.

  60. 60.

    “Syria: Ban Voices Deep Regret after Security Council Fails to Agree on Resolution,” UN News, February 4, 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/402402-syria-ban-voices-deep-regret-after-security-council-fails-agree-resolution.

  61. 61.

    “UN Security Council 6711th Meeting” (United Nations, February 4, 2012), 9, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6711.

  62. 62.

    “General Assembly Demands Syria Halt Violence Without Delay,” UN News, February 16, 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/403592-general-assembly-demands-syria-halt-violence-without-delay.

  63. 63.

    “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Strongly Condemning ‘Widespread and Systematic’ Human Rights Violations by Syrian Authorities,” United Nations, February 16, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11207.doc.htm.

  64. 64.

    “Kofi Annan Appointed Joint Special Envoy of United Nations, League of Arab States on Syrian Crisis,” United Nations, February 23, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14124.doc.htm.

  65. 65.

    See Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983); Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 2013); Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945–1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 213–33, https://doi.org/10.3751/65.2.12; and Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the ‘Struggle for Syria’, 1947–1958 between Accommodation and Ideology,” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (May 2004): 134–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/0026320042000213492.

  66. 66.

    Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution,” Financial Times Magazine, May 17, 2013.

  67. 67.

    “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya,” Middle East/North Africa Report (Cairo/Brussels, 6: International Crisis Group, June 6, 2011), 24–26.

  68. 68.

    Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and Arthur Quesnay, Civil War in Syria: Mobilization and Competing Social Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 135.

  69. 69.

    Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Syria’s Political Opposition,” Middle East Security Report (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War (ISW), April 2012), 9, http://www.scpss.org/libs/spaw/uploads/files/Reports/Syrias_Political_Opposition.pdf.

  70. 70.

    In an interview in June 2015, a member of the SMB executive alleged that the SNC’s reversal of fortune in 2012 was primarily due to the enduring Western suspicion of Islamists.

  71. 71.

    Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

  72. 72.

    Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay, Civil War in Syria, 137.

  73. 73.

    Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

  74. 74.

    International Crisis Group, “Anything but Politics: The State of Syria’s Political Opposition,” Middle East Report (Beirut/Damascus/Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 17, 2013), 22, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/146%20Anything%20But%20Politics%20-%20The%20State%20of%20Syrias%20Political%20Opposition.pdf.

  75. 75.

    Interview conducted with a member of the SMB executive in June 2015.

  76. 76.

    See Philipp O. Amour, “The Arab Spring Movement: The Failed Revolution. Preliminary Theoretical and Empirical Deliberation,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington, DC: Academica Press, 2018), 199–224.

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Booysen, H. (2020). Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In: Amour, P. (eds) The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_7

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