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Neuroscientific Evidence and Criminal Trials

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Neuroscience and Law

Abstract

Neuroscience have been on the scene for some time now, alongside the more traditional investigation methods and tools. The most important contribution neuroscience has offered so far is in the field of insanity; it is also used for the reconstruction of the facts and, in particular, for the verification of the reliability of the declarations made by witnesses and defendants during the trial. An updated version of the lie detector is represented by the IAT, a tool designed to decipher the lies through a careful analysis of the reaction times of the examined subject. The problem remains—on which there are divergent opinions—of the compatibility of this type of techniques with the freedom of self-determination and, more generally, regarding the rights of the person.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ex multis, see Bargis (2011), p. 47; Capraro (2012), p. 95 et seq.; Caprioli (2008), p. 3520 et seq.; Di Giovine (2011), p. 837 et seq.; Dominioni (2005), p. 11 et seq; Scalfati (2011), p. 149 et seq. More recently, see Carlizzi (2018), and also the Volume Carlizzi and Tuzet (2018). For a specific application of neuroscience to criminology and risk assessment see Zara (2013), Zara and Farrington (2016), Chapter 4, p. 148 et seq. See also Zara and Gino (2018) for the application of specialized assessment of risk in particular forms of violence such as IPV (Intimate Partner Violence).

  2. 2.

    Bentham (1827).

  3. 3.

    Naturally, it is possible that one day the progress of artificial intelligence will be to realize the dream of deducing historical truth from science, with the result of replacing the evaluations and the inferences of judges to computers; but it is equally evident that the contradictory and the figure of the defence lawyer would then also be set.

  4. 4.

    Concerning the prejudices that sometimes fuel hostility towards neuroscience, see, e.g. Di Giovine (2011), pp. 837 et seq., pp. 842 et seq., whereby jurists base ‘doctrinal coldness’ on the unconfessed fear that neurosciences can provide evidence in the near future to expropriate the judge in the assessment of the trial definitively, by handing it all over to the expert, thus leading to the point of zenith that a progressive review of the legal game that the entrance of scientific evidence has long been determined within the penal process and reinforcing the risk of a different and surreptitious return to the system of forensic evidence.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Pizzetti (2012).

  6. 6.

    Cf. critical thinking with respect to the use of the art. 189 c.p.p. to introduce in the crimal trial the c.d. ‘scientific evidence’ Bozio (2013), pp. 66 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Concerning the risks connected with the compulsory execution of neuroscientific examinations, Tonini and Conti (2012), p. 184.

  8. 8.

    Regarding the vagueness of the concept of “medical findings” and its relative limits Tonini (2012), p. 350; Conti (2011), pp. 130 et seq.; Gabrielli (2009), pp. 30, 73.

  9. 9.

    Cordero (2012), p. 243.

  10. 10.

    Court of Appeal of Trieste September 18, 2009, see Forza (2010); Court of Como May 20, 2011, see Terracina (2012). For the analysis of both court cases and for the framework of the opposing attitudes of the jurists with respect to the entry of neuroscience into the criminal trial, See Musumeci (2012), p. 119.

  11. 11.

    Regarding the relationships between neuroscience and freedom of will see Di Giovine (2011), pp. 840 et seq., whereby neurosciences do not modify the traditional conceptual categories based on insanity.

  12. 12.

    See Garapon (2012), p. 91, the possibility of judging the mentally ill had already been suggested in the 1960s by Thomas Stephen Szasz, one of the fathers of antipsychiatry, who saw an emancipation from the control over the interiority imposed by asylums: abolition of non-imputability, meant all accused of the crime should have been judged.

  13. 13.

    Garapon (2012), pp. 90 et seq.

  14. 14.

    Cf. point 7 of the Guidelines drawn up during the Seminar on “The Scientific Evidence within Criminal Trials” promoted by the International Institute of Criminal Sciences (ISISC) on 15 June 2008 (“In order to preserve the autonomy of the judges’ assessment, questions need to be formulated in ways that do not imply definitions or legal qualifications whose knowledge must be reserved for the judge”).

  15. 15.

    See Capraro (2012), p. 101.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Garapon (2012), p. 86.

  17. 17.

    The Court of Cremona (July 19, 2011) ordered an examination with the IAT and TARA methodologies on the autobiographical memory of the victim, as an integrative investigation.

  18. 18.

    Regarding IAT techniques, cf. Stracciari et al. (2010), pp. 206 et seq. In termini critici v. di recente, Gennari (2018), p. 5 et seq., whereby “it is not completely true that the proposed test enjoys such widespread credit”.

  19. 19.

    A primal and amusing version of IAT is described by the philosopher Bertrand Russell: “As everyone knows, the association offers a method to trap criminals. You are questioning, let’s say, a man you suspect slit his wife’s throat with a knife. You say a word, and he must answer with the first word that comes to mind. You say “cat” and he answers “dog”; you say “politician” and he says “thief”; you say ‘knife’ and he has a first impulse to say ‘throat’, but he knows it’s better not to say it, so, after a long hesitation he says ‘fork’. The duration of the hesitation demonstrates his resistance”, (1969), p. 139 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Gennari (2018), p. 10 et seq.

  21. 21.

    Capraro (2012), p. 101.

  22. 22.

    See, ex multis, Cordero (2012), p. 616; Di Chiara (2007), pp. 19 et seq.; Grevi (2018), p. 313; Grifantini (2015), p. 678.

  23. 23.

    Ricci (1999), pp. 543 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Cfr. Ferrua (2011), pp. 77 et seq. See also Ferrua (2017), pp. 317 et seq.

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Ferrua, P. (2020). Neuroscientific Evidence and Criminal Trials. In: D’Aloia, A., Errigo, M.C. (eds) Neuroscience and Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38840-9_19

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