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Solving the Hi-lo Paradox: Equilibria, Beliefs, and Coordination

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Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency

Part of the book series: Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality ((SIPS,volume 11))

Abstract

Game theorists have tried for decades to explain how rational or quasi-rational individuals are able to coordinate in situations in which there is more than one way to satisfy their preferences. In this chapter I focus in particular on the formation of common beliefs that supposedly sustain coordination in Hi-lo games. I review some attempts to solve the problem, such as bounded rationality, team reasoning, and solution thinking. Following their lead, I suggest that successful coordination is belief-less coordination, and that simple means-ends rationality explains how coordination problems may be solved using techniques of minimal mindreading.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There is also a third equilibrium in this game, where the players choose each strategy with a certain probability, and they have no incentive to change this probability. Such ‘mixed-equilibrium strategies’ are highly implausible in coordination games, and therefore I will ignore them from now on. I trust the reader to be able to figure out, before the end of the chapter, why they are so implausible.

  2. 2.

    Previous discussions can be found in Hodgson (1967), Gauthier (1975), Sugden (1993).

  3. 3.

    On how institutions help solve coordination problems, see e.g. Guala (2016).

  4. 4.

    Gauthier (1975), Sugden (1993), Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997).

  5. 5.

    For an overview, see e.g. Pacuit and Roy (2015).

  6. 6.

    I will use these terms as roughly synonymous: mindreading is the activity of detecting and interpreting the mental states of other agents. A mental agent uses mental states attributions to explain and predict the behaviour of others.

  7. 7.

    The expression ‘primary salience’ has been coined by Mehta, Starmer and Sugden (1994) in a paper that will be discussed shortly.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Simon (1982), Gigerenzer and Selten (2002).

  9. 9.

    The evidence indicates that very few people actually go beyond level-2 reasoning (cf. Nagel 1995; Camerer et al. 2004).

  10. 10.

    See e.g. Gilbert (1989), Hurley (1992), Searle (1990), Tuomela (1995, 2002), Bratman (2014).

  11. 11.

    See Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003), Bacharach (2006), Gold and Sugden (2007).

  12. 12.

    According to Bacharach (2006), the process is automatic and largely sub-conscious. According to Sugden (2011), each individual can make a deliberate decision whether to reason in team mode or not.

  13. 13.

    See also Pacherie (2018). I have discussed the similarities between team reasoning and solution thinking in Guala (2016, 2018).

  14. 14.

    See e.g. Morton (1980), Gordon (1986), Goldman (1989).

  15. 15.

    This is a modified version of the scheme in Guala (2016: 97). That scheme suffers from a confusion between means and goals that I have tried to correct here.

  16. 16.

    I take MMR to be a cluster of approaches sharing a family resemblance, rather than a unified body of theory. Relevant contributions include e.g. Gallagher (2001), Gallagher and Hutto (2008), Vesper et al. (2010), Andrews (2012), Butterfill and Apperly (2013), Pacherie (2013), Fiebich and Coltheart (2015).

  17. 17.

    See e.g. Evans (1984), Sloman (1996), Kahneman (2011).

  18. 18.

    See, again, Andrews (2012), Fiebich and Coltheart (2015).

  19. 19.

    The idea that attributions of ‘full blown’ mental agency play primarily a normative, justificatory function can be traced back to Bruner (1990). This insight has been further developed and articulated by McGeer (1996, 2007), Hutto (2008), Zawidzki (2008, 2013), Andrews (2012, 2015).

  20. 20.

    See Wellman and Woolley (1990), Perner (1991).

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Acknowledgments

I have presented this paper at the University of Rostock and at the University of Milan. I’m grateful to seminar participants and to Anika Fiebich for making detailed comments that have helped me to improve the paper. All the remaining mistakes are obviously mine.

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  1. Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milano, Italy

    Francesco Guala

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Correspondence to Francesco Guala .

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    Anika Fiebich

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Guala, F. (2020). Solving the Hi-lo Paradox: Equilibria, Beliefs, and Coordination. In: Fiebich, A. (eds) Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_9

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