Abstract
As it is well-known, Husserl distinguishes between three levels of formal logic: pure morphology, consequence-logic and truth-logic. The distinction between the second level, which concerns the peculiarities of the derivation of propositions from each other, and the third level, which concerns the deduction or any kind of proof as a whole in which the truth of the premises and the consequences are at work, is very important to understand Husserl’s conception of pure logic. Such a distinction remains unnoticed for the truth-functional approaches toward logic, for they define the meaning of logical connectives on the basis of truth and falsity. Therefore, they cannot recognize the peculiarities of the derivation or consequence-relation as such. My aim in this paper is to show that the dialogical distinction between particle rules and structural rules, and also the distinction between play-level and strategy-level, may be considered as representing the distinction between the second and the third levels of logic; and thus the dialogical semantics provides us with a device to explore the phenomenological idea in a precise way. On the other hand, certain themes of the overall phenomenological analysis of logic help to show the philosophical significance of those dialogical features.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Der ideale Gegenstand, der ideale schlichte Gegenstand (ich meine nicht in kategorialer Synthesis gefasst) und ebenso jeder kategoriale Gegenstand, der auf Ideales geht, ist ein in der Ideation, in der kategorialen Anschauung abgeschlossen, fest, fertig Gegebenes oder zu Gebendes (Husserl 1986, p. 210).
- 3.
For a good explanation of this point see Rückert (2001).
- 4.
- 5.
In order to handle this rule it should be determined for each party how many times it may repeat the same attack (repetition of defense is redundant in any case and it is not allowed). This is called repetition ranks. Clerbout (Clerbout 2014) has shown that, in propositional logic, it would be sufficient to assign the rank n + 1 to the proponent while the rank n is assigned to the opponent, namely there is a winning strategy for a formula if and only if there is a winning-strategy for that formula while the proponent is allowed to attack once more than the opponent. Therefore, I do not specify the ranks in the following dialogues, and one can suppose that it is 1 for O and 2 for P.
- 6.
See for example (Husserl 1969, p. 137).
References
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Acknowledgements
This paper is a revised version of the talk I gave in the workshop Constructive Semantics. I warmly thank the organizer, Dr. Christina Weiss, for the invitation and also the participants for the valuable comments.
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Shafiei, M. (2019). A Phenomenological Analysis of the Distinction Between Structural Rules and Particle Rules in Dialogical Logic. In: Weiss, C. (eds) Constructive Semantics. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 44. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21313-8_3
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