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The Effectiveness-Legitimacy Conundrum in the International Law of State Formation

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The Normative Force of the Factual

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 130))

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Abstract

According to the traditional textbook account, the coming into existence of States is a fact, depending on the realization of effective government over territory and people (so-called three-elements doctrine). Against this background, the present contribution argues that while the formation of States is a predominately fact-based phenomenon, it is not limited to a mere test of effectiveness. The formation of States has always incorporated elements of legitimacy and even more so by virtue of the development of international law in the wake of World War II. Issues of legitimacy become relevant in particular in extreme situations, i.e. in the event that the foundational principles of the contemporary international legal order as manifested in the concept of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) are at stake.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See in particular Jellinek (1900), p. 245: “Das Völkerrecht knüpft daher an das Faktum der staatlichen Existenz an, vermag dieses Faktum aber nicht zu schaffen.” (“Thus, international law ties in to the fact of existence of States, but cannot create this fact.”; translation ATM).

  2. 2.

    As regard the so-called “three-elements doctrine” see Jellinek (1900), p. 355 ff and the following chapter.

  3. 3.

    See only recently Tomuschat (2017), p. 309 ff.

  4. 4.

    See e.g. von Arnauld (2016), p. 27, expressly referring to “the tension between effectiveness and legitimacy” (translation ATM) in this regard; see in a similar vein Shaw (2008), p. 198.

  5. 5.

    See supra note 1; see also Jellinek (1900), p. 246: “Der Zeugungsakt selbst aber liegt gänzlich ausserhalb des Rechts.” (“The act of procreation [of States] completely lies outside the law.” translation ATM).

  6. 6.

    Jellinek (1900), p. 354 ff; see also Oppenheim (1955), p. 118; Verdross and Simma (1984), pp. 223–225. See also Arbitration Committee attached to the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, 3 European Journal of International Law (1992) 182; Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, September 2009, Vol. II, 127.

  7. 7.

    Jellinek (1900), p. 250.

  8. 8.

    Jellinek (1900), pp. 243–244.

  9. 9.

    See the useful account in Crawford (2007), p. 13 ff.

  10. 10.

    Oppenheim (1955), p. 544.

  11. 11.

    See the useful references in Crawford (2007), p. 4; Taki (2013), para. 6. See, for instance, also the statement of the then Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, Security Council Official Records, 340th meeting, 27 July 1948, 29–30: “[T]he existence of a State is a question of fact and not of law. The criterion of statehood is not legitimacy but effectiveness […].” See also more recently Arbitration Committee attached to the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, 3 European Journal of International Law (1992) 182: “the existence or disappearance of the state is a question of fact”.

  12. 12.

    See in this regard Crawford (2007), p. 5, 97.

  13. 13.

    See notably Jellinek (1900), p. 304.

  14. 14.

    Jellinek (1900), p. 307.

  15. 15.

    Grant (1999), p. 408; Crawford (2007), p. 37, 40.

  16. 16.

    Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19.

  17. 17.

    According to Grant (1999), pp. 413, 315 it is “[t]he source most often cited”, with further references; see also Crawford (2007), p. 45: “best known formulation of the basic criteria for statehood”.

  18. 18.

    Grant (1999), p. 456.

  19. 19.

    Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1949, Report to the General Assembly, 289.

  20. 20.

    Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. 1, 2nd session, 22 June 1950, 84.

  21. 21.

    Verdross and Simma (1984), p. 229.

  22. 22.

    See in particular infra Sect. 4 regarding the case of Somaliland.

  23. 23.

    The Arabic word dawlah which is used by ISIL as self-denomination can be translated as State although it carries various connotations beyond the modern “Western” concept of State.

  24. 24.

    See notably Security Resolution 2368 (2017), referring to ISIS as “a splinter group of Al-Qaida” and, more generally, as a terrorist group; as regards the latter see already Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015).

  25. 25.

    See supra note 16.

  26. 26.

    Crawford (2007), pp. 45–46.

  27. 27.

    Grant (1999), p. 435; Crawford (2007), pp. 61–62.

  28. 28.

    Crawford (2007), p. 58; see in a similar vein Grant (1999), p. 440.

  29. 29.

    For instance Cyprus or Spain, arguably particularly due to the separatist tendencies faced by these States.

  30. 30.

    Grant (1999), p. 435.

  31. 31.

    Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, 403 (hereinafter: Kosovo Advisory Opinion).

  32. 32.

    “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

  33. 33.

    Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 80.

  34. 34.

    Security Council Resolution 216 (1965), 217 (1965).

  35. 35.

    Security Council Resolution 541 (1983).

  36. 36.

    Security Council Resolution 787 (1992).

  37. 37.

    According to the ICJ, Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) did not have the effect of making the Kosovar declaration of independence illegal; see Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81: “In the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position.”

  38. 38.

    Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81.

  39. 39.

    See infra Sect. 3.2.

  40. 40.

    See Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81: “egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character” (emphasis added).

  41. 41.

    Jellinek (1900), p. 245.

  42. 42.

    See text preceding note 12.

  43. 43.

    See Grant (1999), pp. 441–442.

  44. 44.

    Schmalenbach (2018), p. 966.

  45. 45.

    Schmalenbach (2018), p. 996.

  46. 46.

    Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as annexed to General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.

  47. 47.

    See in a similar vein Grant (1999), pp. 411, 441, 450; Crawford (2007), pp. 46, 98, 102, 105, 107; Taki (2013), para. 10, with further references; see also Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, September 2009, Vol. II, 128, qualifying certain “criteria of legitimacy” as an “additional standard for the qualification of an entity as a state”. See in general regarding the rise of legitimacy reasoning after World War II Franck (1990).

  48. 48.

    See supra notes 34–36.

  49. 49.

    Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), preamb. para. 3.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., op. para. 2.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., op. para. 7. Subsequently, Security Council Resolution 550 (1984) condemned the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Turkey (which is still the only State to have done so).

  52. 52.

    Crawford (2007), p. 158.

  53. 53.

    Grant (2014), paras. 8 ff.

  54. 54.

    “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” See further, elaborating upon this basis, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), the so-called Friendly Relations Declaration (“No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.”) as well as General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974): “No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.”

  55. 55.

    Even though it may also be explained in the traditional sense by referring to the lack of genuine governmental power of the Northern Cypriot authorities as they widely act under the orders of the government in Ankara, notably in the light of the significant military presence of Turkey in Northern Cyprus; see in this regard ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 77.

  56. 56.

    Security Council Resolution 787 (1992), op. para. 2.

  57. 57.

    Security Council Resolution 662 (1990), op. paras. 1 and 2.

  58. 58.

    See supra text following note 30 regarding the “law of inertia” in international law.

  59. 59.

    See also the example of the Baltic States which were conquered by the Soviet Union in 1940, but were considered to continue to exist as sovereign States until they could regain their independence half a century later.

  60. 60.

    See supra Sect. 3.2.

  61. 61.

    See Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 80. Also Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) did not contain any obligations for individuals even though the ICJ accepted that the Security Council could have created such obligations; see further Schroeder and Müller (2011), pp. 374–376.

  62. 62.

    Security Council Resolution 216 (1965); Security Council Resolution 217 (1965), op. paras. 3 and 6.

  63. 63.

    Grant (1999), p. 411.

  64. 64.

    Crawford (2007), pp. 98, 148.

  65. 65.

    See for the opposite view, Crawford (2007), p. 148: “there is so far in modern practice no suggestion that as regards statehood itself, there exists any criterion requiring regard for fundamental human rights”; see ibid., 155: “this has not matured into a peremptory norm disqualifying an entity from statehood even in the cases of widespread violations of human rights”.

  66. 66.

    See supra Sect. 2.

  67. 67.

    Grant (1999), pp. 442–445; see further Orakhelashvili (2006), pp. 50–66.

  68. 68.

    See supra Sect. 3.2; see in general also Lauterpacht (1947), and Talmon (2006).

  69. 69.

    See in this context notably Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16, para. 119; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, para. 159.

  70. 70.

    See supra notes 34–36 as well as 57.

  71. 71.

    East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski, paras. 129–130.

  72. 72.

    See, for instance, Oppenheim (1955), p. 128.

  73. 73.

    Crawford (2007), p. 45.

  74. 74.

    See, for instance, Crawford (2007), p. 19 ff.

  75. 75.

    Adopted at an Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting on 16 December 1991, available in 4 European Journal of International Law (1993) 72; see also reflection of this in work of Arbitration Committee attached to the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia (the so-called Badinter Commission).

  76. 76.

    After all, according to Article 4(1) of the UN Charter, UN membership is exclusively open to States. In practice, what counts even more is the requirement under Article 4(2) of the UN Charter that admission will be effected by majority decision of the General Assembly “upon the recommendation of the Security Council”, which guarantees that the State quality of the candidate to membership must have the blessing of at least the five permanent members of the Security Council which could otherwise veto the recommendation resolution; see Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, 4, 10; see further Hillgruber (1998).

  77. 77.

    Fastenrath (2012), p. 348.

  78. 78.

    See, for instance, the well-balanced discussion in Grant (1999), pp. 440–445.

  79. 79.

    See supra text following note 30.

  80. 80.

    See Taki (2013), para. 13.

  81. 81.

    Jellinek (1900), p. 244; but see also the continuing criticism and doubt whether conformity with international legal rules should be considered a prerequisite to statehood; Grant (1999), p. 442, with further references.

  82. 82.

    See also Crawford (2007), pp. 98–99.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of European Law and Public International Law, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Andreas Th. Müller

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  1. Thémis Institute, Genève, Switzerland

    Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac

  2. Institute of Public Law and Political Science, University of Graz, Graz, Austria

    Christoph Bezemek

  3. School of Law, University of Virgina, Virgina, VA, USA

    Frederick Schauer

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Müller, A.T. (2019). The Effectiveness-Legitimacy Conundrum in the International Law of State Formation. In: Bersier Ladavac, N., Bezemek, C., Schauer, F. (eds) The Normative Force of the Factual. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18929-7_6

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