Abstract
The Standard Model of elementary particle physics is one of the best theories that we currently have and thereby invites realist engagement. Adopting a realist stance towards it involves careful consideration of the nature of the symmetries that it incorporates. Here I begin with such a consideration and argue that it leads us to a form of structural realism that, following Cassirer might be called ‘Parmenidean’. I conclude with some thoughts on how this meshes with ‘local’ forms of realism.
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French, S. (2019). Structural Realism and the Standard Model. In: Cordero, A. (eds) Philosophers Look at Quantum Mechanics. Synthese Library, vol 406. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15659-6_11
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