Abstract
In this paper, I present, first, a syncretistic account of existence, which tries to show not only that the first-order and the second-order notions of existence are compatible, but also why we need all of them in order to properly understand what existence all in all amounts to. Second, I discuss to what extent Marty’s account of existence, which inter alia mobilizes Brentano’s attitudinal approach to it, can be legitimately considered to be a syncretistic account as well.
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Voltolini, A. (2019). A Syncretistic View of Existence and Marty’s Relation to It. In: Bacigalupo, G., Leblanc, H. (eds) Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05581-3_8
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