Abstract
In the paper I argue for the multilayeredness of anticipation. After presenting what multilayeredness is and how it may be understood, I analyse three main axes of multilayeredness of anticipation. These are short- versus long-term perspective, then existence versus non-existence, and, finally, first- versus second-order anticipation. The three axes concern, respectively, lifetime, existence understood as extending beyond the death of an individual and awareness of anticipation. They involve the tension between, respectively, short-distanced and long-distanced futures, the inward and the outward and anticipating and meta-anticipating. I conclude that these characteristics may be accepted as formal criteria for distinguishing the different ways in which anticipation may be viewed.
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Notes
- 1.
For more see, e.g. Poli (2001, 263, 267 & 276): The ease with which the immediately subsequent reductionist approach dismantled the tenets of the emergent evolution movement highlights the intrinsic shortcomings and the superficial generalizations of many of its theses [...] The theme of the levels of reality can also be used as an acid test to select structurally defaulting ontologies [...] The ontological poverty of contemporary philosophy and science is evidenced by the constant shuttling by many authors among problems which belong to different theoretical domains (i.e., theories of particulars, of wholes, of levels), etc. See also S. N. Salthe (2009, 96): This hierarchical model can be seen to be non-reductionist because individuals at the different levels are different in kind. For examples, molecules cannot run, and animals cannot get oxidized. But running can be reduced to oxidation because oxidation could support any kind of macroscopic activity made available at a higher level. [...] New semantics are required to describe new levels of reality.
- 2.
See Poli (2001, 268): In other words, applying the categories of one realm to the items of another realm may give rise to a categorial error, to a metabasis eis allo genos.
- 3.
See Plato (1967, 331d–e, transl. W. R. M. Lamb): Well, at any rate, he said, justice has some resemblance to holiness; for anything in the world has some sort of resemblance to any other thing. Thus there is a point in which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so with all the other things which are regarded as most opposed to each other; and the things which we spoke of before as having different faculties and not being of the same kind as each other - the parts of the face - these in some sense resemble one another and are of like sort. In this way therefore you could prove, if you chose, that even these things are all like one another. But it is not fair to describe things as like which have some point alike, however small, or ash unlike that have some point unlike.
- 4.
See N. Hartmann (1953, 76): The recurrence of lower categories never determines the character of the higher stratum. This character always rests on the emergence of a categorial novelty which is independent of the recurrent categories and consists in the appearance of new categories. The modification of the recurring elements is contingent upon the emergence of novelty.
- 5.
A group of feelings or emotions is what is constituted by several feelings or emotions sharing the same modus of affectivity or, to put it otherwise, that have the same kind of formal object, e.g. group of sorrow(s), group of desire(s), group of fear(s), etc.
- 6.
Page numbers correspond to the online version (https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/2732482.pdf, retrieved Feb. 28, 2017).
- 7.
This is why this is an exaggeration to say that [h]ierarchical classification is a new approach to emotional analysis (Ghazi, Inkpen and Szpakowicz 2010, 141). However, what these authors say confirm what Poli (2001, 261) claims, i.e. that on the rare occasions when an author has alluded to the problem of the levels, by far the most prevalent standpoint has been that of levels of interpretation, not of reality.
- 8.
See also, more recently, Ben–Ze’ev (2010, 41) who observed that [e]motions [...] involve all types of mental entities and states that belong to various ontological levels [sic!]. Yet, he didn’t develop his claim.
- 9.
This is not a prevailing interpretation. See R. Zaborowski (2012). See also Salthe (2009, 88), who, however, relies on his own work Development and evolution: complexity and change in biology (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1993), which, in turn, relies on a chapter from an unpublished thesis by J. van der Meer, Beginnings of the hierarchical view of the world (1989).
- 10.
And also Plotinus who offers an even more explicit model.
- 11.
See Salthe 2009.
- 12.
For a distinction between (purely) bodily and (purely) intellectual kind of pleasure/joy, see Plato (1900–1907), Protagoras 337c: (εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι (Plato (1967), transl. W. R. M. Lamb: [...] for he is comforted who learns something and gets a share of good sense in his mind alone , whereas he is pleased who eats something or has some other pleasant sensation only in his body.) The distinction is reported by Plato as made by Prodicus.
- 13.
A personal communication from T. Kobierzycki (on several occasions in 1987–2016). In K. Dąbrowski (1996, 174–176), the test is presented otherwise. However, T. Kobierzycki provided me in May 2017 with a typewritten Kwestionariusz do Autobiografii [Questionnaire to Autobiography] = Dąbrowski (n.d.), in which the question No 29 reads thus: Who you will be in your imagination in three years, in 15 years, in 20 years?
- 14.
Roberto Poli informed me – I thank him for that - about a study which may further support Dąbrowski’s ideas: Quoidbach, Gilbert and Wilson (2013). What is interesting is that they observed (96) that the older the participants were, the less personality change they reported or predicted (see also 97, the older participants were, the less change in their core values they reported or predicted, and again (98), The older the participants were, the less change in preferences they reported or predicted.) This is, the authors say, consistent with a large body of research showing that personality becomes more stable as people age. I think however that in the light of anticipation, another interpretation may be offered: this is so because the older people are, the more realistic their anticipating is, and the more realistic their anticipating is, less changes are envisaged.
- 15.
This is different to comparing two types of lives one might live. See Sobel (2016, 57–63).
- 16.
But even then they are qualitatively as distinct as contingency and essence.
- 17.
Transl. A. T. Murray. Homer (1924, IX, 410–416):
μήτηρ γάρ τέ μέ φησι θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα
διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλος δέ.
εἰ μέν κ᾽ αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι,
ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται:
εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ᾽ ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν
ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ᾽ ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.
- 18.
One may think about the explanation Plato (1900–1907) gives in the Symposium. First he mentions (180a) Achilles’ eagerness to join Patroclus and then (208d-e) his desire for immortality (ἐπαποθανεῖν). Immortality is now understood not biologically. It is not a question of prolonging the human genus by procreation but a question of Achilles’ individual existence immortalized by means of the fame that he will enjoy. R. G. Bury (1909, ad loc.) comments 208d thus: An obvious allusion to 180 A ff.: Diotima corrects Phaedrus by showing the motive for self-sacrifice to be not so much personal ἔρως as ἔρως for immortal fame. I think there may be no conflict between self-sacrifice and desire for immortal fame, for they may be two hardly dissociable reasons of Achilles’ anticipation: his ἔρως is as strong as to make him immortal and, on the other hand, it is his personal ἔρως which is the reason for his act.
- 19.
M. Proust (1931, 257, transl. S. Hudson = M. Proust (1989, 483): À ce premier point de vue, l’œuvre doit être considérée seulement comme un amour malheureux qui en présage fatalement d’autres et qui fera que la vie ressemblera à l’œuvre, que le poète n’aura presque plus besoin d’écrire, tant il pourra trouver dans ce qu’il a écrit la figure anticipée de ce qui arrivera. Ainsi mon amour pour Albertine, et tel qu’il en différa, était déjà inscrit dans mon amour pour Gilberte, au milieu des jours heureux duquel j’avais entendu pour la première fois prononcer le nom et faire le portrait d’Albertine par sa tante, sans me douter que ce germe insignifiant se développerait et s’étendrait un jour sur toute ma vie.)
- 20.
Transl. H. Rackham. Aristotle (1934, 1105a–b): ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας: εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. [...] τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ᾽ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι᾽ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. [...] εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων [...].
- 21.
Transl. H. Rackham. Aristotle (1934, 1114a): ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως [...] αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν: διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.
- 22.
See Aristotle (1934, 1105b): [...] πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει [...] (transl. H. Rackham: [...] but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail [...]).
- 23.
Compare Plato (1955, 133b): Then if an eye is to see itself , it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight. (transl. W. R. M. Lamb).
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Zaborowski, R. (2019). Multilayeredness of Anticipation. In: Poli, R., Valerio, M. (eds) Anticipation, Agency and Complexity. Anticipation Science, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03623-2_3
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