Abstract
Foundationalism is now widely held in epistemology. In some version or other, it has been presupposed by many philosophers, including some who would not describe their view using the term ‘foundationalism’ or any equivalent. The view was set forth in some detail by Aristotle, with his version of the epistemic regress argument presented in Posterior Analytics 72b (and, what is less widely recognized, in Book One of Nicomachaen Ethics as applied to motivation). My Architecture of Reason (2001) discusses these matters in detail). Since at least the late 1970s, I have argued that epistemological foundationalism can be moderate in not requiring foundational beliefs to be infallible or even indefeasibly justified. For Müller and Seidel, at least, it appears that further clarification is needed.
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Audi, R. (2018). The Role of Fallibility and Defeasibility in Moderate Foundationalism. In: Müller-Salo, J. (eds) Robert Audi: Critical Engagements. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00482-8_9
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