Abstract
This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s (1248–1298) conception of the role of dispositions (habitus) in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology.
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Notes
- 1.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 50 appendix, ad 3 (ed. Jansen, 2: 54): “Constat autem quod praeter essentiam potentiarum substantialium animae exiguntur speciales habitus et dispositiones et actuales aspectus seu conversiones ad obiecta ad hoc quod expedite et perfecte exeant in suas actiones.” When referring to Olivi, I shall use the original title of the work, Summa quaestionum super Sententias. Jansen has edited the second book of this work in Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, and questions from books 3 and 4 have appeared in print as Quaestiones de incarnatione et redemptione (ed. Emmen and Stadter) and Quaestiones de novissimis (ed. Maranesi). On the concept of aspectus, see Toivanen (2013a, 151–160). For Olivi’s biography and an overview of his thought, see Boureau and Piron (1999) , Burr (1976) , Piron (2010 ).
- 2.
- 3.
From this point on, I shall translate the term habitus as “disposition” or simply leave the term untranslated, especially when I discuss the relation between habitus and dispositio.
- 4.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to address the role of dispositions of the will and intellect in this connection. Those who are interested should consult Yrjönsuuri (2002) and Faucher’s article in the present volume, p. 115–120.
- 5.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, qq. 81–82 (ed. Jansen, 3: 175): “[…] habitus seu habituales inclinationes et dispositiones.”
- 6.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 467): “Praeterea, in virtutibus activis non exigitur ad aliud dispositio nisi ad coaptandum eas ad agendum debite et expedite, unde et sine habitu aliquid agunt et agere possunt, etsi non ita perfecte.” Ibid. (ed. Jansen, 2: 398): “Item, habitus voluntatis disponunt ipsam et determinant ad agendum potius quam ad patiendum; ergo videtur quod sunt dispositiones et determinationes eius. […] Quando autem dicitur quod habitus sunt quaedam formae activae, sicut in minori praedicti argumenti tangebatur, tunc secundum istos nomine habitus significatur ipsa potentia ut sic disposita et habituata; alias secundum eos non debent dici principia effectiva sed solum dispositiones principiorum effectivorum.” Olivi’s point is that a habitus can be called an efficient principle of acts only if it refers to the power, which is disposed in a certain way. Properly speaking, it is not an efficient principle.
- 7.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 50, art. 3 ad 2. On Aquinas’ general conception of habitus, see Darge’s and Löwe’s articles in the present volume, p. 143–165 and p. 167–184.
- 8.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 16 (ed. Jansen, 1: 346): “Praeterea, virtutes et habitus consuetudinales, sive boni sive mali, per frequentes actus et applicationes potentiarum magis et magis educuntur in esse et crescunt.” See also ibid., q. 31 (ed. Jansen, 1: 524): “virtus consuetudinalis”; ibid., q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 515–516): “virtutes consuetudinales et multas alias affectiones habituales”; Summa III, q. 2 (ed. Emmen, 107–108): “vitiositas consuetudinalis”; ibid., qq. 8–9, (ed. Stadter, 330) : “consuetudo fidei.” Occasionally Olivi uses assuefactio, apparently as a synonym for habituation. See, e.g., Summa II, q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 431–432).
- 9.
Summa II, q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 485): “[H]abitus dicunt dispositionem potentiae in ordine ad actum.” See also ibid., q. 58 (2: 398, 424–432, 467); q. 64 (2: 604–605; quoted in note 44 below); q. 72, ad 3 (3: 41): “Potentia enim activa saepe ex parte sua eget debito habitu et debito aspectu et, si est organica, eget debita dispositione organi”; q. 74 (3: 119; quoted in note 21 below); q. 74 (3: 126–127, 132); q. 105 (3: 250): “[…] aliquem habitum virtutis vel aliquam partem eius aut aliquam habilitatem seu habitualem dispositionem ad bonum.” Summa III, q. 1 (ed. Emmen, 47): “[…] quae insistentia non est proprie habitus eo modo, quo habitum vocamus dispositionem potentiae ad actum.”
- 10.
Matter is disposed by the forms it has, and the disposition of matter enables it to receive further forms or certain kinds of acts; see, e.g., Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 16 (ed. Jansen, 1: 315, 336, 339); q. 22 (1: 399–401); q. 49 (2: 15); q. 54 (2: 270); q. 57 (2: 364); q. 61 (2: 547–585); q. 72 (3: 12–13, 31, 41); q. 74 (3: 113–114). For instance, the body is disposed to receive the soul and air is disposed to receive the form of light, etc. The background is, naturally, Olivi’s acceptance of the plurality of substantial forms. A clear case of this kind of usage is at Summa II, q. 111 (ed. Jansen, 3: 279): “Licet autem habitus animae vitiosi sint quoad quid nobiliores quam prava dispositio corporis a qua causantur.”
- 11.
- 12.
This is pointed out by Pasnau (2011).
- 13.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 432–433).
- 14.
There is some uncertainty as to what Olivi’s final position is because he proposes slightly divergent views in different places. The bulk of the evidence suggests that habitus belongs primarily to the form, but it is necessarily actualized in the matter. See Summa II, q. 51 (ed. Jansen, 2: 113); q. 72 (3: 41, 45–46); cf. 58 (2: 432–433). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 50, art. 4.
- 15.
- 16.
See Thomas Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 49, art. 4; q. 50, art. 3, esp. ad 3; and q. 51, art. 1.
- 17.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 432). Olivi uses this example as an illustration of the manner in which repeated use of the will brings about a habitus in the spiritual matter of the will.
- 18.
- 19.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 127); q. 58 (2: 429, 432–433).
- 20.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 128). The two kinds of dispositions in this illustration correspond to types A and B as discussed below.
- 21.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 119): “Habitus sunt quaedam principia effectiva suorum actuum, id est, sunt formales dispositiones potentiae per quas fit potens vel potentior ad talem actum efficiendum.” Olivi is not aiming to give a full definition, but to distinguish dispositions from memory species. In other places, he characterizes dispositions as follows: “Nullus habitus intellectus vel voluntatis dicit per se rationem principalis potentiae activae, sed solum aliquam dispositionem ipsius, determinantem ipsam ad speciale obiectum et ad specialem modum agendi” (ibid., ed. Jansen, 3: 127); “Et sic species actus non datur ab aliquo habitu, immo potentia est semper principale agens; habitus vero cooperatur ei non proprie per modum agentis instrumentalis, sed per modum formalis dispositionis potentiae agentis” (ibid., ed. Jansen, 3: 132).
- 22.
See Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 51 appendix (ed. Jansen, 2: 165); q. 16 (1: 346); q. 58 (2: 467); q. 74 (3: 117, 130); and q. 22 (1: 390, 407–408).
- 23.
It is interesting that Olivi presents many of his ideas in order to refute other (unnamed) philosophers, who held contrary views, which shows that even though his view may be typical in many respects, it was not universally accepted. He is taking part in ongoing debates concerning the nature of dispositions.
- 24.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 114): “Et forte in omnibus [potentiis cognitivis] exigitur aliqua accidentalis claritas seu vivacitas. Quae non solum in diversis personis est maior et minor, sed etiam pro diversis temporibus in eadem. Hanc autem claritatem in intellectu vocamus ingeniositatem docibilem et acutam seu perspicaciam promptam ad multa et alta faciliter addiscenda vel investiganda. Et hoc est unum genus habitus potentiarum cognitivarum. Respectu etiam quorundam actuum vel modorum agendi exigunt potentiae interiores, et specialiter superiores, aliquos alios habitus determinantes potentiam ad habituales assensus vel dissensus, qui aliquando sunt scitivi, aliquando vero creditivi seu opinativi.” Elsewhere in the same question (3: 131–132), the expression modus agendi is used.
- 25.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 118).
- 26.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 117–118): “[A]liqua habitualis claritas seu aliquod habituale acumen exigatur ad actum cognitivum, probatur. Primo, ex hoc quod non solum quidam habent visum vel auditum vel intellectum acutiorem et promptiorem ad sua obiecta citius et clarius de novo percipienda quam alii, immo idem homo pro temporibus diversis hoc habet. […] Aliquando exigatur alter habitus a praedicto, patet ex habitu fidei, sine quo nullus potest virtuose et salutifere credere illa, quae sunt nobis secundum Deum credenda. Habitus vero scientiae vel opinionis vel aestimationis per nostros actus aggeneratus non necesario praeexigitur ad actum sciendi vel opinandi. […] Quod autem isti habitus et consimiles differant a primo genere habituum patet. Primo, ex hoc, quia isti habitus dicunt habitualem assensum vel dissensum habitualiter affirmantem vel negantem sua obiecta, praedicta vero claritas vel acumen nihil tale dicit.”
- 27.
The list here is not exhaustive. In addition to faith, knowledge, opinion, and estimation, Olivi mentions at least habitus erroneus/errorum, habitus dubitativus, habitualis credulitas, and of course virtue and vice; see Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 130–131); q. 40 (1: 686–687); Summa III (passim).
- 28.
It should be noted that faith is singled out as a special case because it is the only B-disposition that one must have before being able to act accordingly. In the case of knowledge, opinion, and estimation, the acts come first and the dispositions are generated by the acts. See also Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 130).
- 29.
Olivi points out in Summa II, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 118–119) that dispositions affect the way we consider the objects of our thoughts. A Jew and a Christian both may think of Jesus, but only the latter thinks of him as Christ, and the difference is due to the disposition of Christian faith, which is present in the latter but not in the former: “[…] nam Iudaeus credens Iesum non esse Deum nec de Virgine natum ita habet memoriales species horum terminorum sicut habet Christianus hoc credens.”
- 30.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 36 (ed. Jansen, 1: 651): “[N]otitia terminorum differat realiter a praedicto assensu […] quia saepe sciuntur huiusmodi termini absque hoc quod sciamus vel credamus affirmativam vel negativam compositionem ipsorum, sicut patet de eo qui scit quid est mulier et quid virgo et quid parere, et tamen nondum scit vel credit mulierem virginem peperisse. Secundo, quia de eisdem terminis nobis notis possumus nunc unam scientiam vel opinionem habere, nunc vero contrariam, et nunc veram, nunc erroneam, nunc probabilem, nunc improbabilem, et hoc per successionem temporum potest sic in infinitum variari.”
- 31.
See also Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 74, ad 1 (ed. Jansen, 3: 131).
- 32.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 36 (ed. Jansen, 1: 650–651): “Item, quantum in nobis experimur, scientialis aut creditivus vel opinativus habitus in nobis sunt idem quod habitualis affirmatio vel negatio seu habitualis assensus vel dissensus intellectus de veritate vel falsitate obiectorum suorum, nisi per nomen habitus intelligas habituale acumen ingenii perspicacis vel oppositum eius, scilicet habitualem tarditatem et hebetudinem ingenii rudis et grossi. Habitualis autem assensus, quando est scitivus, dicitur habitus scientiae; quando autem est creditivus vel opinativus, dicitur habitualis credulitas vel opinio.”
- 33.
See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 50, art. 3.
- 34.
Aquinas acknowledges the possibility that the internal senses of human beings can be habituated, but he explicitly denies that the external senses can; see ST I–II, q. 50, art. 3, ad 3. Olivi uses seeing and hearing as examples of powers that can be affected by dispositions of type A; see note 26 above.
- 35.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 111 (ed. Jansen, 3: 272–273): “Circa primum ergo sciendum quod sensitivae potentiae animae recipiuntur et existunt in partibus corporis sicut in propria materia et, ut ita dicam, sicut in proprio vase, ita quod in illis et cum illis inclinantur et diriguntur ad sua obiecta et ad suos actus quos utique habent intra ipsas. Et ideo habitus et aspectus et actus potentiarum sensitivarum sunt in certis partibus corporis sicut in propria materia potentiarum quarum sunt. Hoc autem facile est videre in sensibus particularibus.”
- 36.
See note 24 above. It is clear that the expression potentiae interiores refers to the internal sense, because it is contrasted with external senses on the one hand, and intellectual powers (potentiae superiores) on the other.
- 37.
As Hartman points out in his article below, certain fourteenth century authors claimed that habitus that make intellectual thinking easier must be located in the sensory powers of the soul. See p. 235–239.
- 38.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 78, art. 4; Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 13. See also Di Martino (2008, 85–101).
- 39.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 64, (ed. Jansen, 2: 603): “[…] sint una et eadem potentia, sic tamen quod eius habitus aestimativi […] differunt a potentia illa, sicut habitus actualis differt a potentia cuius est.”
- 40.
- 41.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 64 (ed. Jansen, 2: 604–605); q. 58 (2: 509–510).
- 42.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 63 (ed. Jansen, 2: 601): “Quando etiam canis per doctrinam et assuessionem acquirit aliquos habitus in suo sensu communi et appetitu, ita quod habitualiter amat et aestimat multa quae prius non amabat vel odiebat nec noverat: tunc utique habitualis amicitia et prudentia eius potentiis et organis acquiritur differens a suis actibus qui cito recipiuntur et transeunt”; see also q. 66 (2: 610). Ibid., q. 64 (2: 603): “Quod dico, quia tam in homine quam in brutis sunt multae habituales aestimationes tam a consuetudine quam a natura genitae et inditae.” Olivi’s idea that dispositions (habitus) may be innate and thus completely natural goes against Aquinas (see ST I–II, q. 51, art. 1).
- 43.
- 44.
One way to put this is to say that the perceptual contents of the cognitive acts of the sheep and the bear are similar but differ when it comes to the estimative element. This means, of course, that the cognitive experience of these two animals is different because the estimative element is part of it.
- 45.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 64 (ed. Jansen, 2: 604): “[A]estimativa nihil addit supra sensum communem et imaginativam nisi solum quasdam habituales aestimationes vel quasdam dispositiones determinantes aut inclinantes ad sic vel sic aestimandum.”
- 46.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 64 (ed. Jansen, 2: 605): “Si vero contra quaedam praedictorum obicias quod sensus communis non est susceptivus alicuius habitus vel habitualis dispositionis: contra hoc est primo Augustinus, VI Musicae, dicens et experimentis probans quod aliqui ex frequenti usu probandi et gustandi vina acquirunt maiorem peritiam faciliter iudicandi bonitatem vel malitiam vinorum ac melioritatem et peioritatem eorum. Et consimiliter dicit quod ex usu cantandi et cantus varios audiendi non solum in sensu communi sed etiam in sensu auditus gignitur et augetur aliqua affectio et discretio ad concordantias vocum subtilius et facilius discernendas.” See also Summa IV, q. 7 (ed. Maranesi, 159). Olivi is not completely consistent when it comes to the seat of the dispositions which allow us to, say, better judge the quality of wines. In Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 632) he says that such dispositions belong to the sense of taste.
- 47.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 64 (ed. Jansen, 2: 605): “Praeterea, nunquid acumen sensualis iudicii in suis obiectis acutius et facilius iudicandis iuvatur per frequens exercitium? Certe pueri, quando didicerunt litteras et ex litteris syllabas et dictiones componere et legere psalmos, habent sensualem habitum cito diiudicandi et discernendi quaeque legenda, ita quod quosdam dicimus in hoc tardos et duros, quosdam vero acutos et promptos.” When children learn to read, they learn to recognize a certain arrangement of lines as a letter. This change in their perception is caused by an acquired habitus , which is possible to understand as similar to B-dispositions. See Toivanen (2013b, 333–335) for discussion.
- 48.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 432).
- 49.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 635–636): “Videtur ergo quod quilibet sensus duas potentias comprehendat, unam scilicet apprehensivam et aliam appetitivam.” See also q. 54, 277. Olivi’s position is dynamic: the dispositional state of the appetitive powers of the senses changes from time to time. For a more detailed discussion, see Toivanen (2011, 428–438).
- 50.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 632): “[E]x visu vel apprehensione eiusdem proprii et formalis obiecti aliquando delectamur, aliquando contristamur; unde aliquando in gustu vini vel mellis eiusdem saporis delectamur et aliquando sic contristamur quod illud tanquam abominabile reicimus et evomimus.” See also ibid., q. 64 (2: 605); Summa IV, q. 7 (ed. Maranesi, 159).
- 51.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 633): “Quia obiectum non sentitur esse conveniens ex hoc solo quod absolute sentitur et discernitur eius essentia et natura absolute sumpta, sed potius ex hoc quod sentitur concordare et conformari alicui affectioni suae. Quod probatur: quia eadem natura obiecti aliquando sentitur ut conveniens, aliquando vero ut disconveniens, aliquando vero ut indifferens, et hoc nulla variatione facta ex parte ipsius nec ex parte cognitionis eius, in quantum cognitio, sed solum ex parte affectionis et modi afficiendi. […] Gustus etiam noster, quando tangit vel rodit paleam mundam, sentit eam ut sibi indifferentem, gustus vero bovis ut sibi delectabilem, et aliud animal naturaliter horrens eam sentit eam ut sibi horribilem; et tamen absoluta natura sui saporis est apud omnes gustus eadem.” See also ibid., q. 54 (2: 277–278) and Summa IV, q. 7 (ed. Maranesi, 160–161).
- 52.
See, e.g., Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 635).
- 53.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 632): “Nullus sensus in obiecto delectatur, nisi prius habeat quandam affectionem proportionalem ad illud. Quae quidem affectio secundum eum [sc. Augustinum] ibidem [VI Musicae] per frequens exercitium augetur et per contrarium usum minuitur et aliquando eius contraria gignitur, et dat exemplum in auditu cui aliqui modi cantuum placent qui prius non placebant, dicitque quod, nisi numerosam proportionem illorum cantuum haberet prius in aliqua affectione sua, non repente demulceretur in auditu illius nec offenderetur in auditu contrarii, et idem dicit de gustu respectu diversorum vinorum.” See also ibid., q. 64 (2: 605); Summa IV, q. 7 (ed. Maranesi, 159).
- 54.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 70 (ed. Jansen, 2: 632–633): “Ergo ista affectio est quiddam habituale alicuius potentiae oppositis modis affectibilis seu contrariarum affectionum susceptibilis.”
- 55.
Peter John Olivi, Summa II, q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 32): “Praedictus etiam habitus vitiosus non est factus ab anima, quia ipsa non causat in se habitus innaturales nisi per aliquam actionem intermediam. […] Item, fit hoc modo habitualis affectio nostri gustus ad hunc vel illum saporem vel cibum ex varia complexione vel corporis dispositione causata. […] Quibusdam etiam secundum variam dispositionem cerebri et auditus habitualiter sapiunt quidam modi cantandi qui aliis propter contrariam dispositionem habitualiter desipiunt, et idem est de odoribus et visibilibus et tangibilibus.”
- 56.
This study was funded by the Academy of Finland and the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond.
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Toivanen, J. (2018). Cognitive Dispositions in the Psychology of Peter John Olivi. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_10
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