Abstract
This entry reviews the literature on the economics of organized crime. While the economics of organized crime is a small subfield of economics, it can offer insights in unexpected areas of economics. The field began some 40 years ago with the study of organized crime and its participation in illicit activities such as prostitution and gambling. Over time, the economic analysis of organized crime has expanded to address broader questions of governance in the absence of formal institutions.
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Baker, M.J. (2015). Crime (Organized) and the Law. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_16-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_16-1
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